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This thesis is located between. It is not quite about outdoor environmental education. It 
is not quite about research methodology. And it is not quite about the author’s learning. 
These delineated categories exist on a different plane to the thesis, at least, to what the 
thesis becomes - is becoming. The thesis is thus a haecceity, a certain thisness that is no 
other. This is not meant to be a grand claim to the contribution or originality of the 
thesis. It is a statement about the nature of being that ‘I’ have been moved towards in 
exploring what practice might be in a world that is ‘post’ environment and ‘post’ 
methodology, and where the separation of theory and practice dissolves. 
 
The thesis is constituted of eight haecceities. The starting place is my concern, as 
(becoming) an outdoor education academic, for finding a pedagogy that might help 
mitigate environmental degradation. The search for this pedagogy takes up new 
materialist inclinations and particularly the concept of immanence as described by 
Deleuze and Guattari (2004). This in turn changes the thesis, and leads it to an 
exploration of various post-qualitative informed ‘fuzzinesses’ of research methodology; 
where methodology becomes a pedagogy and the notion of an educational practice that is 
separate from my life, a life, is troubled. From here, the thesis takes up an increasingly 
‘post’ autoethnographic lilt to explore becoming a post environmental education 
academic. This exploration is carried by writing, and collaborative writing, as forms of 
inquiry by which various stories are told; stories in which the boundaries between 
environments, theory, practice, learning, and research become unclear. 
 
Throughout the thesis various concepts are created to help explore these tensions. These 
include the concept of the haecceitical self as the occurring process of, rather than a self 
being connected or in relation to something; the concept of becoming alien, as an 
attempt at unhumaning ourselves. i.e. to raise awareness of our belonging to something 
else, rather than the stable and quiddital (whatness) of the concept of the human; and 
lastly the concept of environing education. Environing education is difficult to define, 
but it is at the least the process of learning to live more ethically in response to the 
contradiction of caring about environmental degradation, whilst at the same time 
questioning the category of the environmental. The concepts are not monolithic and not 
necessarily transposable to other situations. Rather they live in their use within the 
thesis. 
 
Whilst the thesis originates from a place of trying to advocate for the environment, 
through the process of writing the ‘environment’ becomes troubled as a conceptual 
category, thus troubling the environmental as a category of moral value. Instead, towards 
the close of the thesis, I explore the competing lines of desire that function to produce 
the thesis, in the search for an immanent ethics. This ethics of affect is co-constitutive in 
the writing of the haecceities, to aesthetically explore post human/environment tensions 
of becoming an academic, and acknowledging the personal struggles that this entails. 
The contribution of the thesis lies in its exploration of writing an immanent ethics, given 
the destabilising effects of an immanent ontology on prevailing ethical orientation 
towards transcendent notions of the ‘environment’. In this way, the writing is a form of 
post-ecobiography, whereby the contribution of the thesis is also its affective process, for 






This thesis makes a philosophical contribution to theory and inquiry in 
environmental education by attempting a form of inquiry that at once troubles the 
idea of ‘nature’ and the human ‘self’. The reason for this attempt is to respond to 
recent philosophical turns towards ‘new’ materialisms and the practical philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in educational research, as well as what I see as 
the impact of these theories for prevailing ethical orientations in environmental 
education and my own practice as an educator and researcher. The thesis unfolds 
through eight haecceities rather than chapters. A haecceity is a philosophical concept 
forwarded by Deleuze and Guattari which prioritises the thisness of a thing or event, 
rather than considering a thing as assignable to pregiven delineated sets depending 
on its whatness (quiddity), or identifying characteristics. This move allows a novel 
methodological approach whereby the haecceities act as sites of variation on the 
themes of the thesis. These themes include: the self as unstable and posthuman; the 
environment as everything (immanent) rather than as other, romantic or a green 
version of nature; and the tensions that these moves create for ethical orientations in 
my practice as an outdoor environmental educator and a becoming academic. 
Throughout the thesis various concepts are created to help explore these tensions. 
These include the concept of the haecceitical self as the occurring process of, rather 
than a self being connected or in relation to something; the concept of becoming 
alien, as an attempt at unhumaning ourselves - i.e. to raise awareness of our 
belonging to something else, rather than the sovereign and quiddital (whatness) 
concept of the human; and lastly the concept of environing education. Environing 
education is difficult to define, but it is at the least the process of learning to live 
more ethically in response to the contradiction of caring about environmental 
degradation whilst at the same time questioning the category of the environmental. 
The concepts are not monolithic and not necessarily transposable to other situations. 
Rather they live in their use within the thesis. Towards the close of the thesis I reflect 
on the nature of an immanent ethics for my practice, as well as the teaching that this 
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In the spirit of plateaus, I was tempted to suggest that you need not start here (how 
could you1 start here? You were already there before you arrived. At least, you were 
already something, and many things). I was going to suggest that maybe it would 
make more sense to start at Haecceity 3. There you will find some discussion and 
justification of the (non)methodology of this thesis. Then I thought, maybe it would 
make more sense to start at Haecceity 4. There you can learn something of the 
problems I2 am facing in my field of practice; outdoor and environmental education. 
Perhaps in that haecceity you might find some semblance of a research problem that 
will give everything else a bit more sense as you read on, though I’m not sure I state 
one plainly, and I don’t know about sense. I was also going to suggest that, if neither 
of these things interest you, you might prefer something heavier; to be a fly on the 
wall through a schizoethical episode; a voyeur to a thousand Daves arguing about 
what to do. Haecceity 7 will offer you this. And then I wondered some more about 
                                                 
1 There you are, for the first time. Who are you? Rowland Barthes suggests the two of us 
may not be as simple as we seem, now we are involved in text:  
On the stage of the text, no footlights: there is not, behind the text, someone 
active (the writer) and out front someone passive (the reader); there is not a 
subject and an object. The text supersedes grammatical attitudes: it is the 
undifferentiated eye which an excessive author (Angelus Silesius) describes: 
"The eye by which I see God is the same eye by which He sees me." (Barthes, 
1975, p.16) 
It is not straightforward to say I make demands on a reader (after all, this is a writing-and-
reading, not something written and read. 
2 And here I am. I want you to keep in mind that: 
‘There is no ‘I’ that exists outside of the diffraction pattern, observing it, 
telling its story. In an important sense, this story in its ongoing (re)patterning 
is (re)(con)figuring me. ‘I’ am neither outside nor inside; ‘I’ am of the 
diffraction pattern. Or rather, this ‘I’ that is not ‘me’ alone and never was, that 
is always already multiply dispersed and diffracted throughout 
spacetime(mattering), including in this paper, in its ongoing being-becoming 






you: why are you here? Maybe, just possibly, you’ve read some of my work with my 
colleague Jamie Mcphie. I was going to offer you Haecceity 6 to follow this interest. 
There Jamie and I talk back and forth, not alone but with an island becoming alien. 
And then I thought, ‘maybe you should start at the end!’. Conclusions are useful to 
read if you’re in a hurry, and in all honesty, I can’t claim that you will get more by 
reading the whole thing than you will by jumping to the end. What do I know about 
you, after all? Besides, there’s something transgressive about reading conclusions 
first. However, there are no solid conclusions here, but Haecceity 8 might provide 
you with thoughts about control, power and becoming an academic. Then I thought 
of another suggestion: you might prefer to feel the bracing North Atlantic and swim 
off the west coast of Scotland, or get lost in a book or two, or wander around 
Holyrood Park in Edinburgh. There are students there, and they are thinking with 
place and theory. Haecceity 5 would have been the place to go if you had found these 
options tempting. And then, as another possibility, I thought of Haecceity 2. There I 
struggle with exploring materialist theory and environmental education. 
 
And yet, after all this, I changed again and, although you can jump in when and 
where you like if you prefer, starting from here and following with me as I grow 
through the thesis will offer you a perspective that is a particular thesis. There is a 
thisness of it, as it grows from here as a haecceity. And, in any case, you will see that 






I look down the long brown canal from my canoe. The students are paddling off in 
different directions. J-strokes are practised, brambles crashed into, swans avoided 
and gawked at. I pull my hat over my ears and watch my breath cloud in the cold 
January air. What am I doing here? I’m enjoying myself. And the students seem to be 
too. But, is there something else? I think of origins at this point. I think of ways of 





the blade of my paddle in the water, purposefully making no noise. I watch the shaft 
jolt at an angle in refractive encounter with light and the water and me. I think of 
becoming an ontologist. 
 
This is not autobiography  
But rather a turn in me  
to perform a vibrational artistry,  
to become an ontologist of vibrational force.  
 
(Patricia Clough, 2013, p.69) 
 
Sometimes, when you pull on your paddle just right, the shaft vibrates in resonance 
with the water. You should hold your paddle lightly, but pull it forcefully. It’s a 
balancing act. A tricky technique that is impossible to define or instruct. It’s 
something you feel, and you know when you’ve got it. You just know. Am I trying to 
draw an analogy between sitting in a canoe and getting a paddle stroke right, and the 
skill of writing something not-quite-autobiographical and not-quite-fiction? I don’t 
know. I’m not sure about analogies. I don’t want to draw them, though I probably do. 
I think the resonance you aim for, in canoeing, or anything for that matter, is what 
you aim for in writing as well. They are both physical tasks of the world where you 






But the world gets in the way, and makes you stumble. Or you get in the way. 
Something always gets in the way. I just deleted some writing above. I had 
something else in mind I wanted to write, so I copied the line (cmd+c). I wrote what I 
wanted, and then I went to paste the line (cmd+v). Nothing. The line didn’t appear. 
Something went wrong. Something cropped up and got in the way. I forgot what I 
wanted to write, and I thought of intervention, of intention, instead. But this isn’t the 





intentionality. The thought arose, got thrown up, and then became my thinking. I 
didn’t do it (or anything?) on purpose.  
 
Now it’s several hours later and I can’t recall why I stopped writing the above. 
Things make things happen. Not humans. It really doesn’t feel like there’s a solid 
centre of consciousness writing this. Perhaps the thesis is about this? This thesis is 
amorphous, but it is, at the least, about intentionality and learning. Or perhaps the 
thesis is no longer ‘about’. There is no ‘whatness’ for it to be about. It is rather a 
thisness. A withness. What Deleuze and Guattari (2004) call a haecceity. Or, perhaps 
it’s something of an inbetween. A struggle to move between. A middling, if you like.  
 
Yes, I don’t think this thesis is about environmental education. It’s more with 
environmental education, with (non)methodology, with my becoming. A lived 
environmental education. You’ll see this struggle. In a moment I’ll try and tell you 






This thesis is about becoming an academic who works on the topics of outdoor and 
environmental education. I don’t know if it is about outdoor and environmental 
education. I think that depends on you and whether you plug it into your practice. As 
a becoming academic, I am beginning to take part in the key academic practices of 
teaching and research. My topic being environmental education, I am interested in 
how to teach for the environment (i.e. to do environmental education) and how to 
teach prospective educators to teach for the environment. Nonetheless the thesis does 
not produce ideas for these practices in a straightforward manner. The thesis features 
reflections (what become diffractions) on the life of academic practices in 
environmental education while I struggle with theory that questions essentialist 
renditions of the environment and the human subject. Additionally, I am interested in 





interest me are those concerned with the type or form of educational theory and 
philosophy that might best inform my practice. And so, the thesis also draws on 
theory as data, as a way of influencing thinking throughout, rather than as a base 
upon which to build or as a framework to apply. 
 
Given all this, I have another problem. I can’t get immanence out of my head3. This 
is particularly odd/problematic, as I find immanence hard to pin down. Yet it has me. 
It has caught me. And it won’t let go. By immanence I mean in the Deleuzian sense. 
Immanence is the field of desire. It is desire making space. Forming strata both 
geological and social. Immanence seems to be the statement about the ways the 
world is carved up. And the potential for thinking new ways of thinking the world. A 
good example of the way this impacts environmental education is by considering 
some of the straightforward ways we talk about practice. For instance, if I take a 
group outside, say to a park or to a city centre, then it seems straightforward enough 
to say that I am doing outdoor learning, rather than indoor learning. But then I read 
something like this: 
 
The field of immanence is not internal to the self, but neither does it 
come from an external self or a nonself. Rather, it is like the absolute 
Outside that knows no Selves because interior and exterior are equally a 
part of the immanence in which they have fused (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1986, p.156)  
 
So, if I assume immanence, I’m assuming something like an absolute outside, which 
is actually both inside and outside. So, my indoor learners are really outside all 
along. In which case, what sense is there in talking of outdoor learning? As if there is 
something preordained and significant to the category ‘outdoor’. A category that is 
itself in immanence. Unstable and fleeting. Is there actually anything that can be said 
                                                 
3 What a telling phrase this seems to be! How do you get immanence out of your head? I 
think it is the ground upon which ideas like ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of my head is founded – 
because that is what immanence is! Transcendence is always placed on immanence. But I’m 
so used to thinking that thinking is inside my head, like there is a transcendent inside/outside 
divide that is pregiven. But this reminds me of Anselm’s ontological argument for the 





to link one ‘outdoor’ experience to another? Is ‘outdoors’ actually in our heads? 
You’ll notice I put ‘outdoors’ in inverted commas here. The reason for this is that I 
no longer trust the term, having thought of it a category that is put onto the world, 
rather than one that exists out there. Some authors, (Heidegger and Derrida, for 
instance) put words under erasure to demonstrate that they are problematic yet 
necessary. You’ll see that I do this at times. I don’t feel like I’ve arrived at the 
ground that renders the term ‘outdoor’ necessary yet, so for now I will just signal that 
I find it problematic, with inverted commas. You may find these inverted commas 
cropping up in my writing in this way.  
 
I look up. 
 
It’s eerie here. The front room is dark brown with light. Brown light is eerie in a 
room that is usually lit well. The brown glow comes from the street lights, tinted as it 
travels through the curtains. The eerie light combines with or compounds an eerie 
sensation. I don’t normally do this. Get up at night and write. I feel like I’m having 
some kind of affair with immanence. It creeps at the edges of my day. Always there, 
coming to mind in a conversation with a friend. In the spaces left by the tasks of the 
day, when my mind to throws up thoughts, immanence haunts my thinking. The light 
of the room. The silence. The cold. And the need to write. To get it out. The birth of 
it. They come together in a strange otherness. It makes this feel like a place out of 
time. I check my watch. I’m writing this at quarter to midnight having just left my 
wife asleep with my baby boy. But I had to write about immanence. It’s like I lust for 
it. It totally has me. What is it? It’s just a word, but it sends my mind thinking in so 
many directions. As Deleuze would say, I plug it in to whatever I am thinking of, and 
I get taken somewhere different. Often somewhere troubling and puzzling. This can 
make me feel like I don’t understand immanence properly. But then, I’m sure 
Deleuze said something about it not being about getting it, but about seeing if it 
works for you. This isn’t that consoling either, as I’m not sure immanence is working 
for me. Yet it’s still there. Its claws are deep. Even the sound of the word as I say it 
without opening my mouth. Immanence. It seems immense. Everything. Power. 






In any case, there is a pure plane of immanence, univocality, 
composition, upon which everything is given, upon which unformed 
elements and materials dance that are distinguished from one another 
only by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated 
assemblage depending on their connections, their relations of 
movement. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.255) 
 
Oh gosh. What am I supposed to do with this? When there is no ‘I’ even. Just speeds. 
How do you research this? How do you talk about anything? How do you teach 
anything? How do you write anything? 
 
Perhaps you do it something like this. With a groping. With an attempt. Perhaps 
rather than doing immanence justice, or environmental education research or 
teaching for that matter, you just have a go. You practise. When I did my first degree 
(a BA Hons in Adventure Education) I remember a lecturer telling the class “you’ve 
heard ‘practice makes perfect’, but actually; practice makes permanent”. The 
message was that if you practise something the wrong way, it may stick, and you 
may just keep doing it wrong. I feel that is a risk here. Maybe I’m already doing it 
wrong. Maybe I’ve been doing it wrong for years. If I do have immanence wrong, 
then what? I’ve kept thinking of it in the same way. It’s become my body. And more. 
A life4.  
 
 
Do you mind if I quote Deleuze and Guattari, and not always explain? It helps me 
think. Even if the clarity isn’t there. I’m sorry if I don’t dissect the quote. If I don’t 
                                                 
4 A life. I struggle with this more in Haecceity 6. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) use the phrase 
‘a life’ to distinguish their approach from that of talking of ‘my life’ as experienced on a 
transcendent plane, where subjects exist, to the empirical before all of life as experienced on 
an immanent plane. This is where a life is lived. A life is the singularity of an event. A 
haecceity is a life, rather than a person as defined by a set of characteristics that are human. 
A life is only ever its thisness. Accordingly, I am my ‘longitude and latitude, a set of speeds 
and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. [I] have the 
individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its duration)—a climate, a wind, 
a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). Or at least [I] can have it, [I] can reach 






tell you what it means. Tell you, perhaps, what you want to hear, and what you want 
to be told. Maybe you don’t. Maybe you’re happy to let yourself feel a way into it. 
 
Sometimes I see a bit of writing by Deleuze and Guttari and think ‘well that works so 
well to help me think about this problem’. Here’s an example: 
 
The resulting danger of a worldwide labor bureaucracy or technocracy 
taking charge of these problems can be warded off only to the extent 
that local struggles directly target national and international axioms, at 
the precise point of their insertion in the field of immanence (the 
potential of the rural world in this respect). (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1986, p.446). 
 
Now, I’m not sure what preceded this quote, or what came after it. I was just 
searching for the term ‘immanence’ in A Thousand Plateaus. But when I read it I 








I use the phrase ‘think with’ a lot in the thesis. I borrow it from Jackson and Mazzei 
(2012) who use it to demonstrate the productivity of working different theoretical 
perspectives to the same set of data. The term with captures much in the process 
oriented and non-hierarchical philosophy of Deleuze and other process theorists. It 
draws the subject out into the world in participation, rather than having them view 
the world outside from within, or above.  
 
In relation to his art installation of reflective (diffractive) cubes around a university 






Rather than being the phenomenological object of my own 
intentionality, each cube is an objectile that exceeds my intentions and 
refuses to correlate with my thought. Put another way, the cube is a 
thing to think with, rather than a thing to think about. (2018, p.217) 
 
Objectile is a term which replaces objects as static things, rather objectiles are in a 
process of becoming and in this becoming have a prehensive facet. Cubes, theory, 
books, people, walks, thoughts, research papers, events and practice, such as 
environmental education (and this thesis). These are all things to think with. 
This is not a phenomenology.  
 






Thinking with. It just happens. I can claim it is hard work to think with, but that 
doesn’t mean I could do other than I am. If I do ‘hard work’ it sounds like there’s an 
I that made some kind of choice. But the ‘hard work’ is actually distributed of events, 
not localised in a single me. In which case, is anything actually ‘working’? Or, to 
turn it around, what does labelling something as ‘work’ do? For Deleuze and 
Guattari (1986, p.490-491) ‘labor performs a generalized operation of striation of 
space-time, a subjection of free action, a nullification of smooth spaces, the origin 
and means of which is in the essential enterprise of the State, namely, its conquest of 
the war machine’5. So, if I want to remain free, unhomogenised and unstriated 
(indeed, unhuman) perhaps I should avoid labour, and be more leisurely instead6. I 
                                                 
5 Deleuze and Guattari use the figuration of the war machine as the vanguard of nomadic 
thought. The war machine is a means to overcome striation and so, the State apparatus would 
have done with the war machine. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that writing can bring the 
freeing aspects of the war machine together with lines of escape, or flight, that may be 
productive for overcoming the constantly rehearsed images of thought of the state: ‘Writing 
weds a war machine and lines of flight, abandoning the strata, segmentarities, sedentarity, 
the State apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.4). 
 
6 This feels like it talks to the nature of undertaking a PhD. You put in the ‘hard work’ and 
gain the label, the category, the code: ‘Dr’. In this position, you can be put to work. You 





should avoid putting myself to hard work. But that’s not quite right either. Leisure 
sounds like it is set up as the opposite of work, and in this binary produces privilege 
away from ‘labour’. Further, both seem like humanist endeavours. Maybe I want to 
get outside of both. Artfulness and playfulness. There is activity in these terms. They 
produce. But there is also subversive potential. To overturn and to create the new. To 
perform iconoclasm. Something more creative and involved. Something like what 
Jonathan Wyatt calls ‘creative-relational inquiry’.  
 
Creative-relational inquiry takes up not (only) the common-sense 
understanding of creative – notions of making7, of ‘being artistic’, etc. – 
but the radical creative opening-up-to-what-maybe, an opening-up 
within “an encounter [that] is not a confrontation with a ‘thing’ but a 
relation that is sensed, rather than understood” (Jackson, 2017, p. 669, 
emphasis in the original). (Wyatt, 2019 forthcoming, p.2) 
 
This feels more like thinking with. Thinking with doesn’t mean understanding. 
Thinking with doesn’t feel like work, it just seems to happen as the embodied 
practice-theorising of this event. For instance, the quote from Deleuze and Guattari, 
above, made me wonder what we take as axiomatic about environmental education – 
in research particularly – what a ‘world wide labor bureaucracy or technocracy’ 
might look like in the context of environmental education scholarship…I don’t 
know, perhaps publishing corporations? Globalising education agendas, like 
UNESCO? State national curricula? Who knows? Pick one. Now, what are the 
axioms at work? What are the assumptions that are lived? What do we think we 
know so well that we don’t even think about whether we think we know it or not? 
Again, I don’t know, but it makes me wonder. Now, what’s this about ‘danger’ and 
warding these things ‘off’? And where? Only in the local, not at larger scales, where 
these axioms exist. When I read ‘local’ here, I read it as ‘micropolitical’ or molecular 
- a few more terms from the Deleuze and Guattari glossary. Both seem to be about 
ethics on the ground. Lived and nuanced. This kind of quote hits me in a sweet spot 
of a call to arms and descriptions of the unfolding nature of events at a meta level. It 
                                                                                                                                          
 





suits me to think with this level. That’s all I wanted to say. It’s a form of 






The little sensations before feeling and thought. The tug in my knee. The nearly 
something like dinner smell in the air. The drill. How long has that drill been going? 
Digging deep into my writing and affecting it before I even noticed its dull hum 
backgrounding the bird song and occasional passing car? Each and every thing is 
difference. Difference in itself. These things - drill, smell, bird song etc, - only 
become these things as they are pushed and pulled from the plane of consistency 
through the grill of desire that constitutes me. It is the process that constitutes me. 
Desire takes up difference and constructs the plane. 
 
Everything is different on the plane of consistency or immanence, 
which is necessarily perceived in its own right in the course of its 
construction: experimentation replaces interpretation, now molecular, 
nonfigurative, and nonsymbolic, the unconscious as such is given in 
microperceptions; desire directly invests the field of perception, where 
the imperceptible appears as the perceived object of desire itself, "the 
nonfigurative of desire." (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p.284) 
 
I wonder what that made you think of? It doesn’t mean anything. It makes things 
happen, or it doesn’t. There is no understanding. It’s an event. Actually, it’s 
happening now. What did it make me do? ‘Everything is different’. Everything is 
other. Including me. I love this idea of thinking that I don’t know myself. That I am 
an alien. That everything is alien, if only I can get past the point where ‘the 
imperceptible appears as the perceived object of desire itself’; of everything I’ve ever 
thought or encountered being other than I think. Trying to see the alien in the 
ordinary seems a sure way to stave off complacency. Rather than a Freudian id and 





are a thousand little stories to be created in events of encounter. It’s hard to fight 
desire. Desire wants to tell you that there’s a laptop in front of you. Use it to write. 
Check your email. Check Facebook. Fight desire. On the plane of immanence8 there 
isn’t a laptop that affords these things. There is only difference that can become 






I can’t claim that I am Deleuzian. It’s not in my bones. Perhaps then, I am not 
Deleuzian. Perhaps it is not possible to be Deleuzian. It is always something you are 
practicing. It is always something you are attaining. As Kathryn Strom (2018, p.210) 
says:  
…what does it mean to ‘be Deleuzian’ anyway? Once it has been 
labeled as such, would not that constitute what Deleuze would 
recognize as a molar category—a ‘domesticated multiplicity’? Does not 
this idea—that a scholar would be Deleuzian, in that they would follow 
all the ideas of Deleuze to the letter and apply them in every word, 
thought, action—also contradict Deleuze’s request that with his work, 
we not ask what something means, but what it does and how it works? 
So then, would it not make more (non) sense to do Deleuze—to plug in, 
experiment, and use his ideas, see how they work—rather than seek to 
be Deleuzian? If we are zeroing in on what something means, exactly, 
and evaluating whether or not someone is applying it properly, then we 
are stuck in the realm of meaning and what is. The verb ‘to be’ has been 
imposed—to be Deleuzian—and we are once again back reproducing 
dichotomous thinking: you are, or you are not, Deleuzian.  
 
                                                 
8 In my reading, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) refer to the ‘plane’ of immanence to highlight 
its physical, material, and Earthly nature. Thinking of immanence as a plane; as a steppe, 
forest, ocean or the living room that I am sat in right now, evokes its spatial aspect, its 





And so, I am not very Deleuzian. But I practise. I attempt as best I can9. My writing 
always falls back to old ways of explaining. You’ll see this, if you read on. You’ll 
see that my voice has changed. I am writing this later, after, towards the end. There 
are, perhaps, more comfortable voices to come. Voices slip around. This one is in the 
middle of a transition. I feel like I’m transgressing. Like I’m taking a risk. It has a 
foot in my old world of academia, and a tentative toe in a new way of writing, for 
me. You’ll see that sometimes I risk more, the event risks more, whilst in others – 
and more often – there’s an ‘I’ that hunkers down in ways of explaining I think I 
understand. I realise now that this is the risk, the old way. Trying to convince, and 
trying to convey. It’s not that I’m not brave enough to constantly experiment. It’s 
more that I slip back. Or maybe I’ve run out of time. Out of space, even. And there 
seems to be a lot of skill involved in inventing the world as it happens. I couldn’t 
write Finnegan’s Wake or Ulysses and, besides, don’t I have to say something about 
environmental education and being an academic, even as both those concepts escape 
into the sofa beneath me? 
 
Or, perhaps they come up, from the sofa in some way? Or from somewhere else? 
Where did the thought come from? From a fear in my gut about what I’m supposed 
to write? Is it fear? Or did it become ‘fear’ when I had to find a word? It was more 
like something before fear. But something always-there. The embodied–environing 
thesis. 
 
                                                 
9 Why should I place ‘faith’ in Deleuze in this way? I don’t agree that the concepts offered 
by Deleuze are somehow more doctrinal or religious in nature than the State philosophy that 
dominant academic critique lives within. A philosophy of immanence is entirely 
untheological. It is grounded within the world, rather than transcending it by appealing to 
stable concepts of the subject or God. Rather, Deleuzian concepts are tools that live, nothing 
more or less. They either work for you or they don’t. They are means to think ourselves out 
of dominant modes of thought. And they help me think about concept creation. I could offer 
traditional critique of them, but that would not serve to help me think the environment, 
ethics, or my subjectification differently. I am not trying to present the whole picture as the 
one truth, by poking holes, I am, rather, trying to put concepts to work. This process entails 
acknowledging that I do not always know, that I have not ‘figured it all out’, and that I can 
attempt to work with concepts in my life, whilst still trying to understand them. Indeed, these 
processes may be one and the same. I discuss the difference between traditional critique and 





When I think them - environmental education, being an academic - in this eerie 
brown light, I think them of the space I find myself of. This event of writing them. 
The milieu. The agencement as an event. Who is writing, after all? 
Who writes? It is not that the writer is dead but that “the writer” is “a 
writing,” a writing that lives in viruses and the weather and potatoes. 
Everything that might have been supposed to be outside the writing 
(dinosaurs, for instance) is internal to it. (Harley, 2017, p.277) 
‘A writing’. Of course. They are here with me, both. Cold is also a part of this. I 
didn’t put anything on, when I got out of bed. And now I’m cold. I’ll save this, and 








Asterism: a group of stars. I’ve been searching for a device to demonstrate a change 
of scene. A change of angle or a change of wind. A change of mind. Sometimes a 
spatial change – in geophilosophical terms. Sometimes a temporal change - 
something to demonstrate the syuzhet to the fabula10 of the thesis. A conceptual 
change. Or an affectual11 change. In any case a change in writing. Perhaps I’ve gone 
                                                 
10 Syuzhet and fabula are terms from Russian theatre and concern the depiction of time. 
Fabula is the linear chronology of events; syuzhet jumps back and forth along this line. In 
this thesis, time occurs non-linearly. For instance, this opening section was written at the 
end, and I am making this clear. However, other haecceities contain jumps in time. 
Asterisms are used to make these jumps more prominent, however they may also depict a 
change in scene, etc. Sometimes it is difficult to know where you are in time, this can be 
disorienting and confusing. Christopher Nolan’s Dunkirk enacts just such jumping about. 
The scenes are out of time, and yet the effect is somehow more for this disorientation. 
11 Affect is not the same as emotion. It is the preconscious perception of a body and in this 
way is pre-personal (Clough, 2009). An emotion, by contrast, ‘is a subjective content, the 
socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward 
defined as personal’ (Massumi, 1995, p.88). Affect comes before the subject is formed, 





away and come back different. Perhaps I am different at the same time. Perhaps I 
immediately became different. Perhaps the writing that comes after actually came 
before. Nonetheless, I found myself pressing return twice. Or leaving dots in the 
middle of the page. What are those dots called? A suggestion from Wikipedia: 
Asterism. Not dots. Stars. They’re stars. A constellation. According to Hudson 
(2010, p.396) an asterism ‘indicates minor breaks in the text’. I like the plurality of 
‘breaks’. For me it indicates an asterism as a constellation of potential directions. A 
multiplicity12, rather than a single end to a scene. I also like the politics of a ‘minor 
break’. From my work currently editing a Special Issue of Environmental Education 
Research, I know several scholars re beginning to articulate the importance of a 
minor politics in thinking with Deleuze and Guttari’s work in environmental 
education. A minor politics calls for small, playful alterations and digs at the 
majoritarian order. This is because too large a signifying break can be easily taken 
over. So, while we’re alive, we should all ‘make tiny changes to Earth’13. An 
asterism is also sometimes used when the author of something like a piece of music 
is not known or wishes to hide their identity. Perfect! Who’s the author anyway? Ah! 
It’s ⁂. This being the case I hope my use of asterisms reminds the reader that there 
is no essential subject of Western humanism authoring this text. Instead it’s written 
                                                 
12 Multiplicity is a term used by Deleuze and Guattari to demonstrate the instability of any 
given object, concept, or category. A multiplicity is a thing that is also many other things, 
including its constituting flows. Multiplicities make up the plane of immanence. According 
to Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p.8) ‘Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent 
pseudomultiplicities for what they are’.  
 
13 ‘While I’m alive, I’ll make tiny changes to Earth’. This lyric was written by Scott 
Hutchison of the band Frightened Rabbit. It’s from the song Heads Roll Off. That song, and 
the album it’s taken from, Midnight Organ Fight, has affected my life hugely. For instance, 
while I was wrestling with postgraduate study in the late 2000s it helped me. It’s a lyric that 
speaks to the micropolitics of Deleuze and Guattari. Scott ended his own life in Edinburgh in 
early May, 2018, just as I come to the end of another ‘attempt’. These events, the 
rememberings and the losses, push me to wonder at making joyous tiny changes to Earth. 
Another lyric, ‘To enemy, is pointless to anybody that doesn’t have faith’ reminds me of the 
freeing ethics of immanence, where faith isn’t placed on transcendent principle that blocks 
you up and shuts you down. The educational resonance of the song, the manner in which, as 
one commenter on the music video on YouTube put it, the children in the classroom ‘have 







by a multiplicity. An event. This does not make it politically neutral. The event has a 
history.  
 
An asterism is also used on meteorological charts to indicate moderate snowfall. 
Which I like. 
 
Above all I use asterisms as a demonstration of a middle. A rhizomatic14 juncture. A 
place of pause and deliberation for the reader. A place of departure and arrival. When 
you reach an asterism you can consider what has come through for you, if anything. 
Where does your thought go now? And, if nothing has come through, try another 
book15. Or try another asterism. Bring your constellations to mine. There are 
different ways to read a text. Barthes (1975) posits reading as a form of pleasure or 
bliss. Neither of these are as straightforward as they sound, but Barthes makes the 
point that reading is an activity in which the reader is constituted, depending on their 
approach to the text.  
 
Becoming a diffractive practitioner 
 
When I initiated this PhD, or when it initiated me, before, I was interested in trying 
to provide a broad overview of the implications for what I considered ‘new’ theory 
(new materialisms, posthumanism, a broad range of theory and points of view in 
these emerging discourses). I approached the thesis in a cause and effect manner. I 
walked into my first supervisory meeting with a point by point plan. I had the thesis 
sewn up, I just had to write it. I thought that emerging theory questioned the 
nature/culture distinction in a manner that wasn’t very present in outdoor 
                                                 
14 The rhizome is a figuration (practical philosophical concept) described by Deleuze and 
Guattari to contrast with arborescent organisations of things. Arborescent thought is 
organised from a central stem. It is a pervasive manner of thinking that often doesn’t allow 
for new connections to be made. Rhizomatic thinking crosses established categories and 
works to connect things in a subterranean manner, it allows new cartographies or maps to 
develop, rather than relying on tracing the image of thought of the tree. In a rhizome thinking 
can be messy and unorderly, it can jump about and establish new relationships; ‘any point of 
a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the 
tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.7). 
 
15 There are different ways of reading, after all. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) suggest that you 





environmental education discourse, and I wanted to provide an overview, and discuss 
implications. I wanted to provide solutions to the problem. I have really struggled to 
do this. Rather than gaining this overview, and becoming the expert that a PhD 
suggests you become, I found myself becoming less sure of things. Perhaps I thought 
I was already an expert? Perhaps this thesis has been about falling apart? Breaking 
up? The result is this thesis, which is a palimpsest. Rather than a straightforward 
telling in one voice, the thesis is a place where different emerging ‘me’s have left 
their mark. The result is writing that contrasts and juxtaposes. Yet ‘juxtaposes’ 
sounds too intentional. Perhaps it jars instead? I’ve been told it does, in places. 
Finding something jarring isn’t necessarily bad. For instance, Benozzo, Carey, 
Cozza, Elmenhorst, Fairchild, Koro-Ljungberg and Taylor (2018) take up the 
feminist figurations of the cyborg (Haraway, 1985) – to tackle nature/culture 
dualisms - and the earthworm (Barad, 2014) – to move beyond reflexivity to ‘re-
turning’– in their writing. For Benozzo et al. these conceptual tools ‘disturb binaries 
present in the practicings of academic life. However they are put to work …not to 
produce a smoothness but to jar, disturb and blur the un-sense of writing’ (p.5, 
emphasis added).  
 
I’m sure there is a jarring in my writing. No doubt you’ve experienced it already. Am 
I sometimes over confident? Smarmy? Sometimes too doubting? Self-deprecating? 
There is also an ontological struggle. The struggle between transcendence and 
immanence. The writing is the event, by the way, it is not a writing up. As a result, 
I’m afraid I often get lost. For instance, I was persuaded by arguments such as 
Massumi’s, here, towards the middle of my studies, just as things were becoming 
more unstable: 
 
This is what process-oriented exploration does: complexify its 
conceptual web as it advances. It tries not to reduce. It tries not to 
encapsulate. It does not end in an overview. Rather, it works to become 
more and more adequate to the ongoing complexity of life. This means 
that it does not arrive at any final answers. It does not even seek 
solutions. It seeks to re-pose the problems life poses itself, always 
under transformation. The goal is to arrive at a transformational matrix 
of concepts apt to continue the open-ended voyage of thinking-feeling 





dimensions and the paths by which it comes to full expression in 
politics (taking the world in the plural). (Massumi, 2015, p.xi) 
 
 
And yet I also struggled to do this. I struggled to not reduce. To not attempt to 
provide solutions and to simplify. This is present in the palimpsest of the thesis, a 
geological record of different voices. Different ‘me’s. Both the getting lost 






This thesis is perhaps one iteration of what the PhD process, as an education, has 
done. It is not the only thing it has done, however. It has left affectual torrents that I 
cannot adequately express here. On my body, but also on the bodies of people close 
to me (and other bodies, not necessarily human). That is not to say that this thesis is a 
representation of the PhD process. It is rather to say that the whole process is 
dispersed, here on this screen or page, but topologically dispersed across other bodies 
also. It has increased my affectual capacities, by allowing me to think and creating 
opportunities to affect others, but it also feels as if it has limited my capacities to 
affect in some ways. As I have said, sometimes I feel more unsure of myself. Less 
confident. I feel I know myself less. Or that I know myself as potentially – but not 
quite - more, but don’t recognise what I now know. The alien me. I am undergoing a 
posthuman education that doesn’t stop with this thesis, which is only a middle. There 
are plenty of questions left unanswered. Or rather, the many questions are answers 
themselves, and so require thought. 
 
So, this thesis is becoming concerned with me, my subjectification, my ethical 
capacities, my practice as an outdoor environmental educator and ‘liver’ of theory, 
and troubling the borders that separate these things. It’s becoming concerned with the 
problems that each of those words (me, subjectivity, ethical capacities, outdoor 





other. Perhaps it is a type of troubling autoethnography. Whilst not prominent in the 
higher ranked educational research journals (Gannon, 2017) autoethnographic 
approaches to research are prominent in reflective practice, and there are a number of 
examples of researchers employing autoethnography in their doctoral studies (e.g. 
Lake, 2015; Richards, 2015; Stanley, 2015). And yet, as I discover in time, reflective 
practice is not really what this thesis is about. It is an attempt, rather, to be more 
diffractive. To change difference; to attempt a diffractive practice16. Further, the 
writing is a form of inquiry itself. Like Laurel Richardson (2001, p.35), ‘Writing was 
the method through which I constituted the world and reconstituted myself. Writing 
became my principle tool through which I learned about my self and the world. I 
wrote so I would have a life. Writing was and is how I come to know’, and how I 
come to be(come). Scratch that. How  I  come to be. Scratch that. How becoming 
becomes. The study isn’t ‘about’ one thing. Years of academic training has taught me 
that I should be clear. That the first sentence in a piece of academic writing should be 
‘The purpose of this study is to…’. Well, the purpose of this study is to attempt to 
undo some of that training. To become more unsure. More unhuman. This isn’t easy. 
I seem to grope for certainty. 
 
All this to come. For now the thesis is pragmatic, in that it is concerned with how 
environmental education is configured for me, and how it might be configured, both 
for me, and perhaps people yet to come, in light of a swelling of post-green 
environmental literature and discourse across a myriad of disciplines. I have been 
inspired, for instance, by what are being described as the ‘new’ materialisms by 
authors who have enacted, and are enacting, post-qualitative renderings of a world 
through novel modes of enquiry, and by various ‘prismatic’, rather than green, takes 
on ecological thinking. I am interested in my own attempted escape from and to 
romantic conceptions of nature. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are companions in 
this writing.  
 
                                                 







Writing the thesis 
 
The style of writing the thesis changes from when I initially began, in late 2015, to 
me writing this now in the summer of 2018. As I have said, I didn’t ‘write up’ this 
thesis. I started writing it when I started my studies and consider the change in 
writing style a testament to the learning I have undergone. In some ways the change 
is the thesis. The text here is a worked thing. A process of making. Many sentences 
have been written and rewritten. There is much discarded text. However, I have 
retained earlier writing, especially in Haecceity’s 2 and 3, to demonstrate the manner 
in which my writing has changed through my learning. What at first is a more 
analytic and traditional approach in these two Haecceities gives way to something 
that (at the time) I considered more ‘practice’ focused in Haecceity 4, something 
more aesthetic and contemplative in Haecceity 5, something collaborative in 
Haecceity 6, something fractured and uncertain in Haecceity 7, and something that 
returns to the title of the thesis in Haecceity 8. The writing itself has helped me to 
learn, to understand the topics I am interested in. In this way, the writing has been the 
mode of inquiry. I talk more about writing as inquiry in Haecceity 3, for now I want 
to add a little on how Speedy (2005, p.63) notes that ‘writing as inquiry…assumes 
and articulates a reflexive, situated researcher stance, but does not necessarily dwell 
there’. Through the process of writing I attempt to leave the dwelling space of 
‘reflexivity’ and reflexive practice, to instead enact something more diffractive. 
Again, more on this in Haecceity 3, and particularly in Haecceity 6. 
 
A further point that Speedy (2005, p.63) makes is that writing as inquiry: 
 
 
…assumes and expresses a curiosity or even a thirst for knowledge 
about the contents of the study, but has no illusions that this might 
speak for itself. It leaves much unsaid, uncertain, and incomplete. It is, 
at best, a balancing act between form and content. It is often playful, 
often poetic, often experimental and often fictionalised. It tends towards 
distillation and description rather than explanation or analysis. Above 
all, it attempts to provide sufficient substance to contribute towards 
scholarship in the field as well as sufficient space to engage the reader’s 







I hope I get better at this ‘balancing act’ as I write. Certainly, there are different 
voices in the thesis: the earlier, more analytic voice, and the voice I become in 
exploring more affectively. At times these voices crop up within each others’ speech. 
If there is a hope in the thesis, it is to achieve this. It might be obvious by now that 
the thesis is not a traditional qualitative inquiry, at least as I understand it. This thesis 
is written differently so that you might ‘plug in’ and have something different come 
through for you. It embraces an ontology of becoming which attempts the production 
of something different, something new. Not for its own sake, but to escape molar 
forces. Honan and Bright (2016, p.3) draw on Gilles Deleuze to argue that this is an 
imperative in thesis writing: 
 
 
Our argument, following Deleuze, is that it is imperative for doctoral 
students not to adapt their thinking and writing to what is required 
precisely because: 
 
The problem is not to direct or methodically apply a 
thought which pre-exists in principles and in nature, but to 
bring into being that which does not yet exist (there is no 
other work, all the rest is arbitrary, mere decoration). To 
think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create 
is first of all to engender “thinking” in thought. (Deleuze, 
1994, p.147) 
  
If we take the problem of educational research writing to be one of 
creation rather than application of the pre-existing, then what is 
required is a style and structure that eschews the already thought; a 
writing that is against style and structure. 
 
 
I like to think of the thesis as both art and science; art, in that it is performing an 
aesthetically appreciable event whilst also being political and ethical, and science in 
that it is engaged in the production of knowledge in a wholly pragmatic way. Sitting, 





inaction of the real. An event. A life. A haecceity. It is philosophy as understood by 
Henri Bergson. Elizabeth Grosz (2005, p.4) describes Bergson’s understanding: 
 
For Bergson, philosophy brings to knowledge that which the sciences 
must necessarily leave out, the continuities and connections that the 
sciences cannot see in their focus on closed systems and definable and 
isolatable terms. He articulates that which the arts express more directly 
than the sciences but can articulate only through an absolute and 
ungeneralizable singularity: the continuity of the real, the immersion of 
life and matter in the real, the force and effect of duration. Neither 
science nor art can stimulatingly grasp both the relentless universal 
force of difference, and its absolute specificity: as each touches upon 
one it elides the other. Philosophy functions somewhere ‘between’ 
these approaches, seeking the two-faced movement of universalization 
and particularity, of generalization and individuation, through that 
which united them: the dual force of duration, the double duration of 
past and present, the virtual and the actual, which is the movement of 
difference. 
 
The philosophy enacted here is a pragmatic and aesthetic one. Three strands run and 
converge and impact in the writing. They are three, yet they are a multiplicity also. 
This is a three-way (but multiple) diffraction17 drawing on broad new materialist 
literatures, environmental education theory/research discourse and post-structurally 
informed post-autobiographic/ethnographic inquiry, drawing on my work as an 
outdoor and environmental practitioner and practicing researcher. Like Van der Tuin 
and Dolphijn (2012, p.14) the argument is ‘not “built up” in this book: its chapters 
are not dependent upon one another for understanding their argument…there are 
many different transversal relations between them’. In terms of precedents in 
                                                 
17 Diffraction is the effect of things coming together and being worked through each other: 
‘Diffraction is an iterative practice of intra-actively reworking and being reworked by 
patterns of mattering. A diffractive methodology seeks to work constructively and 
deconstructively (not destructively) in making new patterns of understanding-becoming’ 






environmental education research, Affifi’s (2008) attempt to explore thesis writing as 
a form of environmental education perhaps comes closest. Affifi (2008, p.2) writes: 
 
 
I realized that I continue to teach as I continue to live, and that an 
"environmental education" (EE) curriculum was emanating at all times 
from my actions, whether I wanted it or not. I realized that there were 
some things I could do to make this curriculum more "educational'', and 
even though I had no idea how, I thought I should begin to make my 




This thesis thus moves to become a form of environmental education which 
acknowledges that environmental education emanates ‘at all times’, including now in 
this writing and your reading. However, and in distinction from Affifi’s (2008) work, 
this thesis attempts to move beyond what I perceive as green ecological renderings of 
the environment, to acknowledge that the environment is all (including concepts and 
human produce), and that, for me, this comes to have troubling implications for the 
ethics upon which to base environmental action and pedagogy. I’m not sure I 
succeed at this. It doesn’t seem like something you finish. 
 
There is a degree of ‘auto-citing’ in this thesis that may seem more than the norm for 
academic work. There is a danger that this might be perceived as arrogance, but I 
hope it isn’t read as such; it is rather another means of highlighting the ‘subject’ of 
the thesis; the ‘me-thesis’ becoming. I cite my previous work, often work done with 
Jamie, to highlight my becoming an academic; to demonstrate where threads of my 
thinking have developed from and are headed to. It is the same for an email exchange 
I include, where another academic reaches out to discuss a paper I co-authored. I 
don’t dwell on the thanks, but rather explore the affective nature of what my writing 
might do. Similarly, and again later in the thesis, I dwell for some time on an 








Voices and images 
 
 
One of my supervisors has asked how I use voice in my writing. I agree with Mazzei 
and Jackson (2016) who in turn echo Gilles Deleuze and Spinoza – the universe is 
ontologically univocal. When ‘I’ speak in this paper, ‘I’ am not really speaking 
(ontologically) alone, ‘my’ voice being historicised, embodied, and material-
discursive. ‘I’ cannot be asking the reader to take what ‘I’ say ‘at face value’ – the 
face is already decentred. Likewise, when I include other ‘voices’ –Mazzei and 
Jackson, or Deleuze for example -  I am thinking with (intra-relationally), rather than 
against or for. This is a movement in both ontology and the nature of academic 
critique; towards the gathering (Latour, 2004; Ivakhiv, 2014) or what Taylor (2016a) 
calls a generous critique.  
 
We move toward positing voice in qualitative educational research as a 
thing that is entangled with other things in an assemblage (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987) that acts with an agential force (Bennett, 2010b). We do 
this by (re)configuring voice: we refuse the primacy of voice as simply 
spoken words emanating from a conscious subject and instead place 
voice within the material and discursive knots and intensities of the 
assemblage. Thus, we do not ‘calibrate’ voice to the human, nor do we 
attend to voice as ‘either pure cause or pure effect’ (Barad, 2007, p. 
136) via human intentionality. Rather, we account for voice as a 
material-discursive practice that is inseparable from all elements 




There is a form of collaborative writing at work here then, that moves even beyond 
the authors I draw on, for, like Deleuze and Guattari (2004), I understand myself as 
multiple and, like Speedy (2013), bodies and environments are co-authors here. On 
this plane ‘my’ free will to choose the direction and nature of my writing is located 
not in my being, but in a doing (Jackson, 2013), which is already an assemblage. 
 
 
In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explained that the 





no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and 
a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the 
author)” (p. 23). The hierarchy that enables the privileging of the 
material in the material/textual dualism is not thinkable in their 
ontology, and the “just textual analysis” distinction doesn’t make sense. 
(St. Pierre, 2014, p.12) 
 
 
This is what I am attempting, at any rate. When I use a quotation, such as the one 
above, I am hoping to be generative, rather than representational. I am hoping that 
they speak to the reader. That they perform as data. Perhaps they can be perceived in 
the same way as participant interviews, or field notes, gathered from the world and 
inserted here for the reader. Another way to think of them might be as the material-
discourse with which the thesis is crafted, and the crafted thesis as the thing that only 
becomes when it is read. Deleuze and Guattari imagine texts as operating in a 
performative sense: 
 
…the way A Thousand Plateaus is written is very intuitive and kinetic. 
it's very unlike most other philosophy writing: D&G don't really try to 
explain in plain language what they are doing. rather they just keep 
going round and round on this one concept. improvising around a 
theme. it's like jazz. 
 




This is a difficulty I struggle with in the thesis. The line between attempting to affect 
-the reader, myself - and the constant urge to represent, to give an answer, to work 
out the problem. This is the becoming of the thesis, perhaps. The becoming ‘post’. 
And then there is the problem of becoming. This going ‘round and round’ on a 
theme. I hope this becomes a felt refrain. Like a rhythm or a hum. Deleuze and 
Guittari suggest that the refrain wards off music. I understand this as the refrain 






The performativity of text is not limited to quotations. Bridges-Rhoads (2017) puts it 
this way: 
 
Movement happens as quotations from texts I’ve read, words someone 
said earlier that day, memories of a time I thought something similar 
yet different materialized for me to think with. Easy separations 
between thought, content, form, and process crumble in favor of an 
entangled mess that affirms the not-yet-thought. (2017, p.4) 
 
Because of this, a number of elements repeat themselves across the haecceities. I 
don’t want to isolate separable themes, but there is a certain (re)turning to the 
eventing nature of the process of writing, to practise as lived, to the question of 
immanent ethics, and relating each of these to attempting to overcome nature as 
distinct from culture. This is never a full repetition, as such a thing is impossible. I 
am with Sellers (2009, p. 8) when she states: 
 
 
The (ad)venture has been to make all these plateaus work singularly 
and together, acknowledging a refrain of ideas risks repetition, although 
as circles of convergence each (re)connecting is in different space-times 
of thinking and brings with it other concepts interrupted, such 
‘repetition’ opens (to) other understandings.  
 
 
These repetitions are like refrains that emerge from the process. This isn’t a 
weakness, they offer ‘other understandings’ at each juncture. There is something of a 
progression in the writing as well; narratives from my personal life as a voice 
somehow detached from the theory are slowly brought together in the writing. These 
voices are sometimes given different fonts and sometimes different page 
justifications to subtly suggest differences and relationships. 
 
 
Images operate in a similar fashion in the thesis. Deleuze was not a great fan of the 
photograph. He thought it a manifestation of a representational image of thought. I 





reader make connections for themselves in their becoming with the thesis. To this 
end I often leave photographs unlabeled. 
 
 
Haecceities to come: 
 
The thesis is constituted by haecceities, rather than chapters. A haecceity is a 
philosophical concept forwarded by Deleuze and Guattari which prioritises the 
thisness of a thing or event, rather than considering a thing as assignable to pregiven 
delineated sets depending on its whatness (quiddity), or identifying characteristics. 
This move allows a novel methodological approach whereby the haecceities act as 
sites of variation on the themes of the thesis. A brief description of each haecceity 
follows below. 
 
Haecceity 2: New materialisms and this thesis. In this haecceity I begin by writing 
back to myself from nearer the end of the thesis. At least, I do this initially. This 
haecceity details philosophical materialism, and new materialisms, as approaches to 
contemporary theorising and inquiry, and discusses how they have been taken up in 
environmental education to date. However, the voice from the end of the thesis 
critiques the manner of this writing. Through this juxtaposition, I explore my 
becoming an academic writer through the thesis process. The voice from the end of 
the thesis, realising that a judgmental critique is not an immanent critique and may 
not leave space to grow, leaves the dominant voice to continue its journey through 
the thesis.  
 
Haecceity 3: Research fuzziness: making the thesis. In this haecceity I inquire into 
the type of inquiry I am enacting in this thesis. The terms ‘fuzzy’ and ‘fuzziness’ 
seemed to fit in describing something present yet indistinct. Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004) use ‘fuzzy’ to describe an opposition to axiomatic approaches, where the 
taken-for-granted is operationalised. For them ‘the axiomatic manipulates only 
denumerable sets, even infinite ones, whereas the minorities constitute “fuzzy,” 
nondenumerable, nonaxiomizable sets, in short, “masses,” multiplicities of escape 





take method for granted. They also move across ‘denumerable sets’, or pregiven 
categories to posit vague problems and directions of methodological consideration 
that have influenced the thesis.  
 
Haecceity 4: Becoming rocked. In this haecceity I juxtapose some stories of my 
practice as an outdoor environmental educator with coming to understand new 
materialist and Deleuzian critiques of Nature. I begin with climbing with students in 
Fontainebleau forest in France and move through critiques of the Anthropocene and 
various takes on ecology as either shallow, deep, dark, or flat. I discuss a particular 
excursion on Mount Tryfan in North Wales, and posit that a flat ecology could allow 
educators to experiment with notions of the real with students, particularly with the 
idea of mapping haecceitical selves.  
 
Haecceity 5: Practicing environing education: affects, concepts, practice. In this 
haecceity I draw further events of practice through each other. Twist them together. 
Juxtapose them. Or jar them. I take instances of practicing environmental education 
to see what writing, experimenting, and iteratively re-turning to events of 
environmental education as I experience it as a becoming academic pushing at the 
borders of subjectivity does. I explore the affective becoming of these immanently-
lived environmental educations - becoming environing education - with other aspects 
of my life. A life. For instance, I write with the sea and snorkeling in the north west 
of Scotland. I write with a day out with postgraduate students in Holyrood Park, 
Edinburgh. And I write with the book Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life by Gilles 
Deleuze (2005). These three narratives rise and fall in this haecceity. They bob 
against each other, providing the opportunity for the reader to make connections 
where they see them. I do this in an attempt to enact a drawing of concepts, practice 
and affects through each other. I attempt to write transversally, cutting across the 
boundary of difference between theory and practice to instead create theory-practice 
and practice-theory.  
 
Haecceity 6: The diffractive practitioners. In this haecceity my colleague, Jamie 
Mcphie, and I perform collaborative writing as inquiry to write-think-do 





enacting diffractive practice, where the events of a day of outdoor environmental 
education with a group of postgraduate students on Walney Island, Cumbria UK, are 
passed back and forth between the authors to trouble stratified notions of 
environmental education practice. Through thinking with each other, our places of 
encounter, interactions with students, educational and philosophical concepts, and 
Walney Island, we arrive at a kernel of something new; a becoming alien. 
 
Haecceity 7: Practicing immanent ethics. In this haecceity I struggle with the aliens 
within and the ways I am an alien without. Scratch that. The aliens that lie, 
transversally, across any fictitious boundary of the Self. By alien, I don’t mean little 
green men, but rather the others that I already am and that I become. Or that are 
before I am as I occur. The conversation between these aliens is an ethical one. It is 
also one about ethics. Or perhaps this is the same thing? The inquiry is always 
ethical; towards matters of concern. A struggle with ethics dwells in this thesis as a 
faint refrain. Here I take up the conversation more directly, for now at least. 
 
Haecceity 8: Another, different, middle. In this haecceity I end without ending. I 
partly agree with Ben Highmore (2010, p.135) when he writes that a ‘commitment to 
descriptive entanglement is hard to sustain for long and harder still to shape into 
academic conclusions’. I feel I could keep on entangling, and indeed I do, a little. But 
I agree that academic conclusions are hard to gather from threads which complexify. 
In this haecceity I discuss becoming an academic and possibilities for enhancing my 
capacities to affect and be affected. Further to this, I forward contributions of the 
thesis as being an example of what an environing education might teach, and as a 
form of writing-as-inquiry that explores living ethically in the face of environmental 











Haecceity 2: New materialisms and this thesis 
 
I begin this haecceity by writing back to myself from nearer the end of the thesis. At 
least, I do this initially. This haecceity details philosophical materialism, and new 
materialisms, as approaches to contemporary theorising and inquiry and discusses 
how they have been taken up in environmental education to date. However, the voice 
from the end of the thesis critiques the manner of this writing. Through this 
juxtaposition, I explore my becoming an academic writer through the thesis process. 
The voice from the end of the thesis, realising that a judgmental critique is not an 
immanent critique and may not leave space to grow, leaves the dominant voice to 
continue its journey, through the thesis. The voice from the end of the thesis is 






What is a minor literature? Deleuze, Guattari and Brinkley (1983) note that the 
first characteristic is that it is the way the minority overtakes and deterritorializes 
the major language. Following this, the second characteristic of minor literatures 
is that: 
everything in them is political...Minor 
literature...exists in a narrow space, every individual 
matter is immediately plugged into the political. Thus 
the question of the individual becomes even more 
necessary, indispensible, magnified microscopically, 
because an entirely different story stirs within it. 
(Deleuze, Guattari and Brinkley, 1983, p.16) 
 
I am starting here with a minor literature in an attempt to become micropolitical. 





operate in Aion time. Free to move in time as a singularity18. Let me show you 
something. A way of writing from nowhere. A way of writing in Chronos time, as 
if there exists a linear arrow of time that unfolds space as it passes. In the writing 
I will show you, written as a majoritarian literature, I can perform what Haraway 
(1988, p.581) calls ‘the god trick’; The claim to be able to see everything, and yet 
not exist yourself. It’s a different Dave writing to the Dave, the me, sat on my 
sofa now in Edinburgh, Gemma, my wife, changing my son’s nappy as he pants, 
animal like. A Dave in the past. I’m embarrassed to show you him. What was he 
thinking?  
 
Real history undoubtedly recounts the actions and 
passions of the bodies that develop in a social field; it 
communicates them in a certain fashion; but it also 
transmits order-words, in other words, pure acts 
intercalated into that development. History will never 
be rid of dates. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.81) 
 
 
My body, as I write this, is pressed against the sofa and tired from a broken night 
of sleep. A broken night. A broken super-swell of dreaming in grey and purple. Of 
what will happen. An old friend. The strangeness of walking or climbing through 
tunnels and clouds. And then the wakening. And Fen and Gemma. Fen calling 
out. Scared. What does a six week old fear? What are his dreams? Again, I think of 
the future. Of scary articles about climate change. Again, I think about futility in 
academia. About academic careers in environmental education. What is that? A 
voice from the past?  
 
 
                                                 
18 A singularity, for Deleuze and Guattari, is more than just a single instance. A singularity is 
‘a potential to become in a distinct way’ (Colebrook, 2002, p.75). In this sense it is a feature 
of the plane of immanence. The plane of immanence is the limit category, there is nothing 
outside it. Deleuze and Guattari state that this single phylum consists of ‘the flow of matter 
in continuous variation, conveying singularities and traits of expression’. Importantly for this 
thesis the ‘operative and expressive flow is as much artificial as natural: it is like the unity of 









His story of materialism 
 
The theoretical ground for this inquiry is the recent turn to materiality in academic 
discourse. Traditionally materialism is a monist ontological position that claims the 
primacy of the physical and material. In this way, it has generally been differentiated 
from dualist or pluralist ontologies which assume categorical, pre-physical or 
otherwise incorporeal features of the world. As a philosophical orientation 
materialism has historical roots traceable to before 600 BCE including the 
materialism prominent in the Indian schools of Cārvāka and Ājīvika, which are 
atomist in nature, as well as materialist aspects of Jainism and Buddhism, prominent 
in the Indian classical period. Concomitant materialist thought developed in Ancient 
Greece due to its close ties with the near and middle East in and around the mid-500s 
BCE. Indian philosophy likely greatly influenced thought in the Mediterranean 
classical world due to shared origins in the Bronze age civilisations of the near East, 
inclusion within the sphere of influence of the Persian Empire, and the trade that 
existed between Greece and India in the Alexandrian and Roman periods 






See how he sets out the stall, that old Dave. Tells one story as if there is only one 
story. This isn’t a history, but a his story. It has a patriarchal, Western inflection 
that doesn’t see other histories, other her stories, others’ stories. It doesn’t tell 
one story as if there are many.  
That is environmental writing. This is environmental writing. This is 
environmental reading. They all practise the environment. They enact 





story that may be picked up by the reader; that it is possible to live outside of the 
world. That it is possible to tell the story. Yet, there is a materiality here, in the 
doing of this writing I am present. Or, an event is presenting. In the reading, your 






Subsequently pre-Socratic Greek thinkers also developed philosophies drawing 
variously on the material. Thales for instance held that water is the origin of all 
matter, and Leucippus and Democritus each developed atomistic materialist 
philosophies, claiming the world to be made up of an infinite number of physical, 
indestructible parts. Anaxagoras, Epicurus and Heraclitus are other Greek 
philosophers whose metaphysics are largely materialist in nature (Burns, 2000). 
Richard Swinburne identifies Aristotle and Plato as ‘substance dualists’, retaining a 
notion that minds and bodies are made of ontologically distinct materials, a view that 
lingers in modern frames of knowledge (Alston and Smythe, 1994). In pre-Roman 
Europe Celtic animist traditions were grounded in ontologically material conceptions 
of the world (Green, 1997). The field of ‘contemporary animism’ has recently arisen 
to explore the role that materiality, as conceived as vibrant or alive, has played in 
many pre-literary as well as modern non-western cultures in the Americas, South 
East and Central Asia and Australia. The term ‘contemporary’ is used to differentiate 
this approach from the naïve anthropology practiced by Edward Tylor, who 
perceived animism as a primitive form of religion, rather than an alternative and 
legitimate metaphysical orientation which expands definitions of life and 
consequently relationality and responsibility. Drawing on archaeological and 
anthropological work there is a suggestion that relational material ontologies may 









I can feel how I have changed since I wrote this. I’m bored by this writing. This is 
hardly an attempt at immanence.  
 
History is always written from the sedentary point of 
view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus, at 
least a possible one, even when the topic is nomads. 
What is lacking is a Nomadology, the opposite of a 
history. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.23) 
 
 
Deleuze and Guattari are awash with nomads19. They wander from established 
category to de-established uncategory. Nomads appear situated in a smooth 
space20. A nomadology is particular but not boundaried: ‘The variability, the 
polyvocality of directions, is an essential 
feature of smooth spaces of the rhizome type, and it alters their cartography. 
                                                 
19 Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p.118) introduce the nomad as a ‘countersignifying semiotic’. 
That is, rather than thinking metaphysics in terms of settled states, of static objects, or of 
essential power structures, we can think nomadically. Nomadic thought ‘marks a mobile and 
plural distribution, which itself determines functions and relations, which arrives at 
arrangements rather than totals, distributions rather than collections, which operates more by 
breaks, transitions, migration, and accumulation than by combining units’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986, p.118). According to Rosi Braidotti (2011, p.2), nomadic thought is also ‘a 
form of self-reflexivity unfolding in perpetual motion in a continuous present that is project 
oriented and intrapersonal’, this is the manner in which nomadic thought is practised here. 
‘Place’ is understood not as a delineated geographic location, but materially topologically 
placed. That is the manner of this inquiry. 
 
20 Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p.381) state that the nomad distributes itself on a ‘smooth 
space’. That is to say that it does not move about in space, nor does it dwell statically in 
place. Rather it is constantly decomposing, or rather, its territory is a decomposing Earth, a 
deterritorializing Earth. It never arrives, or: the Earth that it is on, the environment it is ‘of’, 
never arrives. It is rather environing. This understanding is an ontological point, as it means 
that the nomad views the Earth as in process: ‘If the nomad can be called the 
Deterritorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialization 
afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary (the sedentary's 
relation with the earth is mediatized by something else, a property regime, a State apparatus). 
With the nomad, on the contrary, it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the 
earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself. It is the 
earth that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad with a territory.’ (Deleuze 






The nomad, nomad space, is localized and not delimited’ (p.382). Nomadic 
writing is placeful whilst not being in place.  
  
Where am I? What is occluded in this history? This his story without him. 
 
objectivity turns out to be about particular and 
specific embodiment and definitely not about the 
false vision promising transcendence of all limits and 
responsibility. The moral is simple: only partial 




Haraway (1988) calls for a situated knowledge. She means to reclaim objectivity 
as feminist, acknowledging that all narratives of objectivity position the mind, 
body, distance and responsibility in certain ways. Rather than the distance and 
unresponsible objectivity of the dominant Western gaze, Haraway (1988) posits 
that: 
 
A feminist objectivity is about limited location and 
situated knowledge, not about transcendence and 
splitting of subject and object. It allows us to become 




To become answerable. To combine ethics with epistemology and ontology. I’m 
sat in my flat in Edinburgh, once more, after just coming in from the office. I 
thought I was finished working for the day. My head was aching.  
 
But now I see I have my laptop open. I’ve opened the file called ‘wholething’. I 
look at the word count. 89860. How funny. That number didn’t count as a word. 
89869. I look at the ‘date last opened’. 17th November 2017. It’s the 6th March 
2018 today. I’ve been putting off coming back here. Coming back to this mess 





pages, without the built-up crud of nearly three years of attempting to write this 
thesis. But I had to come back. I had work to do. And work to undo. Thinking 
environmental education with situated knowledge practices has recently been 
invoked in environmental education (e.g. Blyth and Meiring, 2018; and Gough and 
Whitehouse, 2018; both cite Haraway’s 1988 paper). That does not mean the 
approach is prominent. And it does not mean it is easy. Dave, that Dave is in 
transfer. Is transferring. Feels now, in this writing, as if he is transgressing. 
Breaking down the image of academic thought. Trying to write a materiality 






In the 1300s the Christian Philosopher Duns Scotus forwarded a metaphysics of 
univocity, whereby the world, or being, is uttered with one voice (i.e. God), rather 
than several (i.e. God speaking and things existing independently of him and 
themselves) and giving rise to the concept of haecceity – as something processually 
of being, rather than a being. Univocity is an important concept for the 20th century 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, and is analogous to his concept of the plane of 
immanence – here difference in itself (rather than identity) is spoken univocally 
(Widder, 2009). However, in the 1600s Rene Descartes developed a natural science 
philosophy of dualism which has as a first principle the separation of mind from the 
physical world. In contrast to this dualist approach, skepticism of the existence of an 
incorporeal human mind or soul was provided by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, the 
work of John Locke, as well as Pierre Gassendi’s early specific criticisms of 
Descartes’ metaphysics (Wilson, 2016). Nonetheless, Descartes’ metaphysical 
dualism has taken root as arguably the default ontological position of understanding 
within the Western world and has greatly influenced the development of industrial, 
post-industrial, modern and postmodern institutions, including both education and 
environmental studies. In the modern era, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels articulated 





the materialist philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, Engels’ and Marx’s development of 
historical or dialectical materialism, based on an inversion of Hegel’s dialectic 
idealism, is both social analytic method and ontological position. Their focus on the 
physical and material distributions of means of production have been hugely 
influential in political science and economics without challenging inherent 
ontological dualisms per se. Concomitantly, and throughout the 20th century, process 
philosophers, particularly Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson and Gilles 
Deleuze, developed philosophies that explored the non-static nature of reality. 
Elsewhere Jamie and I have laid out new materialist positions in relation to process 







Why do I show you this? Why don’t I rewrite it in a creative manner? Well, 
maybe this talking back is creative itself. It allows a conversation to 
develop. It demonstrates different modes of thought. Perhaps it allows 
the reader to see my becoming. It allows comment on the genealogy of 
my writing. Of the thesis. I won’t deny, it’s also expedient to write like 
this. But it offers opportunities for my thinking. I can think with what I 
have written and where I am now. Where we are now. Where of is now. A 
diffractive encounter of past and present. Indeed, changing the past in 
the present (Barad, 2007). As I have said, one of my initial intentions for 
the study was an application of theory, as if theory is anything other than 
lived. As if theory was separate from life. 
 
But is this honest? Why include the history at all? I suppose partly I don’t 
know who I am writing for, or to. Yet, how honest is this? I have some 





for me, a space to diffract my practice, as an educator, as a researcher, as 
a person. But then, why show it to you, reader? Why not write it and then 
put it on a shelf, so to speak, or delete it? No, there are other reasons for 
writing it, unsaid reasons. I want a PhD for all sorts of reasons, some of 
which I come to later in the thesis. This writing is not just an attempt at 
diffractive practice. It’s also a manifestation of desire. Desire for 
diffractive practice, but also desire for the PhD. Desire for it to be over. 
Desire for the next stage in my life. Desire that isn’t even my desire. It’s 
desire that constitutes me. Desire as ontological process. All the stories of 
academic success gone before. The story of the career. The story of the 
secure job. The story of the PhD as the pinnacle of academic success. 
These stories are embodied through me, before me, and after me in 
others. Desire wants to achieve these stories. And so, it’s hedging its bets. 
It stands with a foot in each stream; the minor and the major. It wonders 
‘who do I need to convince?’. Desire is afraid of the viva. It is afraid that 
this writing, that doesn’t tell a history of materialism, that instead plays at 
performance, is too risky. But it’s also afraid of the other writing, that a 
history of materialism won’t let it pass. 
 
Carol Taylor (2016) puts it this way: 
 
These forces encourage us—give us heart to—resist the 
tyranny that requires academic writing to display Depth, 
Surface, Essence, Appearance, and Competence in favor of 
instantiating the practices of Performance, Authenticity, 
Pretence, Truth, Lies (MacLure, 2005) which, although often 
castigated as “frivolous,” are more likely as practices to help 
recover some of the gleeful fun of playing with ideas that 
Derrida thought should be the provenance of universities 
(Myerson, 1997). It may be that such writing is risky. It may 
be, as Barthes (1953) notes, that writing which works against 
the modes established “under the pressure of History and 
Tradition” may be “a mere moment” (pp. 16-17). It may also 
be that such writing provides examples of personal 





2011) thought was needed. The exemplars for doing this are 
beginning to multiply—but how might I do this? (Taylor, 
2016, p. 2) 
 
I was initially drawn to Taylor’s question myself. How might I do this? But 
now I see that it is not really ‘me’ asking this question (or me doing this 
seeing). It is desire asking how it might continue. Desire is not one thing. 
It is multiple. But it is historical and therefore economic. The desire that 
writes here is, at least in part, a capitalist desire. Eve Tuck mentions this: 
 
Democratic capitalism, which cannot reconcile itself, is the 
context of Deleuze and Guattari’s incongruous desire, which 
is also irreconcilable. It is desire’s nature of being unresolved 
and self-incompatible that makes desire productive. (2010, 
p.640) 
 
The incongruity is present in my writing. Desire is manifest in the ‘Depth, 
Surface, Essence Appearance, and Competence’ of academic writing as 
well as the ‘Performance, Authenticity, Pretence, Truth, Lies’ of more 
open, creative writing. Desire, manifest through me of flows of capitalism, 
romanticism, westernism, androcentrism, environmentalism…and 
perhaps, hopefully, a potential to destabilise these flows. The genealogy 
of the amorphous becoming Dave. 
 
As a minor voice, I dissipate now. The majoritarian Dave has a road to 
travel before he writes like this. I hope you see the minor cutting through 
at times, and perhaps gradually eliding the major that, for now, takes over 










What’s so new?  
 
The ‘newness’ of theory that positions itself as new materialist is of particular 
debate. The arrival of materialism is something of a recrudescence, being not 
necessarily new; though arriving at a time where it is, by definition, effecting ways 
of thinking the contemporary, and thus producing the new. Indeed, some significant 
articulations from within it state that everything is always new, in some way 
becoming other that it was. Coole and Frost (2011) suggest a ‘renewed materiality’, 
which draws on a long heritage of materialist thinking. Alternatively MacLure 
(2015) draws on Brian Massumi to suggest: 
 
 
As the diversity of terms indicates, contemporary materialisms draw on 
and revitalise a wide range of theories and ideas. Brian Massumi (2002: 
4), noting the multiplicity of intellectual currents that flow through the 
work, takes issue with its characterisation as ‘new’, suggesting that we 
think instead in terms of ‘conceptual infusions’ into an emerging 




Consequently the ‘material turn’ has been characterised as both an academic turn, 
and an academic (re)turn. Termed a turn because it is a movement that is substantial, 
appearing within and often forging social science and humanities discourse in, for 
example, architecture, anthropology, performing and visual arts, geography, and of 
course, education. And positioned as a (re)turn because of the prevalence of 
materialist ideas from post-structural thinkers present within it; thinkers whose ideas 
about language were held more prominent in the linguistic or discursive turns (St. 
Pierre, 2014). The discussion of the ‘newness’ of these movements is perhaps beside 
the point. It is the case that theoretical positions aligned with the moniker ‘new 
materialisms’ are greatly influencing debates across discipline areas in the 
humanities and social science. It is, rather, the opportunities that our present situation 





New Materialisms and Curriculum Studies, editors Snaza, Sonu, Truman and 
Zaliwska (2016, p.xxix) note: 
 
 
New materialisms gather together a range of ideas that have been taken 
up before, both in and outside of curriculum studies, but we think this 
gathering offers us a crucial chance to look at our practices as educators 
again, differently, more closely perhaps, as a gesture toward the 
emergence of new political action. 
 
 
Though there is no agreed definition or demarcation between the discursive and 
material turns, there is a sense in which theory and research have become more 
concerned with ontology.  
 
Within Environmental Education, Payne (2016) has signaled awareness of the non-
newness of theory which returns to circular debates regarding the priority of 
construction or discourse of reality or ontology. Similarly, writing in Children’s 
Geographies, Rautio notes: 
 
…the ‘new’ in new materialism does not have to refer to the alleged 
culmination in a theoretical understanding. Rather ‘new’ is said to refer 
both to the newness of the challenges and problems we face due to the 
complexities of twenty-first-century biopolitics and to the novelty and 




The terms ‘new materialism’ and ‘neomaterialism’ were coined by both Rosie 
Braidotti and Manuel DeLanda independently of each other in the second half of the 
1990s (van der Tuin and Dolphijn, 2010). However, a move to materialist process 
thinking in the social sciences can be traced to Latour and Woolgar (1979) as well as 
having links to other process philosophies of the 20th century. i.e. the work of Alfred 
North Whitehead and Gregory Bateson. Whilst not materialists per se, both these 
figures have effected the manner in which contemporary philosophers consider the 





of ‘brute’ matter, a critique that new materialists would agree with.  New 
materialisms has become an umbrella term used to encapsulate a general academic 
turn towards considering ontology in light of contemporary political and 
environmental events and their historical antecedents. This overview provides an 
acknowledgement of the potential deep implications that new materialisms provide 
for considering theory, research and practice in environmental education. Whist I 
have been interested in the potentials of the new materialisms for thinking 
environmental education for the past few years, and have explored some directions, I 
claim no mastery of the topics, nor answers to the questions proposed by this meeting 
of movements of thought (Clarke, 2017; Clarke and Mcphie, 2014, 2016; Mcphie 
and Clarke, 2015).  
 
What, then, are new materialisms? Whilst encapsulating a broad move toward 
ontology, there is no singular definition. We are all material beings constituted of a 
material world, yet materialism only appears sporadically and marginally in the 
history of philosophical thought (Coole and Frost, 2010). The main thrust of the new 
materialisms is a claim to take up philosophies of matter once again. New 
materialists posit that, philosophically speaking, social science in the last several 
decades has paid particular attention to subjectivity, at the expense of considering 
matter, due to a perceived inaccessibility of the material world.  
 
 
There is an apparent paradox in thinking about matter: as soon as we 
do, we seem to distance ourselves from it, and within the space that 
opens up a host of immaterial things seems to emerge: language, 
consciousness, subjectivity, agency, mind, soul; also imagination, 
emotions, values, meaning, and so on. These have typically been 
presented as idealities fundamentally different from matter and 
valorized as superior to the baser desires of biological material or 
inertia of physical stuff. It is true that over the past three decades or so 
theorists have radicalized the way they understand subjectivity, 
discovering its efficacy in constructing even the most apparently natural 
phenomena while insisting upon its embeddedness in dense networks of 
power that outrun its control and constitute its wilfulness. Yet it is on 
subjectivity that their gaze has focused. Our motivation…has been a 
conviction that it is now time to subject objectivity and material reality 







Whilst there are disparate strands in the new materialisms, there are of course 
affinities between theories that have attempted to move beyond discursive or 
linguistic accounts. Connolly (2013) for instance, acknowledges that whilst escaping 
discourse seems difficult, we have never been able to truly escape matter, and so new 
materialists offer various forms of contestable metaphysics. Specifically, new 
materialist theorists ‘find it essential to bring such a cosmology into play in concrete 
explorations of ethics, state politics and global politics, exposing by contrast and 
comparison as we do so conventional cosmologies now tacitly in play in the human 
sciences’ (Connolly, 2013, p.400). The political effects of troubling pre-given 
ontologies is perhaps one of the fundamental characteristics of the various new 
materialisms. For instance, there is a general troubling of the concepts that are often 
taken, ontologically, as relatively stable in developing policy, theory and research 
approaches. New materialisms ask questions about what agency is and where it is 
located; the axiomatic distinctions between what is ‘natural’ and what is human or 
human derived; as well as the possibilities of expanding the concept of ‘life’ beyond 
the solely organic, as in Jane Bennett’s (2010) Vibrant Matter and materially 
informed contemporary animism (Harvey, 2013). This troubling of established 
dualisms is spearheaded by attempts to articulate forms of protean monism 
(Connolly, 2013). For instance, in reference to the nature culture dualism, van der 
Tuin and Dolphijn (2010) offer: 
 
New materialism is a cultural theory that does not privilege culture, but 
focuses on what Haraway would call ‘naturecultures’. It explores a 
monist perspective of the human being, disposed of the dualisms that 
have dominated the humanities until today, by giving special attention 
to matter, as it has been so much neglected by dualist thought. New 
materialism, a cultural theory inspired by the thoughts of Deleuze, that 
spurs a renewed interest in philosophers such as Spinoza and Leibniz, 
shows how cultured humans are always already in nature, and how 
nature is necessarily cultured, how the mind is always already material, 
and how matter is necessarily something of the mind. New materialism 
opposes the transcendental and humanist (dualist) traditions that are 
haunting a cultural theory that is standing on the brink of both the 







New Materialisms is not one thing. For instance Speculative Realism (often in the 
form of Object Oriented Ontology, or OOO), Feminist New Materialisms, as well as 
an emerging Material Ecocriticism are prominent labels that have arisen, amongst 
others, to engage with the binaries highlighted above.  
 
 
Object Oriented Ontology 
 
‘OOO’ is a term coined by Levi Bryant, after his engagement with the object 
oriented philosophy of Graham Harman (Harman, 2015). OOO has much in common 
with other threads of the new materialisms, including a rejection of 
anthropocentrism. However it is defined by a particular take on ontology that retains 
the ‘objects’ which are often dissolved by other new materialist positions for being 
themselves anthropocentrically established. The focus on objects occurs as an 
attempt to overcome the problem of correlationism (that our observations of the 
world always retain subjective elements - there is no knowing the world or a given 
thing in itself; to say anything of the world is always also to say a correlate of our 
own thinking). Proponents of OOO thus offer various means by which to overcome 
both anthropocentrism and correlationism. In OOO the real is constituted by things 
that ‘are objects, not just amorphous “Matter,” objects of all shapes and sizes, from 
football teams to Fermi-Dirac condensates or, if you prefer something more 
ecological, from nuclear waste to birds’ nests’ (Morton, 2011, p.165). However, 
OOO adds several important stipulations to this position. For instance, in OOO 
objects retain an ‘irreducible dark side’, a position derived from Husserl but which is 
manifest here not in subject-object relationships, but object-object relationships 
(Morton, 2011). 
 
Objects withdraw from each other (Harman, 2015). Further, everything is an object, 
from dogs and tractors to climate change and ourselves. Even ‘relations’ (and ‘intra-
relations’) are objects. Within this field the works of Ian Bogost (Alien 
Phenomenology), Levi Bryant (The Democracy of Objects), Timothy Morton 
(Hyperobjects) and particularly Graham Harman have gained a significant following. 





far). Indeed exploring the relationship of politics to OOO has been critiqued as itself 
correlationist (Bryant, 2009) and, in contrast, as an important consideration for future 
work in OOO (Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, 2011). More recently Bryant has 
considered the implications of speculative realism for a critical pedagogy in the face 
of apocalypse. Interestingly for one of OOOs major proponents Bryant takes up a 
Deleuzian terminology of machinic assemblages of production in developing a 
pedagogy to tackle environmental crisis through considering our ontologies of 
everyday life (OEL) (Bryant, 2015). Other OOO scholars explore how the problems 
which we face are about coming to terms with the indisputability of objects, or, as 
Morton (2011) terms the stuff of the world, strange-strangers, rather than attempting 
to escape to an all encapsulating ‘Nature’ of modernism, or the ‘Non-Nature’ of 
other new materialist positions: 
 
 
The problem (ecological, political, mathematical, ontological) isn’t 
what we call “subject,” but “self” and its correlate, Nature— or Non-
Nature, or Matter. OOO thus differs from eliminative materialisms and 
realisms that hold, “There is a Non-Nature.” The trouble with standard 
ecological criticism—even Deep Ecology—is that it’s not nearly deep 
enough. Clinging to the palpable, we end up with faceless Nature, a 
symptom of how thinking has damaged Earth. OOO allows us to think 
deep down things. (Morton, 2011, p.185) 
 
 
In writing this thesis I draw on OOO in several ways. Tim Morton’s (2007) concept 
of ecology without nature plays an important role, helping me to think my practice 
without a concept of a green nature that is distinct from human produce, including 
football teams or Fermi-Dirac condensates. Further to this, as the thesis progresses, I 
seek to explore strangeness and the alien as modes of subjectification as a posthuman 
other. 
 
Feminist New Materialism 
 
In ready opposition to OOO, or at least, ready to generously critique various OOOs, 
are feminist new materialisms (see van der Tuin, 2014; and Taylor, 2016). Feminist 
new materialisms focus on ‘how the forces of matter and the processes of organic 





resistance to it’ (Frost, 2011, p. 70). In this way, feminist new materialisms position 
themselves as fundamentally political. Material feminists acknowledge how feminist 
theory and practice have been significantly enriched by the exploration of power, 
discourse and performativity of postmodern feminism. However, acknowledging the 
work of, for instance, Donna Haraway and Clare Colebrook, they argue for a return 
to matter to allow exploration of the effects and affects of bodies and the myriad 
material conditions of power: 
 
The retreat from materiality has had serious consequences for feminist 
theory and practice. Defining materiality, the body, and nature as 
products of discourse has skewed a tremendous outpouring of 
scholarship on “the body” in the last 20 years, nearly all of the work in 
this area has been confined to analysis of discourse about the body. 
(Alaimo and Hekman, 2008, p.3) 
 
 
Further, and significantly, the environment, non-human, or more-than-human is 
positioned as an upfront concern in feminist new materialisms. This concern arises 
both as a result of the challenging environmental conditions of the 21st century and in 
response to the need to critically address ‘nature’ from feminist positions. Despite the 
critical work of Carol Merchant and Val Plumwood, mainstream feminist theory:  
 
…relegated ecofeminism to the backwoods, fearing that any alliance 
between feminism and environmentalism could only be founded upon a 
naïve, romantic account of reality…The problem with this approach, 
however, is that the more feminist theories distance themselves from 
“nature”, the more that very “nature” is implicitly or explicitly 
reconfirmed as the treacherous quicksand of misogyny. (Alaimo and 
Hekman, 2008, p.4) 
 
In this way, feminist new materialists including but by no means limited to the work 
of Karen Barad, Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti, have drawn on both post-
structural theory and developments in the biological and quantum sciences, to appear 
at the vanguard of critical discussion surrounding the nature of nature/culture debates 
and returns to ontology. There is a particular taking up of the combined work of 20th 
century continental philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who over the 





metaphysics of immanence to contrast with more prevailing transcendent 
metaphysics. I have previously outlined this philosophy of immanence and suggested 
some implications of this ontology for outdoor education and teacher education 
(Clarke and Mcphie, 2014; Clarke and Mcphie, 2016). Within feminist new 
materialisms, as with Deleuze and Guattari, a posthuman understanding is forwarded 
in which knowledge/world production is neither anti-scientific nor posited on science 
as the single truth, dismissive of other onto-epistemologies (Ahmed 2008). Taylor 
and Ivinson (2013) point out that ‘‘new’ material feminisms displace the human as 
the principal ground for knowledge […] and accepts that matter is alive.’ (p. 666). 
There is a ‘priority given to difference, entanglement and undecidability’ as it 
challenges ‘the distance, separation and categorical assurance that shores up the self-
mastery of the oedipal (male) subject of humanism’ (MacLure, 2015, p. 5).  
 
This thesis borrows the impactful nature of the material and subsequent posthuman 
conception of research practices forwarded by feminist new materialisms. It also 
borrows the decentring of agency and the inseparability of ethics, ontology and 





My third thread, Material ecocriticism, concerns interests in the narrative potentiality 
of matter through significance and innate meaning making and in this sense deviates 
from feminist new materialisms and OOO. The focus on stories within material 
ecocriticism retains an anthropocentric flavour whereby the human ‘species’, whilst 
‘extended’, is ultimately responsible for the destruction of a distinct ‘nature’: 
 
While attending to the radically local, material ecocriticism also looks 
more broadly at human beings and the impact of their agency as an 
especially widely distributed species. Being a species means being 
material bodies with long-term histories, most of which are natural but 
some of which are decidedly unnatural. Nevertheless, our capacity for 
storytelling and tool-making serves to extend our material bodies and 
the material processes in which they are enmeshed, not to sever us from 







Further, Iovino and Oppermann’s (2014) materialism focuses on storied matter:  
 
 
Material ecocriticism is the study of the expressive dynamics of 
nature’s constituents, or narrative agencies of storied matter at every 
scale of being in their mutual entanglements. It seeks to explore the 
narrative dimension of the material world in terms of the stories 
embodied in material formations. (Oppermann, emphasis in original, 
2013, p. 57) 
 
 
This focus on stories is evocative of Ingold’s (2011) notion of storied worlds that are 
verbed into life, which I explore elsewhere (Clarke and Mcphie, 2014). There is a 
further resemblance to the discursive-material nature of reality enacted by agential 
cuts, as described by Barad (2007). Ethically speaking, material ecocriticism seeks to 
acknowledge the relationality of human beings through establishing new narratives 
of matter: 
 
With its sense of agential kinships, material ecocriticism wants to “help 
build ongoing stories rather than histories that end” (Haraway 1). This 
vision entails a sense of ontological and historical humility, an ethics of 
social hope, and a new moral imagination. On this open ground, 
humans share their narrative horizon with other subjects and other 
things, aware that the effort to listen to the world in the entirety of its 




Material ecocriticism is, as with OOO and feminist new materialisms, a broad, loose 
and possibly arbitrary label as there are voices within it that reach across and 
dissolved disciplinary boundaries and categorisation. And so, whilst this is in no way 
an exhaustive review of new materialisms (for example, there are also rich 
articulations of vibrant materiality in contemporary animism theorising as well as 
new science of the mind), I think the three strands above suggest some divergent 
directions that are already influencing material-discourse in environmental education 





enact stories, or narratives of practice, that displace traditional separations of 
education, the environment, and thesis writing. 
 
Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari 
 
The final thread I want to discuss is Gilles Deleuze, and Gilles Deleuze with Felix 
Guattari. As I have mentioned, Deleuze and Deleuze with Guattari have been 
particularly influential among feminist new materialists. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy has been linked to environmental thought previously. Hayden (1997) 
discussed the usefulness of Deleuzian philosophy for environmental thinking. He 
suggests that Deleuze’s notion of micropolitics might be enacted ‘to create new ways 
of thinking and feeling that support social and political transformation with respect to 
the flourishing of ecological diversity’ (Hayden, 1997, p.185). The pedagogical 
potential of Deleuze’s philosophy for ecological futures is echoed by Hroch (2014) 
and Kruger (2016). For Hroch (2014, p.54) this call for a ‘new earth’, ‘new people’ 
and ‘new concepts’ draws together politics, ontology and pedagogy: ‘the call for a 
new earth and a new people is at once an affirmation of and an invitation to the 
people in the here and now to be creative in thinking and practices concerning their 
earthly existence so that they can become-other’. Hannah Stark (2017, p.154) also 
hints at the ethical slant of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, in the way it helps us 
to think: 
 
…not about individual units and their capacities for relation, but about 
the micro-processes, forces and assemblages that subsist beneath the 
level of the subject. Their work is utopian in its tenor. It reminds us that 
subjectivity is not innate and does not manifest an interior essence but 
instead that ontology can be otherwise, that we can be the ‘people that 
do not yet exist’ on ‘a new earth’.  
 
 
Piotrowski (2017) considers the formation of subjectivities in the Canadian 
environmental movement by thinking with Deleuze’s notions of the fold and 





portrayals of hypocrisy. This chimes with Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of things as 
‘haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective 
assemblages’ (1986, p.266). 
 
From Whitehead’s Process and Reality to Bateson and further to 
Deleuze, process philosophy can provide ecology with a conceptual 
ground that allows for the ‘complexification’ [or, in Deleuzian terms, 
the complication] of the current ecological debate beyond the bounds of 
the strict distinction between homocentrism and ecocentrism. Although 
such a complexification would already be an important ‘further step’ 
towards a truly ecological culture, beyond these political dynamics, 
‘processing ecology with Deleuze’ allows for something that might 
ultimately be more important: the ecologization of the subject. The true 
point-of-perspective of ‘processing ecology with Deleuze’ lies in the 
processualization and singularization of the subject, in its immersion 
with horizontal planomenon of flattened hierarchies and within the 
overall ‘mentality – and mental ecology – of haecceities that make up 
the plane of immanence. Ultimately, ‘processing ecology with Deleuze’ 
means never to forget that, in our origami world, “the eco-mental 
system called Lake Erie is part of your wider eco-mental system – and 
that if Lake Erie is driven insane, its insanity is incorporated in the 
larger system of your thought and experience” (Bateson 492). 
(Haferkamp, 2008, p.62-63) 
 
 
There are two elements at work in Haferkamp’s (2008) description of ‘processing 
ecology with Deleuze’. Firstly, that Deleuze brings a particular insight to the 
ontological ground upon which debates of correct response to environmental damage 
are based, and secondly that Deleuze has something to say about what the ‘subject’ 
should become in order to be ‘truly ecological’. In this thesis, as things turn out, I 











There are clear implications of considering modes of environmental action resulting 
from an understanding that the material world is in process with, for instance, 
Morton’s OOO and Barad’s agential realism: 
 
…the difference between Barad’s and Morton’s formulations of agency 
and ontology is a matter of emphasis: Morton is interested in objects in 
motion; Barad is concerned with objects in motion. Despite this 
difference, however, Barad and Morton, when considered alongside 
each other, offer a crucial insight to anyone concerned with human and 
nonhuman relations in a time of climate change. New materialism and 
object-oriented ontology together foreground the way in which 




There is no one ‘new materialism’ but, rather like the nature of the ontologies 
Deleuze depicts, there is a multiplicity. Both one and many. One line through this 
burgeoning and proliferating field of academic writing is present in this thesis. It 
could never be a ‘full’ or ‘rigorous’ reading. Rather, it is my way through, thinking 
alongly (Ingold, 2011). Each time it is encountered it is encountered differently, 
whether slightly or radically. It is never closed off. 
 
New materialisms, then, are multiple approaches. They are certainly no ‘magic 
formula’ but rather they offer a push to think in different ways. In this thesis I draw 
predominantly on broad new materialist literature and the work of Deleuze and 
Deleuze and Guattari, but also draw on feminist new materialisms for the political 
reasons I articulate above. However, I do not consider ‘feminist new materialisms’ 
homogenous, nor homogenable. Instead each reading will be its own path through 
the literature, hence my use of the term ‘a material turn’ rather than ‘the material 
turn’. This term plays a dual role by also articulating (another term for turning!) my 
own turning as a result of this process: my own environmental education (where 
‘environmental’ is understood in the broadest sense). The term ‘turn’ is, in fact, apt 
for the process I am undergoing as I write this thesis. As Hekman (2010, p 68, cited 






…the new approach does not have an agreed-upon label. Many have 
been proposed: several feminist critics of science favor “the new 
materialism”; Nancy Tuana proposes “interactionism” and “viscous 
porosity”; Karen Barad favors “intra-action” and “agential realism.” 
The lack of consensus on a label, however, is indicative of little more 
than the newness of the approach. (p. 68) 
 
 
Sarah Whatmore (2006) offers that within cultural geography discussion of 
materiality ‘manifests a rich variety of analytical impulses; philosophical resources 
and political projects that don’t ‘add up’ to a singular ‘new’ approach, let alone one 
that has a monopoly of insight or value’ (p.601). What is new or significant about the 
language of ‘returns’, according to Whatmore, is: 
 
…a product of repetition - turning seemingly familiar matters over and 
over, like the pebbles on a beach - rather than a product of sudden 
encounter or violent rupture. Just as importantly, what is different or 
innovatory about these materialist returns is generated as much by the 
technologically and politically molten climate that informs cultural 
geographers’ intellectual investments and worldly involvements as by 
any academic repositioning (p.601). 
 
 
Perhaps these are old ideas put to work in new ways, dealing with new problems. 
 
 
New materialisms and outdoor/environmental education 
 
 
Outdoor education approaches have become strongly associated with the 
development of pro-environmental and sustainable values and behaviour 
development in both theory and research practices (e.g. Bögeholz, 2006; Bogner, 
1998; Christie & Higgins, 2012; Cooper, 2010; Duerden and Witt, 2010; Ewert, 
Place, & Sibthorp, 2005; Higgins, 1997; Kals, Schumacher & Montada, 1999; 
Knapp, 1999; Mittelstaedt, Sanker, & VanderVeer, 1999; Tarrant & Green, 1999; 
Wells & Lekies, 2006). Impetus for the development of empirical and theoretical 
work in this area is based on, for example, UNESCO’s declaration that the years 
2005-2015 constitute a ‘decade for sustainability education’ and calls from NGOs 





based within a paradigm of ‘ecological crisis’, which, in turn, stems from the reports 
of the IPCC (2007, 2013), as well as from the historical environmental movement 
more broadly. Policy wise, a terminological move from ‘environmental education’ to 
‘education for sustainable development’ has been seen as legitimisation by some, but 
potentially limiting, overly globalised and prescriptive by others (Jickling & Wals, 
2008). Nonetheless ‘education for sustainable development’ through outdoor 
learning is a prominent concept that, for example, has recently gained policy 
acceptance with the General Teaching Council for Scotland’s embedding of 
‘Learning for Sustainability’ (consisting of the three themes of Global Citizenship, 
Education for Sustainable Development and Outdoor Learning) into the Professional 
Standards for Scottish teachers. A recent review of literature concerning outdoor 
experiential learning’s influence on developing sustainability and an ethic of 
environmental care highlights key themes of perceived importance including the 
promotion of ecological literacy, establishing connections to place, developing 
student empowerment as well as the encouraging of direct experiences with ‘nature’ 
(Christie and Higgins, 2012). These approaches are endorsed by prominent NGOs 
who promote outdoor learning experiences in order to ‘connect’ (RSPB), be in 
‘harmony with’ (WWF), stop the ‘decline’ of (Friends of the Earth) or ‘apprentice’ 
ourselves to (Greenpeace) ‘nature’. However, Christie and Higgins (2012) highlight 
the lack of quality research concerning experiential outdoor education and values and 
action for sustainability. For instance, Lugg (2007) notes that research in the area has 
lacked a ‘learning process’ perspective, instead often quantitatively attempting to 
prove that outdoor experiential education can result in measurable outcomes. Sandell 
and Öhman (2013) suggest this approach is problematic as such relationships are 
difficult to establish in educational research. Previously, Jamie and I have also 
highlighted the dualistic or boundaried assumptions upon which prevailing 
approaches to outdoor environmental sustainability education practice and research 
rest (e.g. working within, and emphasising, a conception of a nature/culture binary) 
(Clarke and Mcphie, 2014; Clarke and Mcphie 2016; Mcphie and Clarke, 2015). My 
interest is in exploring how I might write a personal outdoor environmental 
education in a manner that questions prominent dualisms in environmental education 





have been grappled with by authors of environmental education in many different 
ways.  
 
For instance, recent theoretical developments in cultural studies, anthropology and 
human geography bring to the fore post-human and new materialist counters to 
dominant dualistic essentialist perspectives of human-environment relations that 
have provided opportunities for combining educational research with lived-
experience, ontologies of becoming, and environmental perspectives and values (e.g. 
Castree, 2003; Clarke and Mcphie, 2014; Ingold, 2011; Mannion, Fenwick and 
Lynch, 2013; Wylie, 2007). Mannion, Fenwick and Lynch (2013, p.804), for 
instance, refer to the potential of this ontological turn for sustainability education 
when they state: 
 
Place-responsive pedagogy...can be aligned with emerging post-
humanist lines of thinking and theorising that attend to the 
sociomaterial which we consider a critical feature of emerging debates 
in environmental education about how to change human–environment 
relations 
 
Environmental thinking, then, is moving into a post-green era and there is a growing 
body of literature that takes up new materialist positions in considering 
environmental education. There are, of course, many practices and theorisations of 
how to educate to counter environmental harm. Here I turn to some examples of 
authors who have taken their own lines through new materialisms in the field of 
environmental education. Considering developing materialist theory has already been 
identified as an emerging ‘route’ for environmental education. In Environmental 
Education Research, a significant journal in the field, Van Poeck, and Lysgaard 
(2016) consider the potentials for materially informed theory to explore policy 
approaches to environmental sustainability education and their capacity to: 
 
…challenge certain ideas and perspectives in philosophy of education, 
(social) constructivism and critical theory by revealing the need to 





seriously take the materiality of context of sustainability debates into 
account (Van Poeck, and Lysgaard, 2016, p.313, emphasis in original).  
 
 
Van Poeck and Lysgaard (2016, p.314) further articulate how, amongst other 
approaches, claims of new materialists to operate beyond the strictly discursive may 
‘offer relevant and inspiring ideas, concepts, frameworks and findings to ESE policy 
research as well as the broader field of educational research’. Concurrently the new 
materialisms have recently been characterised as a new movement in thought for 
outdoor environmental education research (Gough, 2016) as well as a theoretical area 
that might hold potential for interrogating various ‘absences and silences’ within 
environmental education research (Payne, 2016). I see a genealogical thread of 
engagement with post-structural materialist thought in outdoor and environmental 
education (e.g. Barrett, 2005; Bell and Russell, 2000; Gough, 1999; Gough and 
Price, 2004; McKenzie, 2005; Stables, 2007), as well as work that has drawn on the 
materialist philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari within environmental education 
specifically (Gough and Sellers, 2004; Stewart, 2011, 2015), that must be considered 
as highly relevant to any ‘new’ turn to materiality in environmental education. This 
is especially true of unresolved debates concerning materiality and language from the 
mid 2000s (see the Special Issue in volume 11, issue 4 of Environmental Education 
Research, especially Russell, 2005). 
 
Examples of recent work in environmental education that reference authors I 
perceive as aligning themselves with new materialist theory include Lysgaard and 
Fjeldsted’s (2015) examination of speculative realism and nature education ‘between 
discourse and matter’, Pauliine Rautio (2014) and Karen Malone’s (2016) uptake of 
the agential realism of feminist new materialist Karen Barad in considering 
children’s geographies. Here I would also include creative engagements such as 
Leesa Fawcett’s (2009) Feral Sociality and (Un)Natural Histories in which she 
thinks environmental education, salmon, and, among other things, earthworms 
rhizomatically to consider the (nomadic) ethical practice of environmental education 
scholarship. There are also a host of authors working in early childhood under the 
combined banner of the Common Worlds Research Collective (e.g. Affrica Taylor, 





Chessa Adsit-Morris’ (2017) book Restorying Environmental Education, in which 
she thinks with the feminist new materialisms of Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, 
and Karen Barad, is yet another example of new theory being put to work to 
reconfigure more contemporary approaches to environmental education. I also see 
commonalties with new materialist theory and Indigenous and decolonial approaches 
which focus on cultural perspectives, ontology and critiques of dominant ways of 
knowing and being, whilst acknowledging incommensurabilities which require 
attention (Tuck, McKenzie and McCoy, 2014; Tuck and McKenzie, 2015). Sonu and 
Snaza’s (2015, p.258) interrogation of ecological pedagogy with new materialisms 
suggests a need to engage in creative practice to ‘disrupt theories of vertical 
domination and conquest’ which may appear within environmental education 
practice-research. Additionally a series of environmental education authors have 
acknowledged the work of feminist new materialists, the related field of non-
representation theory, and a movement in anthropology to move to sociomaterial 
theory beyond nature/culture duality via a focus on ontology (spearheaded by, for 
example, Tim Ingold, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2013, 2016) as significant for environmental 
education research, e.g. Carolan (2007), Gannon (2017), Lynch and Mannion (2016), 
Rautio (2013), Rooney (2016), Ross and Mannion (2012). Lastly, I am aware of the 
diverse terminology in play within turns towards materiality and the particular move 
within educational discourse towards ‘sociomateriality’. Sociomateriality has been 
referenced in research works with a focus on the conception of place based 
environmental education (e.g. Mannion, Fenwick and Lynch, 2013; Nxumalo, 2016). 
McKenzie and Bieler (2016) offer a number of empirical educational place-oriented 
projects through a sociomaterial lens to argue that ‘categorizing some concerns as 
“social justice” or “critical” issues and others as “environmental” becomes 
increasingly untenable’ (p.5) and draw from many authors aligned with the new 
materialisms as they do so. 
 
Importantly, some previous work in outdoor environmental education perfunctorily 
draws on Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, (Zink and Burrows, 2008; Irwin, 2010; 
Waite and Pleasants, 2012) and other work has engaged with some figurations of the 





environmental education (e.g. Clarke and Mcphie, 2014; Clarke and Mcphie, 2015; 
Mcphie and Clarke, 2015; Gough and Sellers, 2004; Stewart, 2011).  
 
Whilst the literature listed here informs my starting place, I do not necessarily return 
to it as I move through the thesis. My hope is that the haecceities that make up this 
thesis add to these discussions by situating an environmental education on a plane of 






Haecceity 3: Research fuzziness: making the thesis 
 
In this haecceity I inquire into the type of inquiry I am enacting in this thesis. 
Currently I’m not sure how inquiry works. Rather than describing a method, I seem 
to have written orientations or clusters of thoughts-theories about inquiry: Fuzzy 
ideas about what inquiry is becoming. The terms ‘fuzzy’ and ‘fuzziness’ seemed to 
fit in describing something present yet indistinct. Deleuze and Guattari use ‘fuzzy’ to 
describe an opposition to axiomatic approaches, where the taken-for-granted is 
operationalized. For them ‘the axiomatic manipulates only denumerable sets, even 
infinite ones, whereas the minorities constitute “fuzzy,” nondenumerable, 
nonaxiomizable sets, in short, “masses,” multiplicities of escape and flux’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004, p.519). These ‘fuzzinesses’ thus try not to take method for 
granted. They also move across ‘denumerable sets’, or pre-given categories. I work 
concomitantly with issues of methodology, and issues of critique in outdoor 
environmental education. This being so it may be generative for the reader to read 
Haecceity 4 before, or perhaps during the reading of this Haecceity; I struggled to 
decide in which order they should appear in the thesis. In Haecceity 4 I lay out issues 
of thinking Deleuze and Guattari and new materialisms with outdoor environmental 
education through stories of my ‘practice’. This was written at a time before these 
fuzzinesses greatly impacted my research, and reading from Heacceity 5 onwards 
demonstrates their gradual impact more fully. The fuzzinesses seem to tail off in odd 
directions that suggest that inquiry isn’t a straightforward endeavour, and yet these 
fuzzinesses are not necessarily transferable to or resonant with other projects. At the 
very minimum, they live in my inquiry. Since writing these fuzzinesses, I have come 
across a new book titled Madness as Methodology, by Ken Gale (2018). I’m halfway 
through the book and find myself nodding often.  
 
Fuzziness 1: Post-qualitative research and politics in environmental education 
 
In my reading of academic literature it seems that in recent years there has been a 
growing turn in educational research. This turn focuses on post-structurally informed 
post-human and the new materialist research approaches and the potential that these 





academic journals (Lather and St. Pierre, 2013; Pedersen and Pini, 2016; St. Pierre, 
Mazzei and Jackson, 2016) and various research textbooks (E.g. Jackson and Mazzei, 
2012; Koro-Ljungberg, 2015; Taylor and Hughes, 2016) the authors taking up these 
post-qualitative methodological issues and insights draw on new materialist, post-
humanist and/or new empiricist theory though, as St. Pierre, Mazzei and Jackson 
(2016, p. 106) state, ‘no doubt, those we might categorize as “new materialists” and 
“new empiricists” will refuse those labels because there is no essence to center such 
structures’. These authors aim to problematise research practices and concepts that 
have been axiomatic in qualitative research handbooks and lecture rooms for many 
years, with the aim of arriving at something new. For example, in her contribution to 
the 4th edition of the SAGE handbook of qualitative research, edited by Denzin and 
Lincoln (2011), St. Pierre (2011, p.623, emphasis in original) wonders: 
 
 
…Why not try something different? 
But what happens next, is happening now, and has always happened, 
cannot be predicted or controlled. People everywhere always re-think, 
deconstruct, invent, and we theorists and researchers are always 
catching up, trying to make sense of their work. We individuate, we 
order, we name, we try to control, we draw lines. Nonetheless, they 
resist structural boundaries as they create entanglements that may 
initially seem incongruous. I propose we worry less – so much angst – 
about what might happen if we give up exhausted structures and attend 
to what is happening. Deconstruction has already happened; it is 
happening at this moment, everywhere. 
 
 
St. Pierre (2011) frames post-qualitative research as a (re)turn to the deconstructive 
possibilities of post-structuralism, and as a chronological indicator of what comes 
after ‘conventional humanistic qualitative inquiry’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p.613). Further 
to this, and perhaps characteristically in comparison to other applications of post-
structural philosophy to research, post-qualitative research is informed by a particular 
curiosity of the affective capacities of bodies, what influential new materialist Jane 
Bennett (2010) describes as ‘thing power’. To this end post-qualitative inquiry draws 
from myriad authors prioritising the affective capacity of things; that questions the 





returned to the questions of the nature of reality, how and if things are divided, 
connected, whole or partial, set or changing, and the role that materiality and 
language plays in creating our worlds and, in turn, the role worlds play in creating 
social and environmental modes of behaviour and oppressions. Suffice to say post-
qualitative inquiry is not one approach. 
 
The extent to which these ‘new’ philosophies are driving critical discussion, and 
specifically research practices, is significant. Koro-Ljungberg, Carlson, Tesar and 
Anderson (2015, p.613) suggest a ‘qualitative revolution’ has occurred: 
 
This qualitative revolution has opened up not only the breadth of the 
field, but, even more importantly, the depth. For instance, recent 
projects on thinking with theory (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012), data (Koro-
Ljungberg & MacLure, 2013), and more-than-human commonworlds 
(Blaise, Pacini-Ketchabaw, & Taylor, 2014) are positioned in what 
Lather and St. Pierre (2014) refer to as post-qualitative inquiry. These 
branches and thinking with and beyond the traditional boundaries of 
research design lead qualitative inquiry down a path of reaching out and 
performing qualitative inquiry without borders or boundaries, as the de-
colonizing and liberating practices of recent qualitative inquiry contest 
the ideas of “oppression” of traditional research design and 
methodology (Steinberg & Cannella, 2012). Qualitative inquiry serves a 
transformative function for “thinking with” or “re-thinking” beings and 




In and of itself, the growth of post-qualitative inquiry is relevant to environmental 
education research as it demonstrates a converging/diverging/emerging current 
concerned with new ways of doing research in education that attempt to account for 
the material agencies that have often been omitted or classified as secondary to 
human experience in the social sciences. As St. Pierre (1997, p.175) puts it, the 
purpose is ‘to produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently’. This 
is useful given the requirement to embrace new modes of thought and research in 
environmental education (Scott, 2009). Aside from the benefit of the ‘new’ that post-
qualitative research brings are, I believe, benefits to the specific problem of nature in 
environmental education research. No matter the diversity of post-qualitative 





dualisms of, for instance, nature and culture and traditional renderings of subject and 
object. These dualisms lie at the heart of the most fundamental questions of 
environmental education: how are people and planet best aligned, conceptually and 
practically. Other fields have begun to acknowledge the push that these theoretical 
discussions have for their research orientations, and environmental education has a 
long history of considering these questions. Discussing the material, as well as other 
recent theoretical turns, Dowling, Lloyd and Suchet-Pearson (2017, p.824) 
acknowledge the challenge in studies in geography for instance: 
 
This shift in recognizing and acknowledging multiple more-than-human 
agencies challenges researchers to do geography differently – to 
perform, to engage, to embody, to image and imagine, to witness, to 
sense, to analyse – across, through, with and as, more-than-humans. It 
also invites researchers to open research relationships, thinking, and 
representations to beings, things, and objects previously ignored as 





As previously mentioned, there is a space of environmental education research which 
is beginning to take up the potential of post-qualitative/post-human/new materialist 
approaches. This space combines with the history of post-structural critique in 
environmental education (see Hart, 2005). I would point to Karen Malone’s (2017) 
work on child-dog encounters as an example of this. Further Sonu and Snaza (2015, 
p.261) draw on Pettman (2011) to highlight the potential of new materialist research 
to considering the fragility of ecological pedagogy, noting:  
 
 
Although humanist education treats the human as a being separated 
from “nature” by a rupture, we must begin to imagine forms of 





Noel Gough’s contributions over the years, including his taking up of Deleuze and 





significant in forging this space. Gough’s recent contribution on considering the new 
materialisms as a postparadigmatic ‘new movement of thought’ for environmental 
education has serious implications for the manner in which environmental education 
research is framed. Further, Phillip Payne (2016) has recently suggested that new 
materialist inquiry may lie on the path that springs from the question ‘what next?’ in 
relation to environmental education research. Payne (2016) highlights a series of 
‘absences’ and ‘silences’ within environmental education research discourse. One of 
his silences and absences is the ‘new theory’; the critical turns of various kinds, new 
academic grammars, methodologies and resources. Payne broadly implies that the 
new materialisms may have something to offer environmental education theory, 




Although deconstructing the alleged nature-culture binary might be 
fashionable in certain quarters, the universalizing implications of 
homogenizing and conflating nature and culture, and their 
environments, and humans and nonhumans, for EE and ESD are 
profound—theoretically, pedagogically, and practically. What then is 
“environmental education” and what is being “sustained” in relation to 




There is a sense in which the orientations provided by post-human theory, including 
the new materialisms, tackle ontological problems whilst presenting (or ignoring) 
political ones. For, as I asked earlier, if there is no nature, then what is environmental 
education for? Eve Tuck and Marcia McKenzie (2015, p.17) voice their concern for 
what they perceive as the apolitical nature of some new materialist research: 
 
 
The increasing influence of Indigenous and decolonizing scholarship, 
spatial theories, and new materialisms on the theories, methodologies, 
and methods of social science cannot be disputed. However, although 
one might suppose that such innovations and recalibrations might 
prompt a more robust discussion of place in the social sciences, this is 
not often the case. In many cases, flattened ontological or materialist 





attempting to better attend to the inter-connected “networks” or 








…‘to date much empirical sociomaterial research has a relatively 
narrow and depoliticized research gaze. We anticipate a growing 
number of empirical studies that use similar theoretical frames to take 
up critical questions of place and materiality.’ (2015, p.104) 
 
 
Examples of more ‘political’ (according to Tuck and McKenzie, 2015) research 
using sociomaterialism include Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy and 
Public Life by Braun and Whatmore (2010) – they site Hawkins, (2010) who 
discusses Bennett’s (2010) thing power and plastic bag use and ethical reasoning 
about the environment. Rose (1999) who posits ‘technologies of citizenship’ in the 
form of lightbulbs and thermostats, as well as the work of Marres (e.g. 2016) who 
advocates public involvement in environmental issues via technologies. Of course, I 
would read this as a narrowing of the term ‘political’ to always involve the human.  
 
Gerrad, Rudolph and Sriprakash (2017) raise several points of (traditional) critique 
against post-qualitative approaches. They suggest that, in what they see as its 
complexity and difficulty, it can fail to acknowledge the exclusionary boundaries it 
creates; between those in the know and with secure academic positions to execute it, 
and those not in these positions. They are concerned about the potential 
‘mystification’ of the research process in post-qualitative research’s turn to 
researcher intuition and affect. Further, they suggest the focus on the ‘new’ can 
reinforce settler colonialism in research practices. In thinking about these points, I 
could follow a rational logic to agree with or critique these critiques, and this is 
tempting, but, in recognition of an immanent critique as the mode of thought of post-
qualitative research (MacLure, 2015), I instead wonder at the potential for research 
to open-up the concerns that Gerrad, Rudolph and Sriprakash (2017) describe; to riff 





post-qualitative research: they imply modes of existence, they do things. Post-
qualitative research doesn’t attempt to operate from a perspective of critical 
objectivity, but rather acknowledges the situated, partial, ethical, relational, 
posthuman and responsive ways of knowing that have been developed in feminist 
studies. It is non-oppositional. Post-qualitative research might not best be described 
as an approach, but as a series of understandings that can hook up with other 
understandings, even critiques, in the pursuit of ethical research. Personally, I feel I 
am learning about post-qualitative research all the time. It never feels like something 
that I will finally ‘get’. It always feels like an attempt, or something that informs my 
thinking about research. For now, I think that philosophical concepts garnered from 
reading are methods, but are also tools that allow possibilities for living (Taguchi & 
St. Pierre, 2017). In post-qualitative inquiry, philosophy is not an arcane practice that 
has no bearing on the real problems of the world. Rather, philosophical thought is the 
coal face of practice; it expands the realm of the possible, and acknowledges that 
research creates worlds (Law, 2004). 
 
Whilst discussing post-humanism more broadly, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson (2013, 




While post-humanism may have dealt a powerful blow to the 
Enlightenment subject’s claims of sovereignty, autonomy, and 
exceptionalism with respect to nonhuman animals, technology, objects, 
and environment, the field has yet to sufficiently distance itself from 
Enlightenment’s hierarchies of rationality: “Reason” was still, in effect, 
equated with Western and specifically Eurocentric structures of 
rationality. Thus, the very operations of rationality used to evaluate the 
truth claims of the Enlightenment subject remained committed to its 




Along the same lines as the ‘apolitical’ critique offered here, a further consideration 
is that the ‘conflating’ of nature and culture that a new materialist reading suggests - 
the ‘flat ontology’ - is a real concern for those who have argued so passionately for 





postmodern ecological thought, as developed by Carol Merchant, Val Plumwood and 
others, is convincing in its articulation of the damage created by the separation of 
‘nature’ (the environment) and ‘culture’. I think I agree with Payne (2016), then, that 
rather than an abstracted ‘mashing’ of nature and culture, we require nuance and, 
perhaps, a gentle touch which is at the same time firm, curious and concerned. With 
this thought in mind I, perhaps contradictorily, hesitantly and enthusiastically 
consider post-qualitative research a potential theorising tool for articulating the 
nuance required for ‘post-green’ environmental education research. Even if it is a 
mircopolitics, rather than a macro or majoritarian one. Edwards and Fenwick (2015, 
p.1402), for instance, suggest that: 
 
In attempting to blackbox the sociomaterial as non-critical or lacking a 
politics to address issues of power and inequality, there is a matter of 
fact claim being made. Our concern…has been to keep this question 
open in order to provide different opportunities for experimentation 
[with] the questions we could address in educational theory, research 
and pedagogic practice and how forms of intervention address them.  
 
Leaving ethics as an ‘open question’ seems to mean following the possibilities for 
new materialist research and the new ethical worlds it may allow (by paying attention 
to the other), whilst remaining sensitive to the possible ethical infractions, be they 
social or environmental, that this will inevitably enact. This type of ethics is one that 
is lived as it goes. A curriculum alive of the environing process that is people going 
about their lives (in this case, researchers/educators) of the world will always be 
micropolitical.  
 
Politics is, however, not just about the nature of theory, but about the nature of 
critique. The term ‘environmental education’ is something of an empty signifier with 
an ‘impossible identity’ (González-Gaudiano and Buenfil-Burgos, 2009) and so 
cannot be conceived as an essentialised field of practice. So, what do I mean when I 
refer to ‘environmental education’ in the thesis? Initially, I was interested in applying 
new materialisms, or what I thought of as a theoretical perspective, to the corpus of 





combining the Deleuzian inspired critiques of various theoretical positions towards 
environmental crisis, put forward by Mark Halsey (2006), with an overview of 
practical ‘currents’ that constitute approaches to environmental education, provided 
by Sauvé (2005). Once I’d written that chapter it felt unhelpful to where my thinking 
was taking me. It attempted an overview, or a mass movement of capture, which felt 
at odds with the situated approach I am now trying to enact. It felt unethical, like an 
attempt to lay waste to a body of work, rather than think generatively and ‘towards 
the gathering’ (Latour, 2004). It began to make more sense to write of environmental 
education for me, where environmental education was encountered in materials, as 
research texts, places, and time with students, as I experienced it immanently, rather 
than as a thing out there. The thesis thus focuses on a micropolitics of a very specific 
‘environmental education’. Micropolitics here refers to the situated, affectively 
embodied site of subject formation. Singh (2018) discusses a turn to ‘affective 
ecologies’, whereby the broader material and affective turns focus on environmental 
possibilities for environmental change and politics. Singh (2018) highlights the 
debate between the position that a turn to ‘affect’ theory fails to deal with the ‘hard’ 
political problems of environmental justice:  
 
…political theorist Nancy Fraser (1997) voices…concern that the turn 
to affect can provoke a retreat to soft, psycho-cultural issues of identity 
at the expense of the hard, political issues of economic justice, 
environmental sustainability, human rights, or democratic governance. 
In response to Fraser, Bennett (2010: xi) argues that the bodily 
disciplines through which ethical sensibilities and social relations are 
formed and reformed are ‘themselves’ political and constitute a whole 
(underexplored) [sic] field of ‘micropolitics’. (Singh, 2018, p.2) 
 
 
Micropolitics of affect is a useful, perhaps the only, starting place. My thesis has 
come to focus on a further question of transcendent environmental ethics that resides 
in the turn to micropolitical affective ecologies. For instance, Jane Bennett (2010, 
p.xi) also argues that ‘there can be no greening of the economy, no redistribution of 
wealth, no enforcement or extension of rights, without human dispositions, moods, 
and cultural ensembles hospitable to these effects’. Whilst there is a plain focus on an 
affective site of ethics here, the ethical problems are prescribed ahead of time. There 





affective modes of being are posited as a solution (Singh, 2018). This seems to 
contradict both my understanding of immanent ethics (as non-prescriptive) and 
immanent ontology (as flattening the binaries of nature and culture). 
 
I explore these issues through the environing educational becoming process of my 
post-subjective education through and of the (non-essentialised) environment. It is an 
environment made up of places; the city of Edinburgh, of cafes, of my flat and my 
family, of memories, my life, and particularly of excursions with students. It is also 
an environment made up of material encounters with texts and with writing. With 
concepts. With long hours reading and the strange uncanny process of thinking that 
always seems to happen with things; with the fridge door as I close it and think of 
something I’ve been reading. With the bedroom ceiling as a stare at it and my 
thoughts push elements of my thesis around. It is an environment that is constituted 
through life, through the practice of life. It is an environmental education that comes 
to be (micro)political through practice. 
 
Fuzziness 2: Practice and research and data 
 
 
Science or theory is an inquiry, which is to say, a practice: a practice of 
the seemingly fictive world that empiricism describes; a study of the 
conditions of legitimacy of practices in this empirical world that is in 
fact our own. The result is a great conversion of theory to practice. 
(Deleuze, 2005, p.36) 
 
 
St. Pierre and Jackson (2014) describe how each reader of Deleuze makes their own, 
ungeneralised, path. Each reader will work with concepts in unique ways. The 
concepts word particular worlds with the reader. Authors who engage with this form 
of research state that there is not one way to do this new work. The ‘new’ ‘cannot be 
described, having not yet arrived’ (Massumi, 2010, p.3). This being so, post-
qualitative inquiry is inquiry without, or even against, method. Methods are 
prescriptive and prescription limits the potential for novelty (Massumi, 2010). Honan 
(2004, p.268), in her rhizoanalysis of teachers’ reading of policy texts suggests that 





about attempts to translate Deleuzian theory into some kind of methodological 
action’. And so, rather than following or enacting a method, the thesis is more of a 
practice, both in the sense of being an attempt (or several, in fact many, attempts) 
and being something that is physically done. What I’m producing is something akin 
to Anna Hickey-Moody’s (2015) notion of ‘practice as research’. Hickey-Moody 
differentiates practice as research from practice-led research and practice-based 
research. She notes: 
 
 
I use the term practice as research to refer to practical invention and 
evaluation, via processes that draw on ‘multiple fields’ and which piece 
‘together multiple practices’ (Bolt and Barrett, 2007: 12), across 
academic and contemporary art contexts (Hickey-Moody, 2015, p.169). 
 
 
Hickey-Moody realises that ‘in many respects, all practice-based projects are 
rhizomes (or ‘plateaus’) that explore space, time, territories, locations, points of 
stasis and lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification’ 
(2016, p.171). Similarly, Ken Gale (2016, p.244) articulates ‘theorizing as practice’ 
whereby ‘writing, conceptualization, theorizing and so on are modes of practice 
which animate and activate in both pedagogical and research-based terms’. A 
common thread in new materialist research approaches, as in Hickey-Moody’s 
(2015) ‘Manifesto’ for ‘the rhizomatics of practice as research’ is a productive form 
of thinking whereby figurations from the rich oeuvre of post-structuralist authors are 
used to think with data (materially), theory (materially) and the problem at hand 
(materially). Noel Gough has performed just such figurationally informed thinking in 
relation to pedagogy generally and outdoor environmental education for instance. I 




Rosi Braidotti (2000) argues that ‘the notion of “figurations” – in 
contrast to the representational function of “metaphors” – emerges as 
crucial to Deleuze’s notion of a conceptually charged use of the 
imagination’ (p. 170). Similarly, Donna Haraway (1997) asserts that 





maps of contestable worlds… [and] bumps that make us swerve from 
literal-mindedness’ (p. 11) 
 
 
Figurations are tools that allow us to consider worlds, or our data (yet, how can these 
be separate from worlds?), in ways which move against the ‘common sense’ that, 
Deleuze (2015) argues, traces illusory forms of categories and difference, forms from 
which potentially violent environmental judgements are then drawn (Halsey, 2006).  
 
This is the first time the term ‘data’ has really cropped up in the thesis, so it is an 
opportune moment to discuss it. My inclination is to partially agree with Springgay 
(2014) that posthumanism renders the idea of ‘data’ as irrelevant, as data suggests an 
object to the perceiving subject. Rousell’s (2017) suggestion of verbing data, after 
Whitehead’s notion of datum, is more convincing for me than leaving ‘data’ as an 
object, where prehension exists within objects as object events, or objectiles. In this 
understanding: 
 
The objectile lures us into this relational encounter as the potential for a 
new experience, a creative advancement in which the object contributes 
itself as the datum for the next composition of an event. ‘All prehension 
is a prehension of prehension’, such that each new prehension becomes 




This event of prehension, what Rousell terms the data event, I simply term an event, 
or the event. Or even eventing. The ongoingness of the prehension of things. Things 
subjecting/objecting.  
 
What I’m calling the data event is a commingling of such lures and 
respondent prehensions in which data is felt as the accretion of 
experience on the surface. And yet the data event will always exceed its 
actualisations. Something is always left out, something remains unseen, 
unexhausted, spectral, negatively prehended (Manning, 2013, p. 25). 
(Rousell, 2018, 217) 
 
 
This is also my understanding of posthuman inquiry. Though I choose not to identify 





lead me to want to identify these moments as ‘data’, rather than simply ponder them. 
‘Data’ feels like it has too much baggage. I’m with Denzin (2013), and his 15 
reasons for not using the word ‘data’. 
 
My approach has been to wonder at the things that have come through for me, in the 
process of undertaking the PhD. In other haecceities there are vignettes that attempt 
to combine theory which troubles essentialist and representational accounts, as well 
as pushing my affective capacities through creative (post-)environmental writing. 
This is similar but different from attempting, for instance, a ‘slow ontology’ as 
advocated by Ulmer (2016, p.208), who states: 
 
Slow Ontology is a diffraction—a dispersal—of time, space, and matter 
across different wavelengths, moving in different directions at different 
speeds. As waves travel, they move along the cycles of the sun, moon, 
water, land, living organisms, and our waking dreams. Because a Slow 
Ontology invokes time that is rooted in nature, it inspires more natural 
rhythms for our spatial, temporal, and material localities. 
 
 
There is much here that I like, though the inclusion of a romanticised ‘nature’ in 
Ulmer’s approach is a reminder to me to be critically aware of the assumptions of the 
starting locations of our diffractions. For Ulmer, ‘nature’ is given. My focus on 
matter in this thesis doesn’t speak to an out-there environment, but focuses on the 
matters of research practices as embodied, affective and material. In this sense it is a 
focus on ‘things’ eventing in their becoming, rather than the autonomous 
enlightenment human subject or any category of representation. This is because 
concepts are material-discursive, as Karen Barad (2007) suggests. Concepts matter in 
the ways in which they are not the purview of an individual western subject, but go 











Fuzziness 3: Autoethnographic/assemblage/ethnography/non/collaborative 
writing as inquiry 
 
 
In the manner it has recently been practised as an approach to developing 
understanding of outdoor and environmental education practice, Autoethnography 
retains an image of the thinking and feeling human subject in nature, (see e.g. Nicol, 
2013; Collins, Brown, and Humberstone, 2018). Couper’s (2017) autoethnography 
comes close to overturning the subtle nature/culture binary at work in this literature, 
her argument is that the natural, or what she refers to as the ‘blue/green’ is made of 
an inherently differently experienced type of space. This is different to the post 
nature thinking of new materialisms and Deleuze and Guattari. Whitehouse’s (2018) 
autoethnographic inquiry into the ecopedagogical potential of snorkeling is a 
particularly successful and affecting read. She writes of the impacts of experiences of 
coral snorkeling off the coast of Australia, where the experiences juxtapose rich 
living coral seascapes with bleached, dead reefs. Funnily, I also write about 
snorkeling later in this thesis. This work can also provide a jumping off point for 
attempting to work beyond these assumptions. Nicol’s (2013, p.14) call for 
autoethnography of outdoor environmental education practice for sustainability 
highlights two important questions that might inform ‘post’ autoethnographic work: 
 
I wanted to explore what happens when the powerful stimulation of 
outdoor experiences is related to current theoretical concerns 
surrounding environmental sustainability. In so doing there are some 
questions that can provide guidance for educational practice: 
 Who am I as a person living on the planet today? 
 What am I going to do about the way I live on it? 
 
 
The ‘who’ and ‘what’ of these questions are shifted by the philosophy of Deleuze 
and Guattari to instead focus on their ontological premises, yet their sentiment seems 
paramount; what is the nature of the idea of the human subject that conditions or 





into and overturned? In my Masters thesis I emphasised the importance of 
experimenting with the material-behavioural implications of resting environmental 
education practice on unexamined ontological assumptions in attempts to ‘reconnect’ 
with nature. I critiqued both scientific objectivist ‘ecologist’ conservationist positions 
and subject establishing phenomenological approaches. I drew on both Marcus 
Doel’s (2000) and John Wylie’s (2007) reading of Deleuze to critique both of these 
positions as emphasising ‘being’ over becoming. As such, I argued, conservation 
ecology and phenomenology are both ‘pointillist’.  
 
The notion of becoming first captures the Deleuzian sense of a world 
continually in the making, continually proliferating. It also captures the 
strongly anti-phenomenological bent of Deleuze’s writing; in so far as 
‘becoming’ is explicitly a radical alternative to what Deleuze would see 
as the static and sedentary tonalities of Heideggerian notions of 
dwelling and ‘being-in-the-world’. (Wylie, 2007, p. 201; original 




…there is nothing left for the spatial scientist but the play of joints (and 
. . . and . . . and) . . . What remains is precisely that which maintains the 
different detached pieces in their incalculable disjointure—AND . . . 
AND . . . AND—: the interval takes all; the ontology of being gets 
carried away by the conjunctives. (Doel, 2000, p. 130, cited in Clarke 
and Mcphie, 2014, p.204) 
 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (2004) describe method as a royal science; an exercise in 
pointillism: 
 
A “method” is the striated space of the cogito universalis and draws a 
path that must be followed from one point to another. But the form of 
exteriority situates thought in a smooth space that it must occupy 
without counting, and for which there is no possible method, no 
conceivable reproduction, but only relays, intermezzos, resurgences. 
Thought is like a Vampire; it has no image, either to constitute a model 
or to copy. (p.416). 
 
Methods are to be avoided, then. Creative writing, and creative collaborative writing 





Marcia Mackenzie (2005) advocated such approaches in Environmental Education 
Research in her call to take post-structural theory seriously in environmental 
education. Connie Russell (2005), wanting to explore MacKenzie’s (2005) initial 
arguments further, draws on Leesa Fawcett (2000) to attempt to establish the extent 




The strategies listed by McKenzie as potentially enabling co‐
construction, such as participatory action research, narrative inquiry, 
and collaborative writing and theorizing, all rest on an assumption of a 
speaking subject. Is there any room here for ‘nature’ as co‐constructor? 
 
If, as I advocate, ‘nature’ is understood as a potential co‐constructor, 
the questions posed by Fawcett (2000) become important:  
 
…how do we tell stories that acknowledge other 
animals/beings as subjects of lives we share, lives that 
parallel and are interdependent in profound ways? How do 
we ensure that their voices are audible and that we can co‐




I like the link that Russell draws between MacKenzie’s call for creative research 
practices in Environmental Education Research and Fawcett’s questions concerning 
the audibility of the ecological other. Once again, however, I question the exclusion 
drawn between other ‘animals/beings as subjects’ and what might be left out of this 
category, e.g. the geological? The atmospheric? Discarded waste? Climate change 
itself? Similarly, I think Russell is using ‘nature’ in a broad sense here, though I am 
not sure whether she would include everything under this title; including human 
produce and concepts as I hope to. I see connections here to the collaborative writing 
as inquiry explored by, for instance, Wyatt and Gale (2013, p.311). Their work 
moves to make the author, as a human subject, unstable in its ‘enforced separations 
of self and others; form and content; place and space’. Further, I see the manner in 
which their work takes up new materialist concerns as paralleling Russell’s (2005) 
queries about ‘nature’ as a co-constructor whilst also avoiding the category trap of 





research whilst also taking into account the affective materiality of assemblages, for 
instance. This type of inquiry is beyond or ‘post’ autoethnography, as: 
 
 
the research methodology acknowledges, emphasizes and troubles the 
intended open-endedness, rhizomatic and processual nature of the 
research project itself. Arguments have been offered against describing 
research methodology of this kind as ‘autoethnographic’ (Wyatt and 
Gale, 2013a, 2013b) in relation to phenomenological and humanist 
inclinations that are to be found in most conceptualizations of the term 
and the practices that it implies (Gale, 2016, p.245) 
 
 
Thinking of research assemblages depopulates the world of subjects who would, in 
Russell (2005) and Fawcett’s (2000) account, be taken into account. Rather, research 
assemblages trouble divisions between reality, representation, and subjectivity: 
 
 
In such an assemblage, as Mazzei argues: there can no longer be a 
division between a field of reality (what we ask, what our participants 
tell us, and the places we inhabit), a field of representation (research 
narratives constructed after the interview), and a field of subjectivity 




This allows, and conditions/requires, much more creative tellings of selves-
environments. I have come across a number of beautiful (post-)autoethnographies 
that have allowed writers to perform what I perceive to be haecceitical environmental 
educations. For instance, MacDonald (2018) thinks her research assemblage as a 
burgeoning pharologist (someone who studies lighthouses) through the colour blue: 
 
 
In fragmented sections designed to highlight the ways experiences 
intertwine, I move through four phases of feeling “blue”: the deep blue 
of confusing academic anxiety and depression; the search for a 
methodology to lead me to a brighter, more pleasant kind of blue; the 
research journey that moved me forward; and the “blue sky” blue it led 







Her methodology draws on arts based autoethnography of place (Minge and 
Zimmerman, 2013) which draws at least partially on Deleuzian ontology and 
reminded me of Kathleen Stewart’s (2007) Ordinary Affects in its style. However, 
my reading of MacDonald’s work, informed by my own ontological rationale, co-
produces a reading as a haecceitical environmental education assemblage. As such 
this thesis is an experiment with my experiences of teaching and researching with 
new materialisms in ‘mind’, as a ‘post’-subject. This line of thinking moves across 
several (already multiple) themes: research/ing in EE with new materialisms; the 
ethics of new materialisms; the problem of the ‘environment’ and the ‘subject’ as the 
foundation of environmental education; teaching environmental education, the 
arbitrariness of these as distinct areas through the process of becoming an academic. 
This might seem too wide and shallow, rather than the more normal ‘deep and 
narrow’ approach of PhD study, however, I think that to define the categories of 
study before the study in this way is too hylomorphic. Rather the study is building its 
own ground, creating its own territory, or perhaps mapping its own refrain. Rather 
than fitting into the quiddital ‘whatness’ of these categories of inquiry, it is rather 
creating its thisness, its haecceitical self. It’s an attempt at a subjectless 
individuation. 
 
This is why the study is not a strict autoethnography. My telling here is perhaps post-
autoethnographic, and as such I come to attempt to acknowledge what Gannon 
(2006) calls the (im)possibilities of writing the self-writing. This writing employs: 
 
 
…textual strategies that evoke fractured, fragmented subjectivities and 
provoke discontinuity, displacement, and estrangement. In post 
structural autoethnography, the writing writes the writer as a complex 
(im)possible subject in a world where (self) knowledge can only ever 
be tentative, contingent, and situated. (Gannon, 2006, p.474). 
 
 
And yet, in this writing, there is an ‘I’. I retain the ‘I’ in the same manner as Gale and 






…we do not do away with the I’s’, the ‘me’s’ and the ‘you’s’, partly 
because we can’t! Instead we displace them, we don’t divorce them and 
we will not lose them. We will repeat them and as we do this we will do 
this always with the presence and action of diffractive possibilities, 
always in acknowledgement of and always in play with the 
exponentially existent possibilities of contingency and flux. We will be 
using this in intensity to activate and create further intensities. 




Stories, there are stories that precede and follow. I recognise, along with Gale (2017, 
p.5-6), that: 
 
I have come to the view that any active, vibrant, and living 
autoethnographic practice needs to move beyond the humanist and 
phenomenological proclivities of thinking with and of selves, of bodies 
as beings, as categories of difference, and to start thinking of 
posthuman ways of affectively engaging with them in terms of 
multiplicity, intensity, and becoming and always differentiating 
heterogeneity and contingency. Autoethnography, the very name that 
many people here identify with, in my view, appears to enshrine the 
narrow individualism of the Cartesian ‘I’ and the arborescent sense of 
self idealised by Enlightenment thought. 
 
 
As I move through what follows, before and after this haecceity on inquiry, the I of 
the thesis becomes more troubled, more displaced; more unhuman. This isn’t 
immediate. Indeed, it is hard to do. I struggle with it. I start off slowly, unknowing 
perhaps. As I continue the event attempts to become more alien to itself. Or to 
become itself whilst belonging to another. I ask you to try to sense this. 
 
Lastly, I have mentioned that I draw on various things that are to hand as I go. For 
example, stories that I have picked up, academic texts, and concepts. I consider these 
thinkings-with as forms of collaboration. In Haecceity 6, for instance, I perform a 
collaborative writing with an event occurring with concepts, students, Walney Island 
in Cumbria, and my colleague Jamie Mcphie. I don’t view collaboration as two 
objects or subjects coming together, but rather as the formation of a territory out of 





themselves can combine to form this new thisness. I choose to keep the term 
collaborate, rather than jettison it as St. Pierre suggests: 
 
 
Collaboration is one of those concepts based on the humanist subject 
that doesn’t work anymore. It assumes there are separate individuals 
who decide to work together. If we think we do not have a separate 
existence, if we think we are not individuals separate from other people 
and everything else, then the word collaboration doesn’t make sense. If 
we believe we exist in assemblage, in entanglement, in haecceity, then 
collaboration doesn’t make sense. That’s one of those words that brings 
an entire ontology along with it […] I certainly think we need others to 
help us think—we’re dangerous when we’re alone in our own heads. 
It’s in those conversations, that, for me, the humanist subject 
disappears. This is much more than conventional collaboration. (St. 
Pierre, 2015, in Guttorm, Hohti and Paakkari, 2015, p.17-18) 
 
 
Collaboration comes from Latin, with the prefix ‘col’ originating from the 
preposition ‘cum’, meaning ‘with’. Thinking with is much more than conventional 
collaboration. It is not so much a doing with as a doing-with. The with does not 
foreground the coming together of two (as each is already a multiplicity), but the 
production of the new in encounters of difference in itself. With immanence, it is 
more like a storm meeting another storm. A haecceity-disturbance patterns-haecceity. 
It is affirmative. 
 
 
Fuzziness 4: Ambulant science, problems, infinite learning, affect 
 
Problems. This thesis is about problems that constitute me. That demand new things 
of my body, and demands the acquisition of new language. The learning I undergo in 
this thesis is resultant of focusing on the problem of environmental concern given 
new materialist critiques of romantic nature and the subject as distinct from the 
world. Problems, for Deleuze are central to a particular take on the nature of inquiry: 
what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) refer to as an ambulant science. Problems, for 







In fact, the Idea is not the element of knowledge but that of an infinite 
'learning', which is of a different nature to knowledge. For learning 
evolves entirely in the comprehension of problems as such, in the 
apprehension and condensation of singularities and in the composition 
of ideal events and bodies. (Deleuze, 1994, p.192, emphasis added) 
 
 
Here the Idea, or conceptual, is not removed from the world, but is empirical within 
it. An ambulant science works against the state, or royal science, in its attempts to 
homogenise and pin down; to create striated, rather than smooth space. Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004) state that an ambulant science is ‘problematic, rather than 
theorematic’ (p.399), that is it is oriented towards the problem, rather than a solution. 
Lebedev (2017, n.p.) suggest that Deleuze’s concept of the problematic allows 
education to focus on the conditions of problems; there constituting assumptions. 
Deleuze’ focus on the axiomatics of problems in Difference and Repetition, rather 
than upon attempting to identify solutions: 
 
 
…unveils an important issue in pedagogy and learning. Ultimately, it is 
argued that the axiomatic element should always be made dependent 
upon a problematic… current emphasizing a calculus of problems very 
different from axiomatics. Only on this condition will thought cease 
presupposing the answer as the simplicity of an essence, and will it 
reconnect the abstract movement of representative understanding with 




Focusing on the ‘conditions of the problem’ in this thesis means turning, as it were, 
to gaze back at the direction of travel; to look carefully at the problem of 
environmental concern, and its constituting elements of subject, object, and 
transcendent morality applied to a transcendent ‘nature’. This process is one of 
infinite learning. Semetsky (2009) notes that Deleuze develops a ‘pedagogy of the 
concept’ that understands concepts to be empirically sensed and affective. Concepts 







…novel concepts could be invented or created as a function of real 
experience. For Deleuze, knowledge is irreducible to a static body of 
facts but constitutes a dynamic process of inquiry as an experimental 
and practical art embedded in experience. Thus experience is not 
confined to a personal Cogito of a Cartesian subject but represents an 
experiment with the environing world: we can, and should, learn from 
experience. Experience is that quasi-objective milieu which provides us 





Further, concepts should be invented which allow the exploration of the conditions 
upon which problems lie. This is a pre-personal, affective, educational, inquiry. This 
is the learning-inquiry that occurs in this thesis. An ambulant science is thus a 
science of problems and affective learning. This is a science that is inherently 
political (and is highly suspicious of royal science’s claims to the apolitical). This is 
because affect is, as Brian Massumi calls it, ‘proto-political’. Affect ‘concerns the 
first stirrings of the political, flush with the felt intensities of life. Its politics must be 
brought out’ (Massumi, 2015, p.xi). Patricia Clough (2013, p.69) experiments with 
affect to move autobiography beyond its current ontological tellings. In this instance 
she focuses on sound: 
 
 
This is not autobiography  
But rather a turn in me  
to perform a vibrational artistry,  
to become an ontologist of vibrational force.  
 
An ontology of vibrational force delves below a philosophy of sound 
and the physics of acoustics toward the basic processes of entities 
affecting other entities. Such an orientation therefore should be 
differentiated from a phenomenology of sonic effects centered on 
perception of a human subject, as a ready made interiorized center of 




I opened this thesis with a section of this quote – thinking now about a change of 
‘me’, rather than in me. Affect then, understood as transversal (cutting across 









Such a science is not only less imperialistic but, in meeting the world 
“half-way” (Barad, 2007), also more in touch with contingencies, 
relationalities, instabilities, and history. This calls for a science more 
attuned to innovation than “the epistemological quarrel over the 
conditions of scientificity” (Dosse, 1999, p. 352) and a critique more 
attuned to the weight of the material in our knowing. What becomes 
thinkable is a science that grows out of practical engagement with the 
world within a different ontology of knowing: This might be the 
beginnings of not only (post) qualitative research but a science worthy 




Fuzziness 5: Thinking with, and diffractive analysis 
 
Thinking with is a methodological approach that characterises well the post-
qualitative turn. Jackson and Mazzei’s (2012) book Thinking with Theory in 
Qualitative Research has, I would hazard, already become something of a classic. 
Jackson and Mazzei (2012, p.viii) describe their intention thus: 
 
 
Our purpose in this book is to challenge qualitative researchers to use 
theory to think with their data (or use data to think with theory) in order 
to accomplish a reading of data that is both within and against 
interpretivism. We argue that qualitative data interpretation and 
analysis does not happen via mechanistic coding, reducing data to 
themes, and writing up transparent narratives that do little to critique 
the complexities of social life; such simplistic approaches preclude 
dense and multi-layered treatment of data. Furthermore, we challenge 
simplistic treatments of data and data analysis in qualitative research 
that, for example, beckon voices to “speak for themselves,” or that 
reduce complicated and conflicting voices and data to thematic 
“chunks” that can be interpreted free of context and circumstance. 
 
 
The notion of thinking with has been taken up across a myriad of disciplines, in 





(2015) The Mushroom at the End of the World. Tsing thinks with matsutake, a 
mushroom and delicacy in great demand in Japan, to theorise economics, capitalism, 
environmental crisis and what is occurring in the ruins of capitalism. Echoing Ursula 
Le Guin’s (2015, n.p.) praise, that ‘in a situation where urgency and enormity can 
overwhelm the mind, [Tsing] gives us a real way to think about it’ and that she is 
‘grateful to have this book as a guide through the coming years’ would posit that 
Tsing’s thinking with a mushroom is at once an educational, environmental and 
novel form of post-green environmental research. Thinking with has been enacted in 
a spectrum of educational research (e.g. in indigenous education studies by Higgins, 
Madden, Korteweg, 2015). The potential of thinking with in environmental education 
is already being enacted and, whilst I am not attempting a comprehensive review 
here, it will be useful to provide instances of this. Adsit-Morris’ (2015) wonderfully 
titled The nomadic wanderings of a bag-lady and her space chums: re-storying 
environmental education with feral figurations takes up the task of thinking 
environmental education with Barad, Braidotti and Haraway as well as other authors 
working in the material turn. Adsit-Morris borrows from Ursula Le Guin to enact 
bag-lady storytelling as ‘a performative new materialist methodology’ in which she 
picks up the figurations, stories and metaphors she finds productive while wandering 
and gathering through the problem at hand. For Adsit-Morris ‘such wandering and 
gathering requires a different logic, an attunement and attentiveness to processes and 
practices of ongoingness (not simply endings). Sharing the stories and figures I 
gathered doing and thinking a performative Environmental Educational inquiry’.  
Adsit-Morris (2015) focuses on a year long school environmental art project in 
British Colombia. Taking up the recurring figuration of the salmon, Adsit-Morris 
demonstrates how she begins to think with Barad, Haraway and salmon as 
experienced in her research:  
 
 
Following Haraway, who is able to playfully unpack figurations 
through their multiplicity, or their contradictory political, material, 
natural, cultural, and spiritual identities, my hope is to unpack the 
figuration of the salmon, a lively entity whose complexities and 
contradictions bring forth (or allow) a deeper understanding of the 





“posthuman performativity” that “incorporates important material and 
discursive, social and scientific, human and nonhuman, and natural and 
cultural factors … [and] calls into question the giveness of the 
differential categories” or “differential boundaries” drawn within 
Western society (Barad, 2008, p. 126). 
 
 
Adsit-Morris (re)configures salmon, variously drawing on Fawcett’s (2009) 
figuration of salmon in her own environmental education writing as well as salmon 
related art installations and genetics, to demonstrate how the stories we tell of salmon 
produce certain worlds. Salmon as escapee, for instance, enacts potentially different 
responses to salmon as refugee.  
 
Thinking with, in this way, has much in common with the heuristic method of 
inquiry in that a conceptually/materially powerful figuration is pragmatically used to 
think difference into being. However, there are important distinctions, Moustakas 
(1990, p.9) suggests that within heuristic methods ‘The self of the researcher is 
present throughout the process and, while understanding the phenomenon with 
increasing depth, the researcher also experiences growing self-awareness and self-
knowledge. Heuristic processes incorporate creative self-processes and self-
discoveries.’ In contrast, thinking with can ‘fuzzy’ the ‘self’. It can be a diffractive 
research practice that recognises the embodied materiality and co-constitution of 
researcher and research process and materials, as well as the materiality and concrete 
repercussions of formulating, asking, and postulating answers to certain research 
questions. It allows diffractive possibilities for shifting, contorting, collapsing and 
mutating beyond/without/out of subjectivity. Diffraction is the acknowledgement that 
the ways in which we matter the world though our research questions literally matter. 
This understanding can be applied to all existing research methods (and indeed 
practices and occurrences outside of research or even human concerns). Mol (2002) 
puts a similar notion to work in her studies of the ways in which medical science 
matters disease conceptually and politically in the framing of research questions and 
concretely in the creation of medical practices, procedures and policies for instance. 
What post-qualitative researchers attempt to do is acknowledge the mattering nature 
of qualitative research and by troubling the foundational ‘drops in the pond’ that 





of these foundations unstable, position new points to diffract from and to, and to 
tentatively think differently. 
 
 
…a focus on coding, or at least an analysis that relies only on coding, 
results in a reporting that focuses on “sameness” within categories as 
researchers adhere to the coding imperative to reach “data saturation.” 
A diffractive analysis, however, emphasizes difference by breaking 
open the data (and the categories inherent in coding) by decentering and 
destabilizing the tropes of liberal humanist identity work necessary in 
conventional qualitative research: the subject, interpretation, categorical 
similarity, and so on. To engage in a diffractive analysis is not to layer a 
set of codes onto the data, or even “a” theoretical concept for that 
matter, but is to thread through or “plug in” data into theory into data 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2012) resulting in multiplicity, ambiguity, and 
incoherent subjectivity. A diffractive analysis, however, emphasizes 
difference by breaking open the data (and the categories inherent in 
coding) by decentering and destabilizing the tropes of liberal humanist 
identity work necessary in conventional qualitative research: the 
subject, interpretation, categorical similarity, and so on. To engage in a 
diffractive analysis is not to layer a set of codes onto the data, or even 
“a” theoretical concept for that matter, but is to thread through or “plug 
in” data into theory into data (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012) resulting in 




This is because discourse does not reflect matter, but tangles with it – of it. In this 
immanent landscape, new at least to critical thought in qualitative inquiry, 
experimenting with the possible is privileged over negative critique – that is, critique 
as ‘construed as the exposure of error, the revelation of hidden circuits of 
power/knowledge, or the unmasking of ideology’ (MacLure, 2017, p.51) This being 
the case MacLure (2017, p.51) asks: ‘does qualitative inquiry, as the transformative 
work of interpretive, intentional, critical human agents, still have a place in our 
theories and research practices? And if not, what shall we do?’. Her answer pushes 
me: 
 
We would need to stop thinking of data as raw material for our own 
intellection. We would need to rethink our practices of interpretation 
and explanation, if these involve identifying ‘what is really going on,’ 





significant (for example, more abstract; more general, more 
meaningful) beneath or above the surface messiness of talk or action. 
These customary understandings all assume a masterful human subject 
separate from the objects of her inquiry, which await her interventions 
in order to attain meaning. Analysis would become ‘diffractive’ – no 
longer a matter of magisterial interrogation by a human agent of her 
data, but an entanglement. We would need to develop forms of 
immanent critique – a matter of sensing and tweaking events as they 
unfold. We would need to think of thought as not intrinsically ‘ours,’ 
but as an impersonal force that exceeds us and catches us up. We would 
need to think emotions, in a similar way, not as welling up from inside 
us, but as affect – pre-individual intensities that connect and disconnect 
bodies. (MacLure, 2017, p.51) 
 
 
Here is affect, again. Critique aims for productivity and creation, via diffraction.  
 
Fuzziness 6: Inquiry as making 
 
I realise I have started writing this before knowing what it is that I’m writing, or how 
I’m doing this piece of research. Should I feel alarm at not knowing which has 
arrived first? The chicken or the egg? The wasp or the orchid? The writing or ‘me’. 
Where is the cause, and where the effect? Taking a post-qualitative stance, I think 
that is ok. Similarly to Deleuze and Guattari (2004), Tim Ingold (2013, p.20-21) 
critiques the hylomorphic model – the notion that the finished image is achieved in 
the human head and then represented in the real world - whether as sculpture, 
painting, building, or as in my case, a journal article: ‘Whenever we read that in the 
making of artefacts, practitioners impose forms internal to the mind upon a material 
world ‘out there’, hylomorphism is at work’. Ingold (2013, p.22) suggests that this is 
a false understanding of the world. Rather, materials are not brute, but push back at 
the maker, both constituted longitudinally by forces and relations: 
 
 
To read making longitudinally, as a confluence of forces and materials, 
rather than laterally, as transposition from image to object, is to regard 
it as…a form-generating – or morphogenic – process. This is to soften 
any distinction we might draw between organism and artefact. For if 








I think this is true in many senses in both writing and research. I am not composing 
this paper alone, it pushes back at me with an …‘and?’. With a question. In this way 
it grows and makes me as much as I grow and make it. Every time I type, I read. The 
materials before me – keyboard, screen, text, and my copy of Ingold’s (2013) 
Making: anthropology, archaeology, art and architecture open before me, an image 
of his students busily making baskets on a beach – constitute a collective research 
assemblage (Law, 2004). As serendipity would have it, I am listening to waves 
breaking on a beach. The noise in the PhD office this morning – chatting, typing, 
coughing - was pulling my thoughts away from work, and so I have my headphones 
on listening to a swollen sea. Topologically I am on the beach with Ingold’s students. 
We are both imbricated in a morphogenic process; them of basket making, me of 
thesis making. But the ‘it’ of the thesis is never finished. It is never complete. It is 
always doing something. It is an event. Particularly now as it is read by you. The 
‘spect-actor’ (Boal, 1979). Research as making in processes of affect seems to 
connect with Gale’s (2017) seeking of anti-hylomorphic and affective writing 
practices, saying ‘yes’ to Kathleen Stewart (2007) in her attempts at ordinary affects. 
This being the case the wasp-orchid demonstrates the anti-hermeneutic nature of 
much post-qualitative work to date. 
 
This morphogenic process is similar to how post-qualitative researchers, including 
Eileen Honan, describe the relationship between researcher and materials – not one 
of a removed organism, prying at brute data – coding it into themes - but of a 
breaking down of this binary: a morphogenic research process in which the 
difference between reader, researcher, researched, data, and theory is no longer 
useful. Instead the spaces between these ‘order words’, carrying out ‘little death 
sentences’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004), are (re)placed with 
conjunctives…and…and…and…or what John Law (2004) might call the messy 
creation of realities. This understanding has been termed a ‘research-assemblage’ 
(Law, 2004; Fox and Alldred, 2013; Coleman and Ringrose, 2013; Masny, 2013) 
whereby: ‘the view that knowledge can be gleaned from observation of the world is 





and Alldred, 2015, p.403).  
But, what then is it to do research in this way? Firstly, it is always partial and 
unfinished. One iteration is never a full picture, especially my attempt at introducing 
some of these concepts to readers. Knowledge/world creation is contextual, situated 
and conditional. This is because ontology is foregrounded and problematized (and 
vice versa) and the forms of solutions that occur from questioning the unsatisfactory 
ontologies that have underpinned prevailing qualitative methods are radical in 
comparison to dominant ones. Indeed, they are new and require new forms of 
empiricism. 
 
My argument is that a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the 
wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of 
all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies because of a 
little mistake in the definition of its main target. The question was never 
to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, 




This is of course a very useful understanding of method given the claims within 
postmodern ecological thinking that planetary environmental crisis is a result of the 
manner in which we perceive ourselves as superior to what we refer to as ‘nature’. 
This ‘crisis of perception’ is an argument suggesting that broad human instigated 
environmental degradation is a result of the prevailing social understanding of the 
human race as distinct or separate, in ontological terms, from the rest of the world – 
in short, people’s often unquestioned assumptions about the nature of reality – 
specifically the state of the human-environment relationship – result in current 
‘unsustainable’ behaviours. The ‘crisis’ discourse has been captured by 
environmental education research and discourse which, sometime knowingly 
sometimes not so, situates itself in an ecological postmodernist paradigm (e.g. 
Goodwin, 2016; Hawkins, 2014; Jordan and Kristjánsson, 2016, Sterling, 2005). 
Ecological postmodernism is an important discourse, but it is not a new one and, 
whilst it may not have been adopted or acknowledged in all environmental education 





for example Sterling, 2005). I was tempted to then explain how research as making 
would be better, how it circumvents the problem and lands us closer to where we 
want to be. But I want to try and escape the instrumental; the approach that says if 
only this, then THIS! There is no easy cause and effect. I’m not suggesting a lens to 
see through to create the right outcome. At least, I’m trying not to, now, not 
anymore. 
Thinking of research as a process of non-hylomorphic making places value in the 
process, not at the end somewhere when everything becomes clear. I am sold on 
Manning’s (2016) term ‘research-creation’, and all it seems to indicate. I’ve only 
come across her chapter Ten Propositions for Research-Creation late on in the 
writing of my thesis. But it seems to articulate feelings I have had in the process of 
writing. Manning (2016, p.141) writes: ‘Research-creation: the value produced is the 
process itself, is its very qualitative autonomy’ and I couldn’t agree more. It makes 
me wonder about all processes of research creation, even those in what are thought of 
as positivistic frameworks. Does the process of that type of inquiry have value, or at 
least, is that not where a certain pragmatics or way of being is produced? In the 
thought-inquiry itself. The image of thought that that form of inquiry requires? For 
me this speaks to the inescapability of immanence.  
Tim Ingold’s (2011) figuration of wayfaring is useful for describing the process of 
research in a post-qualitative landscape. Ingold contends that to be alive is to follow 
the lines of the world’s material becoming. And accordingly the role of artists and, I 
contend, researchers alike: 
 
…is not to give effect to a preconceived idea, novel or not, but to join 
with and follow the forces and flows of material that bring the form of 
the work into being. The work invites the viewer to join the artist as a 
fellow traveler, to look with it as it unfolds in the world, rather than 
behind it to an originating intention of which it is a final product. 
(Ingold, 2011, p.216).  
 
 
This idea of research as non-prescriptive making with the reader is compelling. Other 





the Greek meta (follow) and odos (way) (Doll, 2006, p.89). Doll (2006) traces a 
history of the development of methodology which has produced a process of 
following a well-trodden way, and argues instead for a forging forwards:  
 
As useful as this strategy was in the late Renaissance ages—and 
compared to the abstract intricacies of scholasticism—it has left us with 
a legacy which assumes that knowledge can, and indeed should, be 
presented efficiently: in concise, simplified, methodized 
form…Textbooks, an inheritance of this legacy, by their very design 
and presentation are organized to provide us with a short-cut to 
knowing. Knowledge memorized is substituted for the act of knowing. 
The mimetic is substituted for the poietic—copying for creating 
 
 
Doll (2006), drawing on Dewey (1916/1966), is discussing educational method here, 
but his arguments work just as well for any presupposed attempt at knowing, 
including research methods. Indeed, he could be describing research methods 
textbooks. Elizabeth St. Pierre (2013) notes how the ‘classic’ texts of qualitative 
research methods (Denzin, 1989; Erickson, 1986; Lincoln and Guba, 1985) were 
informed by important interpretive and critical turns in the social sciences, and yet 
within them they were ‘still trying hard to be hard and reap the benefits of the game 
of Science, they imitated a simulacrum of the natural sciences, borrowing concepts 
like data and evidence, an instrumental methodology’ (St. Pierre, 2013. p.224) and 
many other tropes that post-qualitative research - intensely aware of the post-
structural critiques levelled by, for instance, Spivak, Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze 
and Guattari - intends to overturn (Jackson and Mezzei, 2012). Post-qualitative 
researchers argue that, despite post-structuralism having been around for more than 
40 years, ‘even now, some qualitative researchers continue to use concepts and 
practices like bias, objectivity, subjectivity statements, triangulation, audit trails, and 
interrater reliability that signal they are bound to logical positivism/empiricism, 
objectivism, and realism’ (St. Pierre, 2013. P.224).  
 
Making forwards the physicality of research. Making an inquiry. Making a thesis. 






Fuzziness 7: Methodology as pedagogy 
 
St. Pierre notes ‘Not only do people produce theory, but theory produces people’ (St. 
Pierre, 2001, p.142, cited in Gale, 2016, p.256). Ken Gale (2016, p.247) argues: 
 
 
Expressing the contiguity of theorizing as practice with the emergence 
and affective nature of assemblages is partly to address the tyranny of 
the theory/practice dualisms that are present in education research and 
pedagogy and partly to trouble and disrupt the data collection and 
analysis binary that works to construct research practice within the 




Gale’s (2016) observation pushes the thought that I have had and articulated so far. 
That there remains, even in post-qualitative inquiry discourse, as in Gale’s 
description above, a divide offered between pedagogy and the process of conducting 
research. As I have said, the process of making this thesis has been an 
(environmental) education. St. Pierre’s articulation that concepts produce people, 
applies also to methods and methodologies (themselves concepts). Environmental 
education research approaches are so often concerned with the learners they study, 
whilst being unaware that they themselves, the outputs, research articles, 
dissertations, theses, articulate worlds that are taken up by their readers. Ontological 
assumptions are read by students, and taken up. A particular exception to this is Tuck 
and MacKenzie’s Place in Research (2016), where the authors make a case for 
critical place inquiry as stemming from a series of ethical imperatives. Specifically, 
that research methodology that considers place better fulfils ethical obligations in a 
relational world. These obligations are to people across places, to land and to future 
generations. For Tuck and MacKenzie (2016), traditional qualitative humanistic 
inquiry can reinforce unethical practices due to its ‘Western embeddedness in the 
logics of Enlightenment rationality of prioritizing mind over body, individual over 
community, humans over nature’, and this in turn ‘is thus a partial answer to why 
place has not been more significantly taken up in social science research to date’. 
(Tuck and MacKenzie, 2016, p.152) Tuck and MacKenzie (2016) further posit that 





modernism and positivism, ‘focused on epistemology at the expense of ontology’ 
(p.152). Lastly they offer that, if Western society omits place so regularly, why 
would it be more present in Western social science? These understandings point to a 
requirement for research that takes up an alternative, relational validity. 
 
I am pushing myself to pay more attention to research creations as themselves 
affective (and political) forces, regardless of whether they have a policy orientation 
or not. This involves being aware of the metaphysical lessons implicit in research 
outputs. Metaphysics being synonymous with ‘environment’, and all research outputs 
holding metaphysical assumptions, means, I think, that all outputs perform 
environmental educations. 
 
The dominant style of research methods textbooks, then, articulating an ‘end 
product’ of successful research to assess, is one that post-qualitativism critiques, 
taking much of its inspiration from the oeuvre of Gilles Deleuze. However, I think it 
is important not to see the use of prescribed methods as in actuality ontologically 
opposed to what St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016, p.1) describe as the 
‘heightened curiosity and accompanying experimentation in the becoming of 
existence’ in post-qualitative work. For, whilst to follow a research method might 
presume a certain post-positivist ontology, a presumed positivist ontology none-the-
less occurs of this world, not in a removed one. As a result, what may appear a 
pointillist enactment (especially to those enacting it!) is actually outstripped by a 
series of conjunctives; by improvisational movement. As Ingold notes; ‘this is so 
even if practitioners are following directions laid down in a plan, score or recipe: 
indeed the more strictly any performance is specified, the greater the improvisational 
demands placed on the practitioners to ‘get it right’’ (Ingold, 2011, p.216). And so, 
the very specific requirements of stipulated research methods, whether acting in a 
presumed positivist, post-positivist, or social constructivist ontology, are nonetheless 
improvisationally produced with materiality. The illusion of transcendence is one 
produced by immanence.  
 







it is a transcendental empiricism because it insists on beginning with 
‘the experienced’ or ‘given’ as such. (Empiricism is a commitment to 
experience as the starting point of inquiry, rather than ideas or 
concepts.) The empiricism is transcendental because when Deleuze 
begins with experience he does not begin with human experience; for 
Deleuze experience includes the perceptions of plants, animals, 
microbes and all sorts of machines. 
 
 
In transcendental empiricism ‘it is possible to think pure experience of singularities 
without rashly categorising them in terms of their universal features’ (Rölli, 2016, 
p.163). Though it is important to stress that Deleuze would conceive of Colebrook’s 
examples as immanent enactments of production (haecceities/machines) rather than 
transcendent/quiddital categories (animal, plant, etc). In fact, it is exactly these 
sedentary concepts that he is attempting to transcend. It is this escape from 
representation where prevailing research methods fail. At the risk of repeating myself 
(or, embracing the repetition and what it does differently), there are two problems 
with what St. Pierre (2011) describes as conventional humanistic qualitative 
methodology. The first is its tendency to centre the human which is done, for 
example, in hermeneutic or phenomenological work. Johansson (2016, p.450) 
explains: ‘by doing this, not only a dualism between a subject and an object is 
constructed, but also a hierarchy. When the stable, rational, and coherent subject 
constitutes the centre of attention, the objects become secondary’. When we consider 
that methodology teaches, as I have stated, by enacting ontologies that are taken up 
as habit in a researchers/students practice, then it is not only the case that humanistic 
qualitative inquiry may present a poor or uncritical image of affairs, it is that it may 
be unethical in its teaching of the world as removed from those who act within (read: 
of) it. This would appear to be the very problem that (some) outdoor environmental 
education research is attempting to overcome – how to foreground the ‘background’. 
How to become more ecocentric (immanent) in our research/practice? I suggest that 
our research practices should enact the forms of ontology-epistemology-ethics we 
aim for. The second problem with conventional humanistic qualitative methodology 





enough. The methods initially designed to probe the ‘socially constructed’ world 
have become static and staid and, while more creative and experimental work has 
always been present, there has remained a broader process of commodification of 
research approaches and a political pull to ‘rigourous’ methodologies. In U.S. 
educational research a tendency to use positivistic frames, even within qualitative 
research, was bolstered as a result of the No Child Left Behind policy and resulting 
claims about legitimate ways of doing research (St. Pierre, 2011): processes blindly 
carried out on brute, unlively ‘data’. In doing this, qualitative research has itself often 
become an unthinking process:  
 
 
In trying to escape the criticism regarding what in this era can be seen 
as features of arbitrariness in qualitative research’s inability to construct 
sources of generalizations, qualitative research is degrading to concepts 
such as data-collection, reflexivity, coding, research design, bias, 
validity (Johansson, 2016, p.451).  
 
 
What does this teach, this method? It carries with it whole ways of being. Never 
mind that the ontological assumptions upon which it rests can be critiqued, and that 
we should do research differently as a result. But what does the prevailing approach 
to research do? If ontology is always ethical. If it matters what ways we organise the 
world, then humanistic qualitative research has certain ecological fall-out. It teaches 
certain habits of thought-action. 
 
For instance, Karen Barad (2007, p.48) observes the tendency of prevailing 
approaches to divide into dominant pre-given categories: 
 
Both scientific realists and social constructivists believe that scientific 
knowledge (using multiple representational forms such as theoretical 
concepts, graphs, particle tracks, and photographic images) mediates 
our access to the material world; where they differ is on the question of 
referent, whether scientific knowledge represents things in the world as 
they really are (i.e., nature) or objects that are the product of social 








These different foci produce different orientations for action. Often, though not 
universally, ‘nature’ as a pre-given referent is the focus of environmental education 
research. Previously I have been accused of creating a straw man when stating this. 
But it remains the case. At the time of writing this, the most recent paper published 
in Environmental Education Research is called ‘Connecting children to nature 
through residential outdoor education’ (Mullenbach, Andrewjewski and Mowen, 
2018). There are critical voices, and have been since at least 2005 when a special 
issue on the implications of post-structuralism for the field was published, probably 
much earlier. And yet ‘connection to nature’ papers keep coming. 
 
Fuzziness 8: Language 
 
The limits of representationalism and the meaning of language have been identified 
as significant across research in the material turn. Maggie MacLure (2013) 
articulates that a common critique by new materialist authors is that the linguistic 
turn in post-structural theory tended to render the material world inaccessible, hidden 
behind the discursive systems that represent it. In place of this representational 
approach, MacLure (2013) states that materialist ontologies aim for a ‘flattened 
logic’ which escapes the hierarchical nature of representation. Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004) have many terms for this logic, each a figuration which paints the ontology in 
a new light and opens up new ways of considering what might be produced through 
its enactment. The Deleuzo-Guattarian figurations of becoming, rhizome, 
assemblage, refrain, haecceity, and plane of composition, consistency, immanence 
and univocity, Body-without-Organs (BwO), lines of flight, de/reterritorialization, 
and nomad21 have all been ‘plugged in’ to post-qualitative research studies. A non-
signifying ontology produces a conceptual topology where these terms cannot relate 
to any set definition. As MacLure (2013, p.661) points out: ‘conventional definitions 
would strictly be invalid, since to define is to return to the logic of representation, 
                                                 
21 I have been advised to provide definitions for these terms, however I feel that an attempt to 
define them here would be cumbersome as well as against the spirit of the ontology at work, 
which is attempting to explore what things do, rather than what they are. However, see 
Colebrook (2002) for brief explanations for key Deleuzian terms. I explain some of the more 





where words ‘refer’ to entities as if these were separate and distinct from one 
another’. Indeed, many of these Deleuzian figurations are non-static; constantly 
moving (verbing) and as a result (over)lapping and (re)peating and never referring to 
a given, but instead questioning what might be produced. Through an understanding 
of language as non-representational there is an implicit inference of language’s 
immanent nature, its material capacity, or rather, the material/discursive nature of 
reality. This is a logic of sense, or thinking in thought. In this understanding there are 
not two distinct realties - concrete materiality and abstract language – instead there is 
a third way; a Deleuzian sense/event: 
 
 
Deleuze identified something wild in language: something that exceeds 
propositional meaning and resists the laws of representation. Deleuze 
called it sense, this non-representing, unrepresentable, ‘wild element’ in 
language. Sense is important for a materialist methodology because it 
works as a sort of ‘mobius strip’ between language and the world 
(Deleuze, 2004, p. 23). Sense ‘happens to bodies and …insists in 
propositions’ (p. 142), allowing them to resonate and relate, while 
never being reducible to either ‘side’ of that old duality that separates 
the material world from the words that putatively represent it. 
(MacLure, 2013, p.658-659) 
 
 
In both Deleuzian and new materialist understandings of the world discourse, 
literally matters. That is true of what I write now. It is affecting. Validity. I change 
words here and there. I write differently here and there. In a similar vein, Patti Lather 
(1993) chose to retain the term ‘validity’ in her seminal critique 20 plus years ago ‘in 
order to both circulate and break with the signs that code it. What [she] means by the 
term, then, is all the baggage that it carries plus, in a doubled-movement, what it 
means to rupture validity as a regime of truth’ (Lather, 1993, p.674). In my PhD 
inquiry I have grappled with legitimation issues as I have engaged in my doctorate 
‘training’ and conversed with fellow research students and been surprised at how 
little these issues are the focus of others’ attention. Indeed, there appears a tendency 
for the basis of truth to be taken for granted once, early on in the PhD candidate’s 
journey, an epistemological frame is taken, though sometimes this is left until the 





host of concerns which reframe terms such as rigour, authenticity or validity, ‘as 
multiple, partial, endlessly deferred’ (Lather, 1993, p.675). This being so, the post-
qualitative author has creative choice in language. For instance, I use St. Pierre’s 
(2014) term ‘post-qualitative’ in the same spirit as Deleuze and Guattari (2004), not 
in recognition of given conceptual limits under an order-word, but recognising that 
the use of a label no longer matters given the perspective, having reached a certain 
point in understanding. This is why I can keep my own name in the writing of this 
thesis (whilst also allowing myself what Honan and Bright (2016) term ‘a space to 
pass’), for the same reasons that Deleuze and Guattari (2004) kept theirs: 
 
Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in 
turn. To render imperceptible, not ourselves, but what makes us act, 
feel, and think. Also because it's nice to talk like everybody else, to say 
the sun rises, when everybody knows it's only a manner of speaking. To 
reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is 
no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer 
ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, 
multiplied.  
 
Is this disingenuous? Habit is important, it is a manifestation of lines of desire, rather 
than an affliction, like the habit of smoking. And so, while I present my story here - 
alongside and with other voices - of becoming a researcher and diffractive 
environmental educator, it is important to remember that this is only a manner of 
speaking. The trick is first to reach this post-binary understanding. Here, I mean 
post-dominant, or prevailing ‘binary’, as binaries themselves are not necessarily 
‘bad’. To judge them as such would rely on a transcendent ethics. Rather, it is the 
effect of particular binaries that is at issue. To see the text as both performing and 
questioning as de Oliveira Andreotti (2016, p.80) has put it: 
 
“performative” texts are very different from texts that claim to represent 
something literally. As an expression of an aesthetic force the text has a 
life of its own and is out of my control— in the artistic sense, I cannot 
claim responsibility for what it does or even where it comes from. My 
experience with this force is that it intends to “touch” each reader 





to become visible. In this sense, I invite you to observe yourself reading 
the text: to hold your response before you as a gift in your hands 




And yet, different readers come with different preconceptions of what the text is 
supposed to do. In traditional academic writing, the text is supposed to communicate 
specific meaning; be clear, be transparent. The reader is not supposed to do half (or 
all) the work. They are not necessarily supposed to have already read Deleuze. I have 
to imagine a reader as I write. Either a reader who has read A Thousand Plateaus, or 
one who hasn’t. But more than this is occurring as well, for the writing isn’t only for 
the reader; not really. It is the method by which I gain understanding. The method by 
which I explore what is possible for my understanding. And so, with more creative, 
performative texts ‘readers will read it differently, selectively and abusively, even. 
Some will be offended by it, some will have something triggered by it, others will 
domesticate it and make it fit whatever it is that they are for or against’ (de Oliverira 
Andreotti, 2016, p.80). If this is the case, how can a contribution be judged? 
Especially when: 
 
we have too many colleagues and students – male and female – who 
haven’t done their reading, who haven’t kept up and are “paradigms 
behind” (Patton, 2008, p. 269) – who still think and live in those 
binaries. Having to work with them is tiring and irksome and always 
makes me cranky. (St. Pierre, 2013, p.149) 
 
I wonder how this makes you feel, reader? It scares the hell out of me! There is so 
much I haven’t read. And so much I haven’t read well. 
 
Is outdoor environmental education research ‘paradigms behind’? Certainly not all of 
it. However, I don’t think it is a stretch to claim that much environmental education 
research rests on problematic methodological assumptions, often falling either into 
positivistic attempts to measure the effects of nature or social 
constructivist/phenomenological attempts to gain insight to the social meaning or 





understanding, early childhood education research has begun to embrace the material 
turn as a counter to the criticisms of prevailing research paradigms (e.g. Malone, 
2016). Other ways of thinking are occurring. New figurations that help me/us think 
these things differently and I cite some of this research in Haecceity 1. At the time of 
writing this the Special Issue on New Materialisms and Environmental Education 
which I am co-editing contains submissions drawing on a host of new materialist and 
post-qualitative literature, I am excited to see the ways these papers develop, 
especially in exploring the ways in which environmental education literature 
contributes to discussions of the ethical orientations of new materialisms which 
position themselves as environmentally significant. Language, and the space between 
language and reality, has been taken up before in environmental education, especially 
in a special issue on the ‘post-post’ era in a 2005 issue of Environmental Education 
Research. 
 
What to do after method, machines, and matters of concern 
 
This is, as John Law (2006) would say, after method. Following St. Pierre’s (2013) 
instruction to her students, I ‘plug’ my machine - my life and problems - into 
Deleuze’s and others’. What is analysis? Elizabeth St. Pierre (2011) explains that 
when she asks her students what they did when they were ‘doing analysis’ they 
‘describe a multitude of activities’: 
 
washing the car and weeding the garden (the physicality of theorizing), 
making charts and webs, talking with friends, writing, listening, dozing 
on the couch, and so forth. The positivism imbedded in qualitative 
research quickly fails – audit trails can’t capture that work, it can’t be 
triangulated, and it is never saturated. (St. Pierre, 2011, p.622) 
 
 
Analysis is lived with/of things. The machine is a Deleuzian figuration that may 
initially jar with readers from an environmental education background. Stephen 
Sterling (2005) popularly differentiated between a ‘mechanistic’ worldview and an 
‘ecological’ worldview of education, urging a shift to the latter by promoting whole 
systems thinking through education and education management change. As I have 





environmental education practice and research. For instance, Sterling (2005) defined 
the mechanistic worldview as objectivist (the observer views from the outside), 
descriptive, primarily reductive, focused on material reality (as distinct from ‘mental’ 
reality), promoting an ethos of control, atomistic, and dualist among other related 
notions. These are indeed the same objectivist notions that new materialisms seek to 
escape, as St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016, p.100) note ‘the dogmatic, 
orthodox, Cartesian image of thought’ where the world is described as operating as a 
machine still drives much social science. However, the Deleuzo-Guattarian image of 
thought offers an ‘incommensurable counter image of thought’ as a sense/event 
which collapses the separation implied by the representational separation of language 
and materiality (MacLure, 2016). How then do we reconcile this seeming 
contradictory use of the term ‘mechanistic’? I would suggest that Sterling’s (2005) 
label of this dominant way of seeing as mechanistic is metaphorical, that is it offers a 
representation of the state of affairs. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) use the 
term machine, as well as many other concepts and ideas, as a figuration. The 
figuration is non-representational in that it does not articulate a state of affairs, but 
rather acts in the world. For instance, in her contribution to Coleman and Ringrose’s 
(2013) edited collection Deleuze and Research Methods, Jackson (2013, p.113-114) 
opens her chapter with a section of interview transcript. It is a monologue from a 
participant in one of her research studies. Jackson’s interest is in reconfiguring our 
conception of data using the Deleuzian figuration of the machine:  
 
 
I do not begin this chapter simply with data but with a machine: a 
productive force that functions immanently in its becoming. In its 
becoming, the data is already multiplicitous – it is not dependent on 
being stabilized or known in an onto-epistemic project of qualitative 
research ‘interpretation’ and ‘analysis’. As a machine, data ‘works’ 




Jackson (2013) is not saying that her data are like a machine (as Sterling (2005) 
suggests the Cartesian worldview envisions the world to be like a machine), but that 





in contrast to the representational function of “metaphors”- emerges as crucial to 
Deleuze’s notion of a conceptually charged use of the imagination’ (Braidotti, 2000, 
p.170, cited in Gough, 2004, p.263). Donna Haraway comprehends figurations in a 
similar fashion, as ‘performative images that can be inhabited…condensed maps of 
contestable worlds…[and] bumps that make us swerve from literal mindedness’ 
(Haraway, 1997, p.11, cited in Gough, 2004, p.263). In After Method: mess in social 
science research Law (2004, p.151) states that he has ‘tried to show that they 
[prevailing methods] presuppose and enact a specific set of metaphysical 
assumptions - assumptions that can…and should be eroded’. And so: 
 
 
A new materialist methodology is thus performative (Alaimo, 2010), 
requiring researchers to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions by 
becoming entangled with the research process. In becoming part of the 
research-assemblage (Renold and Ringrose, 2008), new materialist 
analysis is necessary in order to trace the affective economy of the 
assemblage (Clough, 2004), to map out the flows of affect between 
researcher-data in order to reveal the micropolitics of methodology and 
the kinds of knowledge they produce (Jackson and Mazzei, 2013), and 
to produce lines of flight that carry us into new possibilities of being-
thinking, forcing us toward a politics-to-come (Rotas and Springgay, 
2013). (Sonu, Snaza, Truman and Zaliwska, 2016, p.xxv) 
 
 
‘Affective economy’. ‘Micro-politics of methodology’. New materialist research 
seems to be (post-)personal-(post-)environmental research. It is constituted on the 
materiality of the situated contexts that make up the research/ed/er assemblages. It is 
concerned with affect. ‘Environmental’ here relates to the entire spectrum of events 
which make up reality – the literal environment which we so often (limitedly) 
perceive as boxed by labels such as the social, the natural, the conceptual. In this 
way, post-qualitative new materialist research offers me the form of post-green 
environmental education research that I require to think past the romanticised 
conceptions of nature. The broadening of the notion of environment in environmental 







Inhuman agency undermines our fantasies of sovereign relation to 
environment, a domination that renders nature “out there,” a resource 




Payne (2016, p.171) draws on Noys (2010, 2014) to highlight the risk of this ‘”post-
critical” space’ – I interpret Payne’s caution as speaking to the manner in which the 
nature of academic critique has changed. For instance Bruno Latour (2004) 
articulates how ontology - the real - is manifest politically – ‘matters of concern’ - as 
well as scientifically – ‘the matters of fact’. This in turn, Latour (2004) maintains, 
requires a shift in the manner of critique. Critique is ontological insofar that, if I 
oppose a matter of fact I critique it, but if I oppose a matter of concern, I may 
damage something very legitimate: 
 
 
Archimedes spoke for a whole tradition when he exclaimed: “Give me 
one fixed point and I will move the Earth,” but am I not speaking for 
another, much less prestigious but maybe as respectable tradition, if I 
exclaim in turn “Give me one matter of concern and I will show you the 
whole earth and heavens that have to be gathered to hold it firmly in 
place”? For me it makes no sense to reserve the realist vocabulary for 
the first one only. The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one 
who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under 
the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants 
arenas in which to gather. The critic is not the one who alternates 
haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk 
iconoclast drawn by Goya, but the one for whom, if something is 
constructed, then it means it is fragile and thus in great need of care and 
caution. I am aware that to get at the heart of this argument one would 
have to renew also what it means to be a constructivist, but I have said 
enough to indicate the direction of critique, not away but toward the 
gathering, the Thing. (Latour, 2004, p. 246) 
 
 
Latour is articulating a further concern of post-qualitative inquiry; a proposed 
collapse of the ethical imperatives that drive our inquiries and the state of the real. 
Latour’s point has been usefully applied by Van Poeck, Goeminne and Vandenabeele 
(2014) in analysing educational practices that enrich discussion of the democratic 
paradox in education for environmental and sustainability education. Karen Barad 





with her notion of the ‘ethics of mattering’. Both of these stances claim that ontology 
and ethics are imbricated, which is a distinction from the claims of, for instance 
Bennett (2010) or Haraway (1994), who each articulate in different ways that the 
realisation of the world’s agency requires an ethical response. And this is different 
again from speculative realists and object oriented ontologists who, whilst 
advocating flattened ontologies and post binary realities, appear less concerned with 
politics. According to Taylor (2016, p.208): 
New material feminists, like speculative realists, adhere to a non-
dualist, flat ontology, which at the same time reworks epistemology 
but, unlike speculative realists, they have been particularly exercised by 
ethics as engaged, embodied, situated, and gendered meaning-making 
practices which necessarily displace objectivity, “truth,” and 
“reason”—what Haraway (1988) called “the god trick of seeing 
everything from nowhere” (p. 581)—as central values in social research 
(Alaimo & Hekman, 2008; Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2010; Braidotti, 
2013; Coole & Frost, 2010).  
 
In this way OOO and speculative realisms retain an interest in matters of fact, the 
ways things are, rather than matters of concern. 
 
What follows and precedes and is 
 
Philip Payne (2016) asks ‘What next?’ in environmental education research, and a 
tentative answer that he provides is that the emergent turns in thought, towards the 
material and affectual, can be thought of as: 
 
 
…another braiding of the calls in EE from the 1980s for a “paradigm” 
shift in education and research, a point touched upon by Bob Jickling 
through Kuhn,…. Undoubtedly, it is an exciting (theoretical) time for 







I agree with this sentiment and have written here a different form of environmental 
education inquiry. Not following a method, post-qualitative work is, at its most 
a/effective, a (non-)method that acts as a catalyst for thought against the pre-given: 
 
Suspicious as I am of efforts to codify and discipline the “beyond” of 
qualitative work, I want to endorse the incalculable, the messy, and the 
responsibilities of not knowing. This is against the much more common 
disciplining efforts that would benefit from an immersion in vitally 
minor possibilities that work against the forces of homogenization. In 
Deleuzean terms, this is a molecular vision of the alternative, a plurality 
of fissions and margins, a system of deviances straining for 
communicability while protecting its marginality, registering in the 
local, enacting the future life of difference, and a way to dream and 
perhaps enact postqualitative work. The question is how might we 
move from what needs to be opposed to what can be imagined out of 
what is already happening, embedded in an immanence of doing. 
(Lather, 2016, p.129) 
 
 
This is a risky and necessary business. What might an articulation of a post-
environmental education look like? What I have ended up producing are haecceities 
of the materiality of a life. They are stories of practice-theorising-inquiry at the edges 
of environmental concern post-nature, or what I come to call environing education. 
Elements of teaching, research, ethics and a life come together in explorative writing 
in eight haecceities (including this one). They are not perfect, nor are they 
(necessarily) complete. They are experiments that ebb and flow between precarity 
and security. I think I start off safe, and become more playful as I proceed, though I 
have started all over the place and not yet ended! My focus ranges across many 
elements of a life, but I hope the stories are grounded in what Lather (2016, p.129) 
calls an ‘immanence of doing’ that is, the call of post-qualitative inquiry. I move 






Haecceity 4: Becoming rocked 
 
 
‘I didn’t know we were at the disco’ said a student down to my right hand side. He 
was remarking on my leg, which was drumming up and down at the knee under the 
odd, angled pressure I was exerting upon it. The student, ostensibly acting as a 
‘spotter’ in case I fell, was one of 12 who had come on this trip to Fontainebleau 
forest about an hour’s drive south of Paris. Fontainebleau is world renowned for its 
sandstone boulders, which are climbed by thousands of people each year. Although I 
had visited ‘Font’ several times before, for the undergraduate students, undertaking a 
degree in ‘Outdoor Adventurous Activities’, this was their first time wandering the 
sometimes thick, sometimes gladed, sometimes deserted Oak, Scots Pine and Beech 
forest. 
 
We had been climbing at a spot called Le Diplodocus in the Trois Pignons area of the 
forest all morning. I had been sitting on a bouldering mat having some lunch when 
some of the students had started trying to climb a short slab route off to my right. I’d 
seen a local ascend the route not ten minutes earlier with little problem, and so was 
interested when these students, among them some very talented climbers, were 
struggling to get to the top. From where I sat it looked ‘do-able’. I wandered over. I 
was drawn over. I could picture placing my right foot on the solid foot hold, stepping 
up to ‘smear’ my left foot wide and high, balancing, and then biting in with the 
rubber on my left shoe to step up to the broad ‘jug’ hold at the top. Three simple 
moves. After helping spot the students for a while they offered up a slot. ‘Dave?’ 
said Tom, indicating to the rock. 
 
To say the rocks are climbed might be something of a mistake. The rock is not inert 
in the process. Rather, it climbs us as much as we climb it. Years of climbers 
returning to the same famous circuits (sets of climbs of roughly the same difficulty) 
and routes (the individual climbs themselves) leave their mark on the rock in the 
form of chalked up hand holds, blackened foot holds and a gradual ‘polishing’ of the 





previous attempt. But the rock acts on the climber in very physical ways also, asking 
her to contort, balance, rush, be still, endure, sprag, smear, bridge, create, push, pull 
and above all, feel – through searching fingers and weighted toes, and the gentle 
pendulum of a balance nearly caught. There is none of this without the rock. If the 
rock is climbed, then the climber is rocked. As Ahmed (2010) notes, ‘while bodies 
do things, things might also ‘do bodies’’ (p.245). 
 
Pauliina Rautio (2013) is a human geographer whose research on the way children 
experience their material world demonstrates this ‘intra-relational’ existence: 
 
Stones have (intra-)agency: stones do things to us and with us. They 
have us pick them up, feel them, close them in our fist (if particularly 
smooth and rounded) or hold them between our thumb and forefinger 
(if small and edgy). They condition our walking: on a frosty morning 
when the roads are slippery the sight of gravel on the ground makes us 
pace with ease. Stones play with us if they are flat in the right way. We 
throw them onto water to make them bounce – just to make them 
bounce. And if our co-operation is optimal they bounce quite a few 
times (p. 404) 
 
 
The students and I spent most of the time looking, in a haptic sense, at the rock 
face22. We chatted to each other as we stroked our fingertips over the rippled 
sandstone, searching for nuances in the face that might hold a toe (the foothold was 
all important for this particular climb). So here we were, our ‘matters of concern’ 
before us (Latour, 2004), imbricating us, intra-acting upon each other (Barad, 2007), 
and all blurring at the edges through our intra-acting; or, more accurately, becoming 
more real as a result of it. In ‘Font’ the routes are numbered, and often named, so 
climbers can follow a circuit, or return year on year to a problem yet unsolved; an old 
friend they want to get to know better. Blue 11 at Le Diplodocus was becoming a 
friend, taunting me warmly, daring me to stand on my left foot. Trust the hold; trust 
                                                 
22 Haptic because, as Karen Barad (2008, p.327) notes: ‘Can we trust visual delineations to 
define bodily boundaries? Can we trust our eyes? Connectivity does not require physical 
contiguity. (Spatially separate particles in an entangled state do not have separate identities, 
but rather are part of the same phenomena.)’. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p.492); 
‘"Haptic" is a better word than "tactile" since it does not establish an opposition between two 






the rubber on my shoe. Trust the students spotting me (another matter altogether). 






I’m walking up the Royal Mile to the office. Once again someone has stopped in 
front of me on the pavement, head tilted upward to the right, squinting as they raise 
their camera. The Tollbooth Tavern clock tower stops people in their tracks daily. 
Like a tractor beam, it roots them to the ground, demands their attention. Each time I 
see it, I wonder how many thousands of photos of the tower lie in barely-ever-open 
folders on hard disks around the world, or in the cloud. The cloud is of course very 
Earthly. These digital images float as electrons in Google’s massive data centres. In 
2015, these centres produced as much CO2 as all air travel (Vaughan, 2015). As I 
learn this I immediately think of a tweet I sent out, raising the issue of academics 
flying to conferences to discuss climate change. I think of the fact that this thesis is 
stored on my Google Drive. Right now my thesis, along with digital replicas of the 






Since reflecting on my experiences of climbing in Fontainebleau and the contingent 
play of materials that become whilst bouldering - enlivening my conception of the 
lithic and, by extension, the material world - I have come across Jeffrey Cohen’s 
(2015) beautiful book Stone: an ecology of the inhuman. Cohen (2015, p.16) 
expresses my sentiments well: 
 
Stone’s time is not ours. For many, this disjunction will never be 
noticed, triggering neither affect nor insight. For those for whom rock’s 





is profoundly, productively disorienting. A climber faces the face of the 
mountain, and in that interface relation unfolds, bringing each into 
intimacy: fraught, perilous, fleeting, familiar, suspended above the 
certainty of ground. Something happens in such interfacial zones: 
anarchic irruption (arche is origin, grounding: what happens when arche 
is impossibly distant, geologically adrift?), generative encounter, an 
erosion of secure foundation, an ethical moment of connection-forging. 
Lithic-induced perspective shift triggers an ontological and temporal 
reeling, a rocky movement of affect, cognition, horizon. 
 
 
‘Ontological and temporal reeling’ is, I think, something like what I hope to get at 
with this study for the very reasons that Cohen articulates: as a bridge to ‘ethical 
connection-forging’ (though I take issue with the term ‘connection’) and, 
particularly, the enchantment and consequential ethics that an understanding of the 
world as lively might produce. However, where Cohen and I differ is in the assertion 
that climbers, per se, know or understand this view, or in the assertion that to climb 
one must attend to this conception of the world. That is manifestly not the case. The 
students I climbed with in Font on that day, and students I have engaged with in 
many other endeavours, do not, by and large, see the world that Cohen describes. 
Nor do I. At least, not all the time. It’s something to practise. 
 
Turning the Anthropocene 
 
Sustainability education has often been conceived as responding to a ‘crisis of 
perception’.  There are certainly alternative ways of conceiving the world to 
dominant western understandings, and it is reasonable to assume that our ways of 
conceiving have an influence on our actions. Are there, then, more ‘sustainable’ 
ways of conceiving? Ways of understanding reality that, through the manner in 
which the ‘human’ is conceived in relation to the wider world, result in change that 
might be productive (healthy? Ethical, even?) for the ‘human’ and the ‘non-human’? 
It is certainly an idea worth exploring. And I wonder what the concept 
‘Anthropocene’ means for our ways of seeing. Mirzoeff (2014, p.215) argues 
succinctly that the concept has unescapable implications for our conception of 






Nature, so often used by humans to define perversity as unnatural, has 
itself become perverse (Mortimer- Sandilands and Erickson 2010: 1 – 
47), undoing all theologies, deisms, Spinozisms, and other forms of the 
transcendent. We now find ourselves confronting an autoimmune 
capitalism that seems determined to extract the last moment of 
circulation for itself, even at the expense of its host lifeworld. Like 
AIDS and other autoimmune diseases, in which the body turns on itself, 
this capitalism has a long etiology and multiple symptoms and is 
resistant to cure: we might call it autoimmune climate- changing 
capitalism syndrome, or AICS for short. I want to acknowledge that it 
was Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009) who first called for humanists to use 




Ontological transcendence is set adrift by the Anthropocene, or revealed as an 
illusory framework upon which western modernity pinned its faiths – including 
modern positivist and neo-positivist social science research (St. Pierre, 2014). As 
Mirzoeff (2014) points out, this is true for our conception of nature – also no longer 
tenable as transcendent, despite some environmental education scholars’ claims to 
the contrary (e.g. Bonnett, 2015). Mirzoeff (2014) wishes to stress Chakrabarty’s 
view of the implications of the Anthropocene in relation to academic endeavour and 
it is a reflection worth considering in light of my own work: 
 
[Chakrabarty’s] crucial point was to emphasize that the periodizing and 
dividing so beloved of academia no longer holds good. In the 
Anthropocene, all past human history in the industrial era is the 
contemporary. No location is outside the Anthropocene, although some 
are affected far more than others. The modern research university has 
grafted the capitalist division of labor onto the medieval vision of the 
individual scholar in his cell. Learning to think, to coin a term, will 
mean letting go of both the divisions of time and space that define 
research and the myth of the solitary intellectual. 
 
 
We are never alone in our being. And what alternative conceptions exist to the 
Anthropocene? Whilst there is healthy debate amongst geoscientists as to ‘when’ this 
‘new’ epoch arose (Zalasiewicz et. al, 2015) there is also debate, in broader fields, as 
to the manner in which we might conceive of any change in a geo-temporal era – i.e., 





expressed this sentiment in Nature: 
 
What counts as epochal change is a matter of perspective and emerges 
from judgements about when quantitative change morphs into 
qualitative transformation. The interpretive and critical parts of social 
science can help us to appreciate that formalizing the Anthropocene is a 
misguided attempt to ‘scientize’ a particular set of value judgements. 
No such formalization is needed to underpin arguments for humans to 




For instance, Donna Haraway (2015) recently de-centred the ‘anthro’ in the 
Anthropocene, noting that ‘…no species, not even our own arrogant one pretending 
to be good individuals in so-called modern Western scripts, acts alone; assemblages 
of organic species and of abiotic actors make history, the evolutionary kind and the 
other kinds too’ (p.159). Whilst some embrace the concept of the ‘Anthropocene’ as 
evidence of the damage that humanity can do, the rush to label humans as the central 
instigator of environmental crises does not sit well theoretically with post-humanist 
theory that attempts to erode the dualism of humans and nature. Splitting history into 
distinct geological phases is, after all, a very Western human thing to do, as is 
naming one of them after us.  
 
Jason Moore’s (2014) ‘capitalocene’ paints a different picture to the dominant 
narrative once again. Moore moves beyond the implied dualism of the Anthropocene 
(that humans are ‘overwhelming the great forces of nature’ [Steffen, Crutzen & 
McNeill (2007)]) to instead depict capitalism as a world–ecology. This conception, 
Moore (2014) argues, is useful for overcoming a prevailing problem, that 
‘[p]hilosophically, humanity is recognized as a species within the web of life; but in 
terms of our methodological frames, analytical strategies, and narrative structures, 
human activity is treated as separate and independent.’ (p.2). Our ways of seeing, 
then, can be likened to the volcanic action that most likely brought on the great 
Permian-Triassic extinction (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014; Mcphie & Clarke, 2014). And 






My story of my experience with Blue 11, and Rautio’s (2013) description of our 
diffusion with the material world more generally, spring from an emerging and 
promising current of alternatives to the prevailing conception that is beginning to 
seep into our ‘methodological frames, analytical strategies and narrative structures’ 
(Moore, 2014, p.2). These alternatives, variously and often enigmatically named, are 
united by their move past dualistic conceptions and transcendent notions of reality to 
reimagine, often to blur and make ‘messy’, the human relation to the world in order 
that we may productively tackle socio-ecological crises. Ivakhiv (2014, p.1, cited in 
Mcphie and Clarke, 2015) describes this entanglement of new narratives and 
perspectives as an: 
 
…“ontopolitical” milieu of contemporary social, cultural, and 
environmental theory, a milieu in which posthumanism, critical animal 
studies, actor-network theory, assemblage theory, critical realism, 
agential realism, nonrepresentational theory, enactive and embodied 
cognitivism, post-phenomenology, multispecies ethnography, integral 
ecology, and various forms of “new materialism,” “geophilosophy,” 
and “cosmopolitics” fashion themselves as intellectual responses to the 
predicament indicated by such terms as the ecocrisis, the climate crisis, 
and the Anthropocene.  
 
 
Many of these neologisms serve to demonstrate their intent by themselves. More than 
this, they can allow the reader to think generatively. For example, rather than acting 
as a signifier to a pre-given realm of reality the term ‘geophilosophy’, derived from 
the materialist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2004), is more of a 
process that cultivates the readers thoughts. What does it make you think to read the 
term? For me, sometimes, the expression implies a rupturing of any transcendent 
divide between the mental abstract and the geophysical. When I read the term my 
thoughts can become as tangible as fjords, or French boulders23 – no longer any 
chasm of categories of reality between them and the ‘real’ world. The challenging of 
modernist dualisms, such as mental/physical, is a feature common to the diverse 
approaches Ivakhiv (2014) lists. This is not, as Ivakhiv (2010) points out, because 
                                                 
23 Deleuze talks of a ‘real empiricism’ where ‘thought itself exists in fundamental 
relationship with the Outside…[where there is] on one hand, a physics of the mind; on the 





dualisms are inherently bad (though there may indeed be negative consequences of 
basing action solely on dualisms), but rather because the (often unquestioned) 
importance we place on them may smother other ways of thinking.  
 
The nature/culture dualism is one such schism that may be stultifying other modes of 
educating for sustainability. Presently much research, theory and academic effort 
supports the notion that spending time in ‘nature’ can inform environmental 
awareness, and even ‘reconnect’ ‘us’ to ‘it’ (Cheng & Monroe, 2012; Christie & 
Higgins 2012; Frantz & Mayer, 2014; Liefländer, Fröhlich, Bogner & Schultz, 2013; 
Sommerville & Williams, 2015). However, the term (nature) is used variously and 
incongruously in the field of environmental education. For example, sometimes the 
term is used to refer to the ‘ecological processes’ of the planet. For instance, 
approaches that advocate ‘ecological literacy’ often suggest helping people better 
understand the ‘natural ecological process’ of the planet (McBride, Brewer & 
Berkowitz 2013). Alternatively ‘nature’ can refer to geographically delineated 
places, supposedly untrammelled (or only partially trammelled) by people. For 
instance some authors advocate ‘nature experiences’, as if there is a transcendent 
‘nature’ that is somehow apart from the everyday lives of people (e.g. Zelenski, 
Dopko & Capaldi, 2015). In the first of these examples, students may be urged to 
consider the ecological systems that they draw from, and which they affect in their 
day-to-day life choices. In the second, students may spend time in supposedly 
‘natural’ places, so as to have firsthand aesthetic experiences, gain propositional 
knowledge of ‘wildlife’ and ‘natural processes’ and as a result start to care for 
it/them. There are many variations of these approaches and ‘nature’ is not always 
essentialised in environmental education literature (see Gough, 2004, for example).  
However, other fields of enquiry have moved much further in their exploration of the 
concepts of the ‘human’ and the ‘natural’, as indicated by Ivakhiv (2014). As the 
term appears so central to environmental education, researchers, theorists and 
practitioners could make more use of this rich world of alternatives. 
 
In environmental and human geography for instance Lorimer (2012, p.2) tracks a 





constituted by ‘a diverse array of non-deterministic and non-dualistic materialisms’. 
The focus on materiality, or new materialisms, allows a dissolving of the essentialist 
barrier that is set up by the terms ‘human’ and ‘nature’ as well as the constructivist 
view of culturally constructed natures. Coole and Frost’s (2010) edited collection, 
New Materialisms, acts as a confluence of this ‘material turn’ in cultural studies, 
demonstrating that it is a turn that has been picking up speed across fields as diverse 
as anthropology, archaeology, feminist studies and political studies for example, 
even producing its own areas of science studies, rhizome studies and contemporary 
animisms as well as its own academic battles (the static Object-Orientated-
Ontologists vs the fluid process-relationalists for example). The potential for these 
approaches to influence how education can help young people conceive of their 
material coalescence of (rather than ‘with’ or ‘in’) the material world is great. This 
fact seems particularly significant given the emphasis environmental education 
discourse places on changing people’s perceptions of their dependence on (or, from a 
new materialist perspective, coalescence of) the world.  
 
Veering away from ‘nature’: shallow, deep, dark and flat ecology and 
environmental education 
 
So what of ‘nature’? New materialists might say that the term is highly 
anthropocentric, implying that humans have the ‘culture’. Why is it, for instance, that 
the action and produce of bowerbirds are not conceived as culture, and everything 
outside of their dances, bower building and selection and display of colourful 
artifacts is conceived as nature? Architect, designer, choreographer and educator Eva 
Perez de Vega (2014) walks us through the different conceptions of the 
‘nature/culture’ problem by highlighting four approaches: four ecologies. She 
highlights the popular deep ecology of Arne Naess (1973) as an attempt to move 
beyond the prevailing dominance of culture in our perceptions of the nature/culture 
relationship, an approach that Naess famously termed a shallow ecology. Naess’ 
premise was that we needed to move from a shallow ‘anthropocentric’ conception, 
where human culture was the dominant concern, to a deeper ‘ecocentric’ conception 
of the world, where nature was considered the home of human culture, and therefore 





postulate what a pedagogy influenced by Naess’ work, and greater consideration for 
ecological process in general, might look like (e.g. Haigh, 2006; Orr 1992; Stone & 
Barlow, 2005). Whilst there may be some examples of practice embracing deep 
ecology and ecological processes in general, the absence of these approaches in 
mainstream education, certainly in the UK, demonstrates that a shallow ecological 
perspective is dominant in schooling in the West. Students may have separate time 
for ‘nature study’ or field trips where nature is experienced as an ‘other’. Deep 
ecology has not even greatly influenced popular adventurous forms of outdoor 
education, where the environment is treated staggeringly uncritically. In this practice 
there may be plenty of time set aside for synoptic weather charts, footpath erosion 
and leave no trace principles, but seldom any for discussion of the petrochemical 
industries required for Gore-Tex jackets, satellite navigation and portable gas 
canisters, not to mention the socio-environmental justice issues created by the 
economies upon which these industries are founded (Cachelin, Rose, Dustin & 
Shooter, 2011). Environmental education theory has, of course, accessed the 
philosophical perspective of deep ecology, and it has even been seen as firm 
conceptual ground on which to construct environmental education practice (Nicol, 
2003). However, de Vega draws on Timothy Morton’s (2010) dark ecology to 
demonstrate the lingering dualism in Naess’ (1973) formation, and the romantic and 
perhaps limiting conception of nature that deep ecology relies on, celebrating green 
‘nature’ over the ‘culture’ of humans. Might there be a way forward beyond deep 
environmental education? 
 
Morton’s (2010) dark ecology, articulated in his books The Ecological Thought and 
Ecology without Nature, suggests that the greatest barrier to ecological thinking is 
the concept of nature itself. This is because the notion of nature sets up an aesthetic 
distance between ‘us’ and the ‘world’. Morton complains that we cannot mourn for 
the environment because we are deeply connected to it – ‘we’ are it – and ‘we’ 
includes our industrial processes, urbanisation, pollution and waste; all of which are 
ecological events that are not ‘killing nature’, but producing their own dark 
ecosystems. In this conception the petrochemical industries are as ‘natural’ as a wild 





modernist ideas of nature, is not much better than shallow ecology’s 
anthropocentrism in clearing up the metaphysical puzzle. Whereas in shallow 
ecology uncivilised nature is to be tamed by culture, de Vega demonstrates how in 
Naess’ (1973) deep ecology there is a favouring of the perceived idyll of nature over 
the presumed depravity of culture; in both cases, however, a metaphysical divide 
remains. In contrast, a dark ecology allows us to cut out the romantic, picturesque, 
idyllic and trite from our environmental conception - an operation that is, perhaps, 
much needed in environmental education discourse. A dark environmental education 
would move beyond ecological principles as popularly conceived. Morton’s 
ecological thought is one that acknowledges the co-existence of all things - things 
already coping with environmental catastrophe. According to Morton (2007), to 
begin to think our way into this new world we have created we must, above all, reject 
‘nature’; whatever else it might be. A dark environmental education would be an 
education without ‘nature’. Jeffrey Cohen (2014, p.xxii) editor of the collection 
Prismatic Ecology: Ecotheory beyond Green stresses the dominant role the hue of 
green has played in even recent attempts at ecocriticism and the world we must 
consider if ecotheory is to have credence: 
 
 
It’s not easy being viridescent. Bright green criticism emphasizes 
balance, the innate, the primal, landscapes with few people, 
macrosystems, the unrefined. What of the catastrophic, the disruptive, 
urban ecologies, the eruptive, heterogenous microclimates, inhumanly 
vast or tiny scales of being and time, the mixed spaces where the 
separation of nature and culture are impossible to maintain? Underneath 
every field stretches an unplumable cosmos of primordial stone, worms, 
recent debris, reservoirs of natural and manufactured chemicals, 
poisonous and fertile muck. In a green Arcadia what do we make of the 
airplane, graves, gamma rays, bacteria, invasive bamboo accidently 
planted as an ornament, inorganic agency, the crater become lake, the 
invisibly advancing or receding glacier refuse, lost supercontinents, 
parasites, inorganic compounds that act like living creatures, species 
undergoing sudden change? Other colors may be necessary to trace the 
impress and interspaces created by ecologies that cannot be easily 
accommodated within the bucolic expanse of green readings, or at least 
within those that possess a utopian emphasis on homeostasis, order, and 







Timothy Morton’s ‘dark ecology’ is of course a reaction to the very same ‘green 
Arcadia’ that Cohen wishes to escape. Phillip Payne (2014) takes up Morton’s (2010) 
dark ecology, along with Rosi Braidotti’s Nomadic ethics, to practise a form of dark 
environmental education in Bear Gully (Bare Gulli), Victoria, Australia. Payne’s 
(2014) reflections on the dark side of his students’/participants’ experiences of a 
stripped back ‘vagabonding’ environmental education experience highlights both the 
potentials for considering a dark environmental education for better understanding 
these experiences (as opposed to more prevailing romanticised or transformational 
accounts), but also the research problems associated with what is essentially a post-
qualitative attempt at knowing: 
 
 
This “problem” is exacerbated by the difficulties of representing both 
the “ecocentric” and “embodied” turns while wrestling with an 
ontological (re)turn in philosophy and theory. Put simply, as unusual as 
it might seem, this researcher believes that the politics of the ontology 
of time, in relation to space, through bodies emplaced in different 
natures, lies most earnestly at the very heart of a renewed post-critical 
“educative” quest for social and environmental justices. Thus at this 
point, additional theoretical resources and explanations of the voices 
and stories of the researched are required. (Payne, 2014, p.55) 
 
 
Payne’s identification that the politics of the ontology of time, space, bodies and 
multinatures are central to the development of environmental education research is 
one that I wholeheartedly endorse and is a reason why I am pushed to examine the 
dualisms in prevailing environmental education research. Whilst retaining an implicit 
favouring of romantic ideas of nature, Naess’ philosophical call is one that at least 
attempts to remove the dualism between nature and culture. Plumwood (2000) recalls 
the debates between Arne Naess and his mountaineering friend Peter Reed; where 
Naess stressed that an environmental ethic must spring from acceptance that nature is 
the home of culture, thus advocating a monistic unity (i.e. that humans and nature are 





conceptions of the sublime and awe inspired by the difference of ‘wild’24 places as 
the grounds from which environmental action would rise (a fundamentally pluralistic 
view – dualisms are limited forms of pluralism, but if your worldview is made up of 
many dualisms it is fundamentally pluralistic). In contrast to these approaches a 
Deleuzo-Guattarian flat ecology places the emphasis on the continuous and 
immanent materiality of the world, before the formation of signifying language (i.e. 
‘nature’ and ‘culture’) (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). Immanently experimenting in 
world-making through storytelling may produce any number of dualisms, however 
the idea is to overcome the staid ones and understand that the dualisms we construct 
can be left behind and discarded – as furniture we are forever rearranging. de Vega 
(2014) employs the term flat as it demonstrates the anti-hierarchical plane of 
continuity, and yet a quasi-form of difference, implied by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ontology. St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016, p.5) also demonstrate the influence 
of thinking flatly on language when they discuss how the subject, the “I”, is likely 
entirely fictional: 
 
Could that “I” be just a habit, a bad habit? Perhaps “I” does not precede 
the verb, “think.” Perhaps thought is not initiated by the “I” but comes 
to the “I” from the world. Perhaps the “I” is not even separate from the 
verb or the object of the verb in the sentence, “I am running in the 
road.” Perhaps “I,” “running,” and “road” only exist together—
irunroad—in a spatiotemporal relation without distinctions. Perhaps 
everything exists on the same flat plane with no depth, with no 
                                                 
24 In immanence everything and everywhere is wild, including what we might think of as the 
most mundane and domesticated of events or differences. In this way, Levi Bryant (2011, 
n.p.) refers to a ‘wilderness ontology’ in which human beings ‘are amongst beings, rather 
than beings for which all other beings are correlates’. If I focus on the plant pot to my left in 
this café, if I imagine myself shrunk to the size of a cell and placed upon its surface, I will 
perceive a wild and sublime terrain full of beauty and danger: 
  
And herein lies the greatness of Whitehead and Deleuze as thinkers of the 
wilderness. Occasionally they will adopt the point of view of humans and discuss the 
peculiar manner in which we encounter the world. Yet for them we are 
always amongst beings. They equally shift to the perspectives of grizzlies, trees, 
neutrinos, metals, institutions, groups, wasps, markets, and Cleopatra’s Needle as 
points of view on the world in their own right, irreducible to vehicles for human 
aims, interests, and meanings. Humans are entangled in these other agencies but are 






hierarchies of subject/object or real/language/representation. But that is 
not the plane of thought Descartes laid out.  
 
From a perspective that attempts an escape of the subject/object divide we can 
become immediately skeptical of the fixity we place on the world and realise that, 
rather than having to fit the world into the language we use, we may instead 
acknowledge that our language may be limiting in all sorts of ways.  Deleuze’s flat 
ontology (ecology) may appear monistic in its conception of the world, but it allows 
for the expression of difference (pluralism) manifesting ‘of’ this apparent monism. 
Deleuze and Guattari justify this twist by rejecting the notion that the world is made 
up of one substance (monism), or many (pluralism). Grosz (2005, p.6) explains: 
 
It is no longer a question of ‘undoing’ binary terms even temporarily, of 
freeing up the subordinated term in an oppositional or dualistic 
structure, for dualisms cannot be resolved either through monism, 
which involves the reduction of the two terms to one, or through the 
addition of extra terms [pluralism] – as if three of four terms would 
somehow overcome the constraint of the two (or the one, for binary 
terms are commonly translatable into a single term and its negation). It 
is only the proliferation of dualisms, and their capacity for infinite 
reversal that reveal the stratum, the field on which they are grounded, 
which is the real object of both Deleuze’s and Bergson’s explorations. 
 
Instead, Deleuze and Guattari argue that all things are produced by a process of 
continual becoming consisting of folds, speeds and intensities, rather than a static 
state of either monistic or pluralistic being. This monist=pluralist conception lays a 
path between the dualistic shallow ecology of pure difference on the one hand, and 
Naess’ attempt at monistic unity on the other. Deleuze and Guattari (2004, p.23) refer 
to ‘the magic formula we all seek – PLURALISM = MONISM – via all the dualisms 
that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever 
rearranging’. In this way, the world is a processual and relational production, one 
where dualisms can be tackled, but in which we can stay vigilant for the likely 
construction of new dualisms: 
 
 





dark ecology rejects nature; while Deleuze’s flat ecology intensifies 
nature, treating it as a comprehensive ontology of complex material 
systems defined not by their identifying properties, not by whether they 
have natural or artificial essences, but by their process of production- 
their morphogenesis. (de Vega, 2014, p.7) 
 
 
Instead of a world consisting of pregiven or boundaried objects or subjects, there is a 
smooth space of univocity, or plane of immanence – a flat ecology. This 
understanding led Deleuze and Guattari (2004) to voice the haecceity, rather than the 
object, as the fundamental property of reality; a move that puts an end to human 
exceptionalism and a move that has creative, exciting and confusing implications for 
environmental education25. Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate the nature of a 
haecceity in their usual enigmatic fashion: 
 
 
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, 
subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A 
season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality 
lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of 
a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist 
entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or 




I will return to the notion of haecceity shortly, for now let us consider the 
implications of some of the ground we have covered for environmental education. 
For instance, what would be the point of a flat environmental education? If all things 
are in a state of material flow, then, why does it matter how things flow? What 
happens to values? Does this new perspective offer anything to the ethics upon which 
we base environmental pedagogy? Karen Barad (2007) suggests that the becoming 
material processes that constitute her ontology of agential realism produce an ethics 
of mattering. Noting that knowing, being and doing are inseparable she (Barad, 
2008) reasons that ‘ethics is not about right response to the other, but about 
                                                 
25 Nature and culture are, of course, conceived as objects in the prevailing approach – physically and 





responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming of which 
‘we’ are a part’ (p.333). In educational terms this has a profound significance. For, as 
Spuybroek (2011, p. 182, as cited in Mcphie and Clarke, in 2015) notes, those 
involved in education ‘are not recipients but participants’; a flat environmental 
education is therefore a pedagogy of engagement and of participation with a world 
that is already participating. In Haecceity 7 I deal specifically with the nature of 
environmental ethics in an ontology of immanence as related to the environmental 
education occurring here. 
 
If environmental education is really about realising that we are already participants 
of a participating world, then pedagogy built on process materialism could be very 
useful; it could demonstrate the diffusion of people and planet by attempting to erase 
the borders of both, and yet retain the persuasive power of difference (and forms of 
language that we still require to articulate the world). Action then, would spring from 
both an understanding that environmental degradation is akin to cutting off one’s 
own arm (in fact, we would no longer perceive an environment or one’s own arm, 
but rather immanence – a life [Deleuze, 2005]) and a form of awe (what Ingold 
[2011, p.75] terms ‘astonishment’ and Morton [2010, p.104] ‘enchantment’) which 
results from living in a world which is seen as constantly becoming, rather than 
static, staid and stultifying. Perhaps, more powerfully than both of these points, a 
process relational pedagogy may demonstrate the eventing nature of existence to 
learners; comprehending the animate nature of their becoming may be inseparable 
from consideration for consequence. In Deleuze and Environmental Damage Mark 
Halsey (2006) draws on Deleuze’s reading of Michel Tournier to conclude that 
‘nature’ may be the possible, stubbornly passing as the real. Halsey concludes that if 
this is so, ‘the object of future socio-ecological struggles should not – indeed cannot 
– be the ‘environment’ or ‘humanity’, but the techniques and processes which govern 
their image(s) and frame the limits of the possible’ (p.257). As Noel Gough (2004) 
has articulated, educating beyond the ‘natural’ and the ‘cultural’ must therefore be 
about helping create educational practice that allows students to experiment with the 






Mapping haecceitical ‘selves’: (re)framing the limits of the possible with 
students 
 
A year before our trip to Fontainebleau the students had undertaken a module entitled 
‘Concepts of Outdoor Education’. During the module we had ascended the 900-
metre North Ridge of Mount Tryfan in Snowdonia, North Wales. Below us the dull 
grey waters of Cwm Ogwen were surrounded by farmland: Fields delineated by dry 
stonewalls climbing high into the surrounding mountains could be glimpsed in the 
occasional gaps in the cloud that was moving down the valley and around the 
prominence on which we were perched. At this point in the module we had moved 
through de Vega’s four ecologies and we were now questioning the received wisdom 
of the ‘human subject’ existing ‘in’ the ‘objective world’. Earlier in the week I had 
introduced the idea of the haecceity to the students. The term haecceity comes from 
the philosophical work of Duns Scotus (1266-1308 [Vos, 2006]), though an 
analogous concept is present in many animistic peoples’ understanding of the world, 
and therefore is much older than the late Middle Ages. In general we tend to think of 
the world as populated by objects. The concept of haecceity works against this 
conception to instead argue that processual unboundaried things, multiplicities and 
becomings constitute the fabric of the world. For a technical definition of haecceity 
the term is best contrasted with the term quiddity (also from Duns Scotus). A 
quiddity is an object as we, in the west, are most used to understanding a thing. It is a 
thing defined by the characteristics that make it a particular type of thing – or the 
question ‘what type of thing is that?’. By contrast a haecceity is a thing defined by its 
thisness, its process of becoming, and, in contrast to the question ‘what type of thing 
is that?’ a more appropriate response might be ‘look at this! What’s it/they 
doing/producing?!’ as haecceities are by definition multiplicities, each thing one and 
many, and unique in their becoming (Deleuze and Guattari’s [2004] Body Without 
Organs might be the most famous conception). At the heart of Deleuze’s project is a 
(re)consideration of ontology of difference as the primary focus of philosophy. Much 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s work is based on this understanding of philosophy, which 
is a philosophy of immanence. Grosz (2005, p.6) explains the fundamental nature of 







Difference is not a concept bound up with units, entities, or terms. It 
characterizes fields, and indeed reality itself. Difference is an 
ontological rather than a logical, semiological, political or historical 
category. It is a relation between fields, strata and chaos. It is 
movement beyond dualism, beyond pairs, entities or terms. Difference 
is the methodology of life, and, indeed, of the universe itself. Things in 
their specificity and generality, and not just terms, are the effects of 
difference, though difference is not reducible to things insofar as it is 




Essentialising the world into, on the one hand, nature and, on the other hand, culture 
is to see the world as made of quiddities. To work with a conception of difference as 
negative, rather than affirmative. Shallow and deep ecology retain a quiddital view of 
the world. A flat environmental education would, by contrast, urge students to 
consider the material intra-relations that constitute their current thisness – their 
haecceitical self.  A flat environmental education questions where bodies and 
environments begin and end – or even if they can begin and end. In this way, the 
student is not urged to ‘connect with nature’ as there is no nature. Rather, they are 
urged to consider how they are materially manifested of the world. The task I had 
given the students while we sat on the lichen covered rocks of Mount Tryfan was a 
challenging one: to map their haecceitical selves; to consider how they came to be 
this currently occurring process – student-mountain-view-lecturer, all at once. This 
was an experiment with pedagogy to see if students might take to the idea of viewing 
themselves as literally constituted of the world, not ‘in nature’, or ‘the environment’. 
Some student took to the idea with good intentions by, for instance, talking about the 
physical affects of the exercise on their bodies and the resulting affects their bodies 
had on the environment – sweat evaporating and CO2 from their breath. Others were 
more interested with the philosophical nature of what I was asking.  It did raise some 
interesting discussion and questions from some of the students - questions that did 
indeed seem as if they might have the potential to push at their ‘frame(s) of the 
possible’ – perhaps with practice from both the students, and myself, we could 
achieve more. See Clarke and Mcphie (2016) for a consideration of the potential for 





themselves by way of creating haecceitical selves. 
 
In the paper A walk in the park: considering practice in environmental education 
from an immanent take on the material turn (Mcphie and Clarke, 2015) we draw 
from a range of post-humanist, new materialist and process-relational theory to 
describe a series of encounters with students where the facilitators create 
opportunities for re-framing the limits of the possible of students’ environmental 
engagement. There is much theory that can be used to draw undergraduates into 
discussion that may challenge their preconceptions of the ‘real’. For instance, Ingold 
(2011) demonstrates how some cultures already perceive the world from this 
perspective. Some animistic cultures, as I have discussed, tend to have a processual 
metaphysical conception of the world. That is, they start from the premise that the 
world relationally constitutes them (and they the world), and is therefore moving and 
active, rather than from the premise that they exist as separate entities within a static 
world that is then populated with objects that they perceive and then represent in 
their heads – they have no ‘nature’. Bird-David’s (1999) study of the Nayaka of 
Southern India, for instance, demonstrates how the Nayaka experience their lives as 
eventing with their environments. 
 
Their attention is educated to dwell on events. They are attentive to the 
changes of things in the world in relation to changes in themselves. As 
they move and act in the forest, they pick up information about the 
relative variances in the flux of the interrelatedness between themselves 
and other things against relative invariances (p.74) 
 
In this way, the animistic Nayaka produce their knowledge of the world, but it is a 
manner of producing knowledge that results in direct action/ethical consequences. 
Bird-David (1999) expresses this fact by comparing the dominant Western approach 
to the ‘acquisition’ of knowledge to the Nayaka relational co-production of 
knowledge. In the West, to gain knowledge of a tree, or any other aspect of the 
world, we tend to fragment what we have before us, cutting it into parts that can then 





has nothing to do with the production of action or morality, but purely with the 
production of a form of abstract knowledge. Bird-David demonstrates the stark 
contrast in the approaches: 
 
If ‘‘cutting trees into parts’’ epitomizes the modernist epistemology, 
‘‘talking with trees,’’ I argue, epitomizes Nayaka animistic 
epistemology. ‘‘Talking’’ is short-hand for a two-way responsive 
relatedness with a tree— rather than ‘‘speaking’’ one-way to it, as if it 
could listen and understand. ‘‘Talking with’’ stands for attentiveness to 
variances and invariances in behavior and response of things in states of 
relatedness and for getting to know such things as they change through 
the vicissitudes over time of the engagement with them. To ‘‘talk with a 
tree’’—rather than ‘‘cut it down’’—is to perceive what it does as one 
acts towards it, being aware concurrently of changes in oneself and the 
tree. It is expecting response and responding, growing into mutual 
responsiveness and, furthermore, possibly into mutual responsibility 
(p.77) 
 
Ingold (2011) posits that the animistic state of coming to exist with a world in 
perpetual becoming results in a state of ‘astonishment’ for the animist. This 
astonishment, rising from the mutual flux of the ‘self’ and the ‘world’, may produce 
actions of ‘care, judgment, and sensitivity’ (p.75). Bird-David (1999) acknowledges 
that relational epistemology, although the dominant form of knowing among the 
Nayaka, is just one of several ways in which they learn with the world. In her work 
she suggests that this epistemology is, however, apparent in all cultures, including 
those in the West, but that it may be marginalised by other dominant ways of 
knowing. Nicol (2003) calls for educational practitioners to formulate their practice 
conceptually by grounding their teaching in epistemological diversity to overcome 
the dominance of dualistic ways of knowing the world. A relational epistemology, 
promoting animistic ways of seeing, may compliment this approach well. What we 










As some of the students looked around the rocks, juniper bushes and sheep poo, 
valiantly trying to map their haecceitical selves on the side of Mount Tryfan, others 
sat, looking out across the valley and remarking on the occasional Royal Air Force 
fighter jet, tearing through the space between us and the ground as it roared towards 
the sea. The play of air on things in flight can make an excellent talking point for 
some of the concepts I have been considering in this haecceity. Clouds, viewed from 
the side or from above, demonstrate that, rather than objects existing in a vacuous 
space, they are instead swept up in a processual flow, themselves entangled in the 
world’s becoming. Snowfall demonstrates this same thing in wonderful fashion. It 
expresses that there is not space in-between the two faces of a valley, but rather a 
continuous play of materiality – a middle you do not see without the snow tumbling 
through, and tumbled by, it. Ingold (2010a) refers to the all-encompassing nature of 
the processes that make up the world as the ‘weather-world’, highlighting how the 
weather is ‘not so much what we perceive, as what we perceive in’ (p. 131). Ingold 
(2010b) directs his students to fly kites so as to demonstrate their haecceitical 
becoming, describing how the kites appeared to be ‘objects’ when they were built 
inside: 
 
But when we carried our creations to a field outside, everything 
changed. They suddenly leaped into action, twirling, spinning, nose-
diving, and – just occasionally – flying. So what had happened? Had 
some animating force magically jumped into the kites, causing them to 
act most often in ways we did not intend? Of course not. It was rather 
that the kites themselves were now immersed in the currents of the 
wind. The kite that had lain lifeless on the table indoors had become a 
kite-in-the-air. It was no longer an object, if indeed it ever was, but a 
thing. As the thing exists in its thinging, so the kite-in-the-air exists in 
its flying. Or to put it another way, at the moment it was taken out of 
doors, the kite ceased to figure in our perception as an object that can 
be set in motion, and became instead a movement that resolves itself 
into the form of a thing (p.7) 
 





agency of ‘objects’, but more importantly for my purposes, he is demonstrating an 
educational exercise that can be used to allow students to explore the concepts 
discussed in this haecceity in intra-relational terms. For the students perched on the 
side of a Welsh mountain we made do with discussions of fighter jets and seagulls in 
flight, which in turn lead to questions of UK foreign policy and whether seagulls 
would even be on Tryfan if people didn’t drop their sandwiches up there. Even 
though the general conversation had diverged to the more conservative ‘leave no 
trace’ questions26, at least two students approached me with questions that I 
perceived to be testing the limits of the ‘human’ and the limits of the ‘environment’ 
as we descended the mountain that afternoon. These conversations, and many like 
them, demonstrate to me that students are often excited and enthusiastic to learn that 
you can (re)frame the limits of the possible. Indeed, it is this excitement that pushes 
me through this thesis. 
 
Thus opens a rhizomatic realm of possibility effecting the 
potentialization of the possible, as opposed to arborescent possibility, 




A middle:  
 
 
In a process-relational world of becoming there are no beginnings or ends, and 
certainly no conclusions. There are, however, plenty of middles, and this is where we 
find ourselves now. The title of this section is thus an attempt to illustrate the 
ontology described in the haecceity, and this may be one way to help engender 
animistic ways of seeing with learners, demonstrating the intra-relational becoming 
of the world with students in any way we can. In the past, for instance, I have asked 
students to read the illustrative prose of Deleuze and Guattari to instigate discussions 
of the human relationship to the world: 
                                                 
26 And this includes one of the biggest ethical questions for students of outdoor education – 
‘why this place’? Can we justify the carbon emitted as a result of our drive to Fontainebleau, 
or up here to North Wales? What alternative practices might we create? – This is, of course, 






‘You will yield nothing to haecceities unless you realize that that is 
what you are, and that you are nothing but that ... You have the 
individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its 
duration)— a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its 
regularity). Or at least you can have it, you can reach it’ (2004, p.289, 
cited in Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, pp. 211-212, emphasis in original) 
 
 
There are many intriguing and generative passages in Deleuze and Guattari’s writing 
and it is often stimulating to ask students what their individuality means to them, and 
if they can think of anything outside of their immediate bodies that constitutes their 
individuation. Often the answers are things like family, friends and material 
possessions, but sometimes students map larger assemblages including the fast food 
dinner of the previous night, the infrastructure that enabled the ingredients to arrive 
at the restaurant and tracks of land turned over for intensive beef farming. Students 
can then ask themselves ‘in what ways do I become changes of the world?’. 
 
My environmental education needs to pay more attention to the ‘virtuality laden in 
the present, its possibilities for being otherwise, in other words the unactualized 
latencies in any situation which could be, may have been, instrumental in the 
generation of the new or the unforeseen’ (2005, p.76-77 emphasis in original, cited in 
Lorraine, 2011, p.11). Grosz (2005) is discussing potentials for theorising and 
practicing feminism in the following quote, but I believe the argument works just as 
well for environmental education.  There is a line that we can follow then, 
considering haecceitical selves, about the potential of practicing subjectivity in 
environmental education and the ways it performs the world. As John Law (2006. 
P.56) notes: 
 
We may find that there are no irrevocable objects bedded down in 
sedimented practices. We may find that the hinterlands are not set in 
stone. And if things seem solid, prior, independent, definite and single 
then perhaps this is because they are being enacted, and re-enacted, and 












In this haecceity I draw events of practice through each other. Twist them together. 
Juxtapose them. Or jar them. I take instances of my experiences of practicing 
environmental education to see what an experimenting and iteratively re-turning to 
events of environmental education as I experience it as a becoming academic 
pushing out the borders of subjectivity. My practices of environmental education 
come in the form of texts, online exchanges, and working with students. For instance, 
I am co-guest editing a Special Issue of Environmental Education Research with a 
focus on new materialisms; I coordinate an online course for postgraduate students 
called Introduction to Learning for Sustainability (University of Edinburgh); and I 
have also sought out ‘face to face’ time with students through working with 
postgraduate students of outdoor experiential education undertaking a module in 
reflexive practice (University of Cumbria). In this haecceity I explore the affective 
becoming of these immanently-lived environmental educations with other aspects of 
my life. A life. For instance, I write with the sea and snorkelling in the north west of 
Scotland. I write with a day out with postgraduate students in Holyrood Park, 
Edinburgh. And I write with the book Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life by Gilles 
Deleuze (2005). These three narratives rise and fall in this haecceity. They bob 
against each other, providing the opportunity for the reader to make connections 
where they see them. I do this in an attempt to enact a drawing of concepts, practice 
and affects through each other. I attempt to write transversally, cutting across the 
boundary of difference between theory and practice to instead create theory-practice 
and practice-theory. The writings are of different lengths, some very short, some 
several pages. I hope the currents intra-act in their being read, or perhaps diffract. At 
any rate, the manner in which they are brought together is not prescriptive.  
 
In the materiality of the doing of the stories and of the writing I draw inspiration 
from Kathleen Stewart’s book, Ordinary Affects. I can’t write like Stewart, with her 





between bodies of writing-text-reading, in my doing-writing-thinking. Between the 
becoming of bodies of text and flesh: 
 
Ordinary affect is a surging, a rubbing, a connection of some kind that 
has impact. It’s transpersonal or prepersonal – not about one person’s 
feelings becoming another’s but about bodies literally affecting one 
another and generating intensities: human bodies, discursive bodies, 
bodies of thought, bodies of water. (Stewart, 2007, p.128) 
 
 
I wrote, with this to hand, or in mind, or moving somewhere inbetween. When I 
started I didn’t know if this would work. I still don’t know if it does. In my writing, I 
attempt to deal with affect in the Spinozan sense, rather than as the emotional 
domain. As Ken Gale (2017, p.6) notes: 
 
there is a need to activate a shift away from the phenomenological and 
humanist concerns that autoethnography seems to continually express 
with emotion and feeling as something that is somehow owned by a 
body, a concern that inevitably places the human at the centre of our 
inquiries. Instead there is a need to consider affective concerns with the 
relational intensities of life. Theorising with affect recognises that 
agency is always distributed through the relationality of bodies, human 
and nonhuman; the capacity to affect and be affected is a capacity that 
inheres in multiplicity in all aspects of spatial and temporal 
relationality. 
 
I am seeking out this posthuman affect in my practice. Practicing the search for the 








Is it becoming clear that when I use the term ‘environment’ in this thesis, including 
in environmental education, I am moving, turning, more and more to the idea of 





rather than an object, and to environ might be a more appropriate term than 
environment for an environmental education interested in haecceities. The 
possibilities of the environment as a process of which we are of, rather than a 
location to be visited or protected, are that it engenders a way of seeing that results in 
a certain attunement to the individuality of events, and thus a certain wonder (Clarke 
and Mcphie, 2014). Understanding this means that I can see each thing as ongoing, 
regardless of its presentation. For instance, I can see each of these words as events, 
as happenings, but this happening can also be occluded by the noun itself. Put 
another way, ‘although at their secret interiors nouns are words in motion, they have 
a habit of obscuring the eventuation of the world, its ongoingness’ (Cohen and 
Duckert, 2017, p.4). So, whilst I can see environment as a verb, rather than a noun, 
the word environ better demonstrates the ongoingness of the world in its becoming, 
as Jamie also argues.  The etymology of environ, as a process of turning, going along 
or encircling, demonstrates its life as an activity, rather than something that can be 
extended to delineate a particular location or place, regardless of scale (Mcphie and 
Clarke, in press). Whilst I am drawn to the movement of verbs, I am mindful not to 
present environing as a straightforward solution to the problem of conceptualising 
environmental relations. I see it rather as a movement in a useful direction to an 
affective presencing. The term has its own problematic history27. Before the 
appearance of ‘environment’ in print in 1603, environ (and variations) was most 
often employed in military terms as to encircle in a threatening way or to lay siege 
(Nardizzi, 2017). Nardizzi (2017) explains how Shakespeare’s early plays associate 
environ with oppressive darkness and with suffocation, stultification and death. 
Shakespeare links environ with: 
 
Sensory deprivation (the threatened darkening of all light and life in 
Henry VI) and with stimulus overload (“ears” crammed with “hideous 
                                                 
27 Tracing the genealogy of words is not an attempt to get to their origin, or beginning. As I 
have said, there are only middles. It is rather a ploy to draw attention to the assumptions we 
enact in our current use of words and a way of demonstrating that the worlds our words enact 
have changed radically over time. This highlights the contingent nature of the world we think 
into being. Nietzsche first enacted genealogy as a research methodology to explore the 
conditions upon which contemporary morality is formed. Foucault subsequently used 
genealogy to explore the history and thus the conditions for the possibilities of contemporary 





cries” in Richard III and a body so imaginatively inundated by water in 
Titus Andronicus that the sea itself turns into a gigantic alimentary 
system that “swallow[s] Titus up”. Being environed in these plays is a 
harrowing affective and physical state in which death and its 





Environings thus organize relations that put the health of individuals 
and populations at risk and endanger life…this is not the most common 
definition for what environments (can) do in our contemporary moment 
(p.191) 
 
Environing is not moralistically ‘good’. However, it offers different ways of thinking 
about environments, as constantly created in practice, along the lines of life.  
 
This line of environing is not necessarily one that must come around to meet its own 
tail, and thus create a circle. Thinking of environing in this way, as an encircling that 
demarcates the inside from an outside (and sometimes subsumes the border) is 
different from thinking oneself as the process of the line doing the encircling (Ingold, 
2011). Rather, the lines of life follow another etymology of environment. The French 
verb virer, a root of the term environment, means to turn or to veer (Cohen and 
Duckert, 2017). Indeed, ‘turning’ to this idea might be the best way to think about 
the verb of environing. To environ seems a practice that we cannot escape from. It is 
the act of living in movement. Perhaps what Deleuze gets at when he talks of 
immanence as a life. 
 
Environing education is thus a practice, something to attempt and never to attain. 
Elsewhere Jamie and I discuss environing education as a process of playing with 
concepts: 
 
Rather than suggesting anyone ‘reconnect’ with nature, as an endeavour 
of environmental education, we instead propose the idea of playing 
with nature, as a concept with learners. This can be conceived as a 







Here I attempt this through stories, juxtaposed. Practice awaits me in every attempt. 








In April 2018 my wife, son and I visit Gairloch in the North West of Scotland. We 
stay at a friend’s empty holiday house. I am here to write. ‘Writing up’ isn’t quite 
right as I already have much written, though I am unsure of how it will come 
together. Maybe I am here to come together? To try to conclude in some way. But 
things are never finished.  
 
I am sat at the kitchen table. There’s a view of the bay, and I can see boats at the 
harbour. I have just emailed a ‘decision’ to an author who has submitted work for the 
Special Issue. She has replied, almost instantly, requesting more detail on how she 
can ready her article for publication. She is concerned that the reviewers’ comments 
pull her article in too many different directions. I think I agree. The article is 
beautiful. Aesthetic. More like poetry than traditional humanistic qualitative inquiry. 
One of the reviewers has said as much. The others want to see more nuance, 
justification, methodology, supporting literature. What do I want to see? Do I parrot 
the journal line, follow the critical reviewers? Something in the middle. I am in an 
academic journal machine. I’m some kind of cog. Similar to the 
AcademicConferenceMachine described by Benozzo, Carey, Cozza, Elmenhorst, 
Fairchild, Koro-Ljungberg, Mirka and Taylor (2018). Except I don’t feel I can 
disturb my machine in the way they do. I will write to the author and explain that it’s 
not ready for ‘them’. The wrong logic is too dominant. ‘They’ need more 





The doing is not enough. Not yet. Academia rests on the state logic. It relies on the 
state logic to justify other logics. And of course, for some, this will never work.  
 
The tide is filling the bay yet slowing, imperceptibly. I sense it. The light draws me 
to the water. 
 
Yesterday I went snorkeling. I had in mind a little outcrop of rocks that met the sand 
at the end of Big Sands beach, not to be confused with Big Sand, further up the coast. 
I’d visited the beach a few years previously and was attracted by the contrasts; black 
rock jutting into pale yellow sand and the blueness of the sea deepening the further 
out I looked. There was something equally alien and inviting about the place. Now, 
I’m back in Gairloch and I’ve brought a snorkel and my wetsuit. I’d viewed the rocks 
from Google Maps the day before and spotted the place again. The morning was 
sunny and I headed to the beach.  
 
I’ve changed into a wetsuit in many carparks. But I was self-conscious as cars came 
and went, and I waited for an opportune moment to get undressed. It has been a few 
years since I squeezed into my wetsuit. I wondered if it would still fit. A struggle, but 
it was on. 
 
Now I’m at a shallow pool. A good idea to practise, seeing as I haven’t snorkeled 
since I was young. I have faith in my wetsuit and wade straight in, place my face in 
the water. My hands sting with the cold. Much colder than I thought it would be. I 
think of the days I worked as an outdoor instructor in Devon, surfing after work. The 
water never felt this cold then. How has my body changed since then? Older? Is the 
water colder here? Perhaps something in between. Another in between. Qualitative 
differences, rather than definite ones. I see the sand below. This shallow watery 
world feels like the beginning of what I’m searching for. I soon forget my hands. I 
look up from the still water of the pool and out, past the rocks acting as a breakwater, 
to the choppier, deeper water. The rocks follow a curve out to sea and out of view. 
Beyond them the horizon. Behind me the comfort of people and dogs on the beach. I 





wanting to stay here, in the known. I start to swim, the unknown has won out, before 
I knew it. 
 
The sand slowly drops away below me as I swim. Shards of seaweed levitate in the 
water below, a sheet of translucent plastic passes. I am far out now, closer to the 
rocks. I think of images I’ve seen; of snorkelers diving down, and blowing out air as 
they surface. I dive and the world changes with me. The crisp sounds of the waves 
suddenly plunge into a menacing silence that combines with the frames of my mask 
to promise monsters lurking just out of sight. Nothing down here can get you, I tell 
myself. Do seals bite? Aren’t seals evolved from bears? A pressure makes my body 
different. It makes my body the ocean. I am flying downward and the cold increases. 
I arch my back as I reach the sand, three meters down at least. I am deep. Below me 
a blue-grey starfish a foot across lays on the sand. In front of me a great wall of dark 
kelp, white spheres of sea urchins picked out by the shards of light. I float, and try 
not to think. 
 
For a moment, somewhere, this is the world I wanted to find. The sense of it. This is 
the way I wanted to be. To feel this lost. This far out. This detached. This immersed. 
To feel this alien. Utterly out of place, and yet finding a place in the practice of it. 
The practice of a different way of being for a while. To feel. Not a romanticisation, 






Non-worlds, in between worlds 
 
This is an attempt at writing my experience of an environmental education with a 
particular book. My reasons for wanting to do this are caught up with my wanting to 
better understand immanence and its relationship to my experience of becoming an 





immanence. The promise of Pure Immanence is too much for me to resist. What is 
it? There is something dark in my wondering here. The book now sits to the left of 
my laptop. Its cover is deep and watery. Mysterious. As if I could lose myself in its 
contents. This seems the promise. The impendingness of immanence. There’s 
something tempting about the destructive potential of it. Powerful. Like deep 




The book is looking up at me from my desk this morning. I’ve sat down to write. I 
feel I need to write about my practice more. My supervisors have nudged me in this 
direction. What is practice? Why do people worry about whether what I’m doing is 
‘practical’? Why do they assume it isn’t? Why would I do something that doesn’t 
speak to me? That doesn’t feel useful? That isn’t a mode of living? I hold the book in 
my hand. It’s hot here. My office always seems too hot. What does the warmth do? It 
fills the space. Shrinks the room, making me claustrophobic. My breathing is 
shallow, I notice. I feel my fingers on the book cover, a light oil from my skin sticks 
the cover to me. I feel the cover pull away. But this isn’t quite right. I am the feeling 





it as such and it becomes *Thuck*. That before, is that a life? I open the book. Pure 
Immanence: Essays on A Life.  
 
What is A Life? I know this can’t mean someone’s, or something’s life. It feels more 
like life, the event we all pass through, of the world. In a wide sense the inorganic is 
even a part of life as the world unfolds. And yet, the singular and capitalised ‘A’ 
suggests something more. Something specific as well as dispersed. And what of my 
practice as an educator? The phrase sounds so odd; ‘my practice as an educator’, as if 
it’s a possession I keep in my pocket. Or something I can leave at home, or rather 
leave at work! It’s right here. Always changed by the things that event with me. Of. 
How is interaction with other people anything other than education? You take them 
into account when you interact. Their cares and surely their futures matter to you in 
the event. I hope for the best for the people I meet. And I want to facilitate that 
future. That’s why I say ‘good luck’, or why I open a door for someone. At least, I 
like to think that’s why we do it. But this isn’t a one-way exchange. We both take 
and give something in the interaction. The intra-action, as Barad (2007) would say, 
constitutes us. But this is not the only thing happening either. The event moves 
backward and forward simultaneously, but in other directions also. 
Multidirectionally. I wish I was more open to this. No, I am open to it. I wish I made 
it more apparent how open to it I am. To be seen to be open. And then there’s the 
education we receive in the interaction. Whilst I may have sympathies with his 
politics, I quote Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the UK Labour Party, simply because I 
think he’s correct when he says ‘Everyone you meet knows something you don’t’. I 
wonder if the same can be said of things. And of your self. What do you know, that 
you don’t? Nobody knows what a body can do. No body knows what it can do, and 
how the ‘it’ changes in the doing.  
 
I look at the book. The yellow font of the ‘Pure Immanence’ seems out of place. 
‘Gilles Deleuze’ is dark, almost sinking into the green pool of the cover. I think of 
the cover as a watery entrance. C. S. Lewis’ The Magician’s Nephew comes to mind 






The next thing Digory knew was that there was a soft green light 
coming down on him from above, and darkness below. He didn't seem 
to be standing on anything, or sitting, or lying. Nothing appeared to be 
touching him. "I believe I'm in water," said Digory. "Or under water." 
This frightened him for a second, but almost at once he could feel that 
he was rushing upwards. Then his head suddenly came out into the air 
and, he found himself scrambling ashore, out on to smooth grassy 
ground at the edge of a pool. (Lewis, 2016, p.22) 
 
The world of trees and thousands of pools is soporific. It transpires that it is not a 
world at all, but a ‘wood between the worlds’. I stop looking at the cover and think 






Practice as concepts, concepts as practice 
 
 
Lenz Taguchi (2007) discusses how, in common renderings, there is a gap between 
the textual and cerebral realm of theory, and the physical realm of practice:  
 
 
It constitutes a binary, which is contaminated by the imagery of, on the 
one hand, a visionary, rational and logical, clean and flawless theory—
an ideal state or condition; and on the other hand, a messy, dirty, 
unorderly practice, in need of being organized, cleaned up and saturated 
by the rationales and visions of theory. (2007, p.278) 
 
 
However, for Lenz Taguchi (2007) life-practices are always already filled with 
theory. Drawing on Judith Butler, Lenz Taguchi suggests that we are all ‘lay 
philosophers’ practising what we think the world is, what we think is doable, and 
what we think is right and worthy. The power of theory, of philosophical concepts, is 
that they expand this potentiality. They do things. Brian Massumi (2010) explains the 






The meaning of a philosophical concept cannot be reduced to its 
semantic content, defined in abstraction from this process. There is a 
transformational aspect to the concept’s letting loose, by which it 
effectively overspills its own definition. This is the aspect of what 
philosophy comes to do in the world: its pragmatic aspect. It is the 
processual aspect of the concept’s moving on, to new effect. The 
concept’s meaning cannot be abstracted from its flow-over effects. Its 
meaning is one with the movement of its taking excess effect. In addition 
to the semantic meaning that it can be defined to contain, a 
philosophical concept carries a surplus of meaning that is one with the 
transformative movement of its performative force. (p.4, first emphasis 
added) 
 
This is one reason concepts can be dangerous. ‘Nature’ has evolved conceptually 
within the realm of science, through the philosophical work of Boyle, Bacon, 
Harvey, Descartes, Hooke and others, who have variously extended the concept of 
nature from a Greek and medieval organismic agent, to a concept of nature as 
mechanistic or as a set of laws guiding the operation of clockwork to be observed 
(Weinert, 2004). The nature of nature has further shifted with the development of 
quantum theory. The plasticity of the concept of nature in the history of the 
philosophy of science demonstrates its empirical and philosophical ongoingness. It is 
an enacted idea, a lively and multiple concept, that is influenced by empirical 
observations. And yet these observations often have little to say about the fact that 
the concept itself occurs and that its implications manifest. They perform 
empirically, even as the concept changes. The concept itself matters.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) explain how the purpose of philosophy is to create and 
deploy concepts of resistance; concepts that may overturn dominant, striated 
concepts of the world. David Cole and Mehri Mirzaei Rafe (2017) note: 
 
Concepts have been connected to territories, trajectories and power 
relations through the expansionist policies of European nations, and the 
resulting colonial episodes that are still arguably paradigmatic in places 





educational research and practice is permeated with the aftermath of the 
history of European thought in, for example, Australia, Canada and the 
USA, and elsewhere, which has deeply territorialised these societies, 
effectively obliterating both the prominence and understandings of 
indigenous (non-European) knowledge and modes of being, and human 
connection with nature. (p.851) 
 
The concept ‘nature’ has a long history of mattering in this way. For instance, 
Human Geography and Environmental History have well explored the conceptual 
construction of the environment, or nature, establishing its material fallout and the 
impossibility of considering it an unbiased element of study (Schama, 1995; Castree 
& Braun, 2001; Lorimer, 2012). Castree and Braun (2001) state for instance:  
 
however rigorous and scientific one’s investigations of the natural 
might be, there is no easy way to separate objective observations from 
social biases and political interests. As Raymond Williams (1980, p. 
70) famously put it, “What is usually apparent [when reference is made 
to nature] is that it is selective, according to the speaker’s general 
purpose.” Secondly, it follows that statements about nature say as much 
about who is doing the talking, and what their individual group interests 
are, as they say about nature tout court. Thirdly, it’s often the case that 
claims about nature – and actions based upon those claims – can serve 
as instruments of power and domination. Consider, for example, the 
wildlife conservation movement in the developing world, which has 
both an ecocentric and technocratic wing. For over a century, in 
countries like Kenya, indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed 
from, or denied access to, traditional territories because conservationists 
have argued that segregated ‘wildlife parks’ are required for species 
protection. (p.9)  
 
 
Along with this understanding, geographers have realised that nature is a story with 
very material consequences that can move far beyond the intensions of the orator. 
For instance, in the context of the colonial European expansion overseas, the 
existence of a conception of a distinct ‘nature’ as opposed to civilisation was ‘easily 
racialized and, in the guise of scientific racism, provided a rationale for European 
colonial rule over more ‘primitive’ cultures and peoples’ (Ginn & Demeritt, 2008, 
p.303). This view of landscape or nature as a storied separation with material, often 





describes how environmental historians have also lamented the annexation of nature 
by culture:  
 
While not denying the landscape may indeed be a text on which 
generations write their recurring obsessions, they are not about to 
rejoice in the fact. The arcadian idyll, for example, seems just another 
pretty lie told by propertied aristocracies (from slave-owning Athens to 
slave-owning Virginia) to disguise the ecological [and cultural] 
consequences of their greed. (Schama, 1995, p.12) 
 
 
Even with the drawing of the human into the scientific realm of nature, by Darwin 
for instance, nature has remained outside of human culture. Conceptualising a 
‘nature’ conceived as the great other, as a realm of study that the scientist is outside 
of, has allowed the dominant narrative to at once paint it as a ‘thing’ (a metaphysical 
trick) whilst at the same time labelling that ‘thing’ as inferior, or perhaps worse, 
condescendingly superior – as in the ideas of the innocent child in nature, the noble 
savage, or women’s emotional and empathetic elevation/subjugation above/below 
men as a result of their closeness to nature – (an ethical and political trick usually 
distributed for/as a result of a patriarchal agenda/occurrence). This perceived 
inferiority can be linked to a myriad of minoritarian groups (children, women and 
indigenous peoples; but also North Sea Cod, rivers, wind, diseases and viruses, pests, 
weeds, and natural ‘resources’ of all kinds) by associating them with that ‘thing’ – 
nature (Plumwood, 2002). Deleuze and Guittari (1986, p.247) describe minoritarian 
groups as ‘groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of 
recognized institutions’. Majoritarian and minoritiarian, referring to the degree of 
power of a group, are distinct terms from that of the majority and minority, which 
refer to abundance of lack. Ostensibly ‘natural’ elements by far outweigh the human 
on Earth, yet the ‘natural’ remains minoritarian. The ‘received’ conception of 
wilderness, as unpopulated terra nullius, has been critiqued as a tool of 
androcentrism, racism, colonialism, and genocide (Callicott, 2000); these are 
material consequences indeed. The way nature is conceptualised has played a 






I could visit each instance of the use of the term ‘nature’ in environmental education 
research, but the review of the literature would be almost endless. What I can say is 
that nature is a multiplicity of a concept doing different things for different people at 
different times. In environmental education research it has often (and continues to 
be) seen in straightforward, unproblematic terms, as a good location or ideal state of 
being. Challenges to this view include the recent Special Issue in Environmental 
Education Research Troubling the intersections of urban/nature/childhood in 
environmental education (Duhn, Malone and Tesar, 2017). However, the risk in 
seeing ‘connection to nature’ as a straightforward educational aim, or something that 
we can train teachers to attain and measure through connectedness scales, is that it 
can be an extension of a capitalist model of education as ‘commercial professional 
training’. 
 
The way out of this dead end of commercial professional training, and 
its motivation, which is universal capitalism, is according to Deleuze 
and Guattari through the ‘pedagogy of the concept’, which involves 
understanding what concepts are, how they function in educational 
contexts and how to create them ecologically, ethically and 
aesthetically. (Cole and Mirzaei Rafe, 2017, p.860) 
 
Nature affects me differently now. When I hear it. When I read it. I have to pay 
attention to the context in which it is said or written. I have to consider what it is 
doing for whoever is deploying it. I have to practise this. It is a practice, the paying 
attention, the trying to stay alert to the doing of concepts. How do I deal with nature 
in my practice? I try to highlight it as a concept, rather than a location. I try to ask 











Holyrood Park time 
 
Edinburgh. Something like ‘me’ wasn’t sure what I was going to do with Jamie’s 
students when they arrived. Jamie was driving them up in a minibus from Cumbria 
and we’d arranged to meet at 11am at the carpark next to Holyrood Palace. As a 
group, we’d walk through the park with the aim of doing something vaguely 
‘material turny’. The students were enrolled on either the MA in Outdoor 
Experiential Education or the MA in Transcultural European Outdoor Studies at the 
University of Cumbria, Jamie’s home institution. I’d applied for, and been offered, a 
lecturing position at Cumbria not six months before. I’d wanted to work at Cumbria 
in their outdoor studies department since Jamie had left Plumpton College to take up 
a position there. We’d worked together at Plumpton on the outdoor degree 
programmes for several years before he left. I stayed on for a few years, taking a 
sabbatical to complete my MSc at Edinburgh, and then returning for a year and a 
half, until winning funding for this PhD. The funding was the reason I hadn’t 
accepted the offer from Cumbria. Although I was greatly tempted to take on a 
teaching load again, and work with one of my best friends, I also remembered how 
desperately I wanted the PhD funding, and how desperately I wanted to complete my 
studies. The funding allowed me time to think and write. Time that would be swept 
away if I had accepted the offer at Cumbria, replaced with planning, teaching, 
administration. The time would be very different.  
 
At this stage, a pencil written comment in the margin asks me ‘why am I writing 
about this?’ Thinking back months ago to the writing of the above passage the events 
were alive in my life, the writing’s life. They were there, inflecting my writing. They 
are the events of the thesis, environing education. My life has changed since then. 
Yet in so many ways it is the same. Henri Bergson describes the inescapability of a 
seemingly subjective experience of time. Rather than linear and wholly viewable, 
time is never capturable, but can only ever be suggested through a description that 
Bergson calls duration. Bergson argues that no two moments can be the same, so 
duration is heterogeneous and must imply movement. Bergson is adamant that no 
image or description of duration can evoke its nature, as our attention is always taken 





only be described by altering traditional ways of thinking and placing yourself in 
duration by intuition. In this famous passage, Bergson’s description of difference in 
duration reminds me of Deleuze and Guattari’s description of difference as 
monism=pluralism, which I introduce in Haecceity 4. 
 
 
The truth is we change without ceasing...there is no essential difference 
between passing from one state to another and persisting in the same 
state. If the state which "remains the same" is more varied than we 
think, [then] on the other hand the passing of one state to another 
resembles—more than we imagine—a single state being prolonged: the 
transition is continuous. Just because we close our eyes to the unceasing 
variation of every physical state, we are obliged when the change has 
become so formidable as to force itself on our attention, to speak as if a 
new state were placed alongside the previous one. Of this new state we 
assume that it remains unvarying in its turn and so on endlessly. 
(Bergson, 1998, p.3) 
 
 
And so on endlessly. I think I feel this as much as I understand it. Time was one of 
the many things I wanted to explore with the students. I knew Jamie was teaching 
The Reflective Practitioner, the module I was helping facilitate that day in Holyrood 
Park, with the hope of demonstrating the possibilities of worldview change to 
students. I use the term ‘worldview’ loosely and not as a technical term related to the 
study of ‘worldviews’. Rather, Jamie’s interests being well aligned (materially 
entwined) with my own, he has been interested in ontological assumptions and the 
possibilities for education to trouble these. The arrow of time is one such assumption 
that I was looking to demonstrate with the students by way of introducing the notion 
of ‘deep time’ and the troubling effects Scottish geologist James Hutton’s insights 
had on 19th century worldviews. The reason that I had decided to focus on this topic 
was that the place – Holyrood Park – afforded such an opportunity, offering 
panoramas from which to depict the tropical shallow seascape of hundreds of 
millions of years previously, the volcanic disruption that had overturned, bent and 
twisted the settled ground, and, famously, the igneous intrusion that, angularly 
contrasting with the sedimentary limestone, offers the glimpse in deep time that 





than this ruptured palimpsest of a landscape? These are of course conceptual-
materialities I wor(l)d here: sandstone, igneous, intrusion. They do certain things 
when worded to students for the first time. They depict worlds that are then taken up. 
I also wanted to explore this doing with the students. The conceptual becoming.  
 
Of course, I didn’t know if any of this was possible. Another pedagogic experiment. 
That Jamie had brought the students to Edinburgh, rather than myself travelling 
down to Cumbria to meet them, was a result of a similar complex meshing and 
folding of contingent material-conceptual events (as are all things), a diffractive 
‘bump’. When Jamie had mentioned to his line manager that I was planning to visit 
Cumbria to help on the module, she replied that I wasn’t welcome to do so. 
Apparently turning down the offer of a job had been taken personally (and, in all 
honesty, I cannot fathom why). Jamie, knowing how keen I was to spend some time 
with students so as to think with the process, subsequently offered to drive the 
students up to me. What a very particular set of circumstances had led to the small 
group of us looking up at Arthur’s seat and readying ourselves for the walk. And so 
on endlessly. 
 
I had invited the students to read a chapter in the book Stone.  
 
 
A long trip to Scotland, and I lose myself on the plane in David 
Abram’s Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology. The book has its 
problems: the cliché of the educated Westerner who comes to 
mindfulness through a visit to Nepal; a proclivity to speak of the 
wisdom of indigenous peoples, as if their earthiness were universal and 
simply affirmative; a reflexive disdain for technology. I read Abram’s 
text through the meditation of a paperbound book, on a plane where a 
screen embedded in the seat displayed three exterior views through 
which I became an intimate of transatlantic clouds. Abram argues for an 
active ecological materiality that has much in common with new 
material feminisms as well as object-oriented philosophies. He arrives 
at his conclusions by following a rather different road (a little Deleuze, 
a great deal of Merleau-Ponty), but what he writes is consonant. And 
beautiful (Cohen, 2015, p.187) 
 
 






‘I lose myself’. Cohen touches immanence. The smooth space that holds me like 
quicksand, threatening and irresistible all at once. Losing ourselves is a mode of 
unhumaning. Unhumaning is the mode of a smooth space, to the striated state of the 
human. This isn’t neccesarily healthy, but it may produce different angles, for a 
while.  
 
Of course, smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the 
struggle is changed or displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its 
stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new paces, switches 
adversaries. Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us. 








The next day, and I’ve chosen to go looking for something at Shieldaig Bay, on the 
road to Badachro. On Google Maps the bay looks shallow, well sheltered from the 
Atlantic behind some islands. As I look at the satellite image I try to spy the places 
where the coast is rocky and where the water is turquoise. I see just the place, a few 
hundred metres out, to the north of the largest island. There’s something attractive 
about the idea of snorkelling next to the sheer rock and the shallow sandy seabed. I 
imagine crepuscular rays. I grab my wetsuit, dried in the sun during the day, and my 
snorkel, and head to the car. 
 
There’s no one in this carpark. I change quickly and hide my keys. Cross the road, 
tread carefully on the rocks and seaweed to the sea’s edge. I’m excited. The water is 
cold despite the blue April sky above, but after yesterday at Gairloch I am ready for 
the temperature. The ground is rockier than I expect, covered in clumps of seaweed 
atop a floor of nothing but broken shells; oysters, razor clams, horse mussels; all 





stomach. The island is across the water, in front of me. I pull up my hood. Spit in my 
mask. Ready myself. Place my head under. The water is clear at this depth. I swim 
forward across the bay, scanning the seafloor for things that catch me. That fetch me. 
The shells pass and lose definition as the depth increases. 5 foot, 10 foot, 20 foot 
below. I have some way to go, so set into a steady pattern of breathing and 
swimming. I spy a speck of brown ahead and as I get closer see it is a fish. Thin, it 
reminds me of a seahorse, it faces upwards, fins gently waving in the shafts of light 
at the surface, it seems to greet me. I even say ‘hello fish’ through my snorkel. The 
water is deep now, and I turn to keep swimming. Suddenly a long dark shape looms 
in the murk ahead, taking me by surprise. I look up, out of the water, and see a buoy 
floating. I look under again, to the other world, and see the long train of kelpy weed 
billowing downward into the deep along the rope that moors the buoy. I don’t want 
to go near the shape. It is frightening in appearance. Wraith like. I’d read about Lions 
Mane jellyfish the night before. Their ‘bell’ can grow to as wide as 2 meters and the 
largest can have tentacles as long as 30 meters. I’d seen small Lions Manes with 
bells a few feet wide whilst sea kayaking and didn’t much fancy meeting one whilst 
snorkeling, even if this wasn’t a ‘real’ one. I give the buoy a wide berth. 
 
The ground comes up beneath me as I reach the island. I see a flatfish on the sea bed, 
perhaps a plaice or a dab, I’m not sure if this is their habitat. I dive down to be closer, 
but the fish is too deep and has swum under cover. I hold myself for a second, the 
way I had done the day before. Again, I try not to think, I try not to sense the ‘me’ I 
know before the ‘thisness’ that might be. It is hard to do, and besides, my suit is too 
buoyant and I rise slowly upwards. At the surface I tread water. I am a few feet from 
the tall rocks of the island. They are unscalable.  I look back to the mainland a few 
hundred metres away. I have judged the tide well; the water is slack and I am not 
pulled in either direction. Turning back to the island my eyes follow the small cliff as 
it curves away, out of view. At that point, I see it. It is swimming across the horizon 
line, a hundred feet away or less. Its profile is clear. It’s large. At first I think it is a 
dog; pointed nose jutting upwards, a rhythmic bounce to its head as it swims. At that 










Transcendental empiricism of the book 
 
I have the book with me in the office. It arrived from Amazon last week. It arrived 
quickly as, on the advice of a friend, I had upgraded to an Amazon Prime account. 
Our friend had said, ‘I’m no fan of multinational tax dodgers, but if you need 
something the next day for the baby, Prime is a life line’. It’s interesting; the ways 
events build on events and how one is wrapped up in the process, both eventing and 
being evented at the same time. The self as a tide in simultaneous ebb and flow. I 
could judge my taking up an Amazon Prime account as morally repugnant, or I can 
consider the modes of existence it implies. The way it increases my capacities to 
affect and be affected. But this feels like a cop-out, at the moment. Nonetheless, the 
book is here. 
 
 
What is a transcendental field? It can be distinguished from experience 
in that it doesn’t refer to an object or belong to a subject (empirical 
representation). It appears therefore as a pure stream of a-subjective 
consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative 
duration of consciousness without a self. (Deleuze, 2005, p.25) 
 
 
I’m about to do educational practice. Drumlin anchored tight and brittle grey. Four 
stories up and typing. A life. Desires run through and constitute a life. Traffic and 
fumes. Tourists walking as if sucked uphill by desire. Me, watching as if sucked out 
of me by desire. And then typing. 
 
 
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is 
not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a 
life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is 








I try to understand this eventing as a life. How to talk about the things that occur, 
without talking of the self? How to do this while acknowledging the presence of a 
self unsubjugated? In Pure Immanence Deleuze speaks of a transcendental 
empiricism. An empiricism that lacks a subject but which does not flatten all into 
obscurity. It acknowledges what Deleuze calls the ‘singularity’ of the event. Its 
capacity to produce only this. The monism=pluralism of a life. Sensing the pluralism 
of the monism seems to be the art of transcendental empiricism. Transcendental 
empiricism is the means by which we see that ‘each point of view must itself be the 
object, or the object must belong to the point of view’ (Deleuze, 2015. p.71). The 
way of looking literally matters. It picks out what’s important. What’s real. What is 
different about today, from yesterday? I got up at the same time. Showered in the 
same shower. Walked the same walk to the office, or stayed in the same flat I 
sometimes do, with coffee and juice on a tray in the front room, and my laptop ready. 
Do I feel the same feelings I felt yesterday? Or even the last time I felt the struggle? 
Did I feel it the same way? Or is there a world of difference? A world of difference 
between all of these things? Sat in my office now, I look up at the bookshelf that I 
have looked up at for months. What is different about it? Some of the books have 
moved around. Some new books have appeared. These are significant differences. 
But even if no book had moved, if I glance up now and glance back a moment later, 
the world has changed. A world of difference has occurred. They are not the same 
‘objects’ replicated in time, I can see-feel-think it this way. I look out of my office 
window at the building over the street. It appears timeless. Yet the event of our 
becoming is always novel. And the more I am aware of this, the more novel it 
becomes. At least, I practise it more. 
 
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic 
discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which 
can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential 
difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative 
diversity. It is in difference that movement is produced as an 'effect', 







Difference is a qualitative degree, not an either or. Never a negation. When I read 
this, I think of my description of a murmuration of starlings and electricity pylons in 
my PhD progression board paper: 
 
Everything is an haecceity, unique in its becoming rather than a 
rendition or repetition of a set. Take, for example, the starlings in 
murmuration in Fig 3. Where is the murmuration? Thickening dark 
densities give way to sparse thin amalgamations in the shifting 
transience of a murmuration. The murmuration moves, is constantly 
becoming. One could be forgiven for contrasting the murmuration with 
the solid towers which suspend the power cables above the fields. The 
towers, firm as they appear, might be conceived as analogous to the 
chapters of a book. Perfectly delineated, each holding up the narrative 
line on its linear journey. The towers, however, seemingly produced 
from the same mold, can also each be conceived as having the 
individuality of a season, a pack, a climate (Deleuze and Guattari, 















I don’t think of Earth as the Pale Blue Dot as viewed from Voyager 1, but rather of 
the extended plane of immanence constituting all. Nature here is a Twitter storm as 
much as a tropical one. I’m looking at The Guardian website which displays the 
headline “Soul-crushing’ video of starving polar bear exposes climate crises, experts 
say’. There is a large ‘play’ arrow, seemingly pointing the way to the grave for the 
crawling animal. The arrow waits to be pressed like the button on a DVD player. 
Like a YouTube video. It seems to say ‘press me’, ‘entertain yourself’. The bear, 
emaciated, waiting in the wings to be called on stage for me. By me. A few things 
happen at once. I feel sick. I feel tension in my arms and across my chest. I feel 
guilty that this has happened. I know I did this. But I also know I didn’t. When I’ve 
made those choices - to fly, to eat meat, to have children – it’s me choosing climate 
change. Starving this bear. But it’s also not a me choosing. My desires are 
inside/outside. Not determinism and agency, but agency without the concept of the 
enlightenment human subject. Events constituting all; not predetermined but 
productive. There’s a Möbius strip to the self. I feel guilty that I’m going to put this 
in my thesis. It feels opportunistic. It might help get me there, to a PhD. But it has 
happened as an event. It is my thesis. There’s the Möbius strip. 







 ‘A long trip to Scotland…’ 
 
And so starts the chapter that I had asked the students to read before they travelled to 
meet me in Holyrood Park. The students and I had started our ascent of Arthur’s 
Seat. Standing at St Anthony’s Chapel, perched on a long volcanic rib of Arthur’s 
Seat, we huddled for protection on the leeward side of the long stone wall. On the 





vista of the city, St Margaret’s Loch below and the Castle in the distance above the 
roof tops. I began by describing the volcano on which we stood, and pointing to 
Edinburgh Castle, a few kilometres away, to ask the students if they knew how the 
rock beneath it was formed. Some guessed that it was volcanic rock also. I then 
asked if anyone know why the Royal Mile slopes up to the Castle in the manner it 
does. There were a few guesses before I described the process of drumlin formation, 
and the glacial landscape that the process required. I wanted the students to start to 
think about this place in big terms; in time and space, but also conceptually. In this 
respect, I moved on to the opening passage of Cohen’s chapter. The chapter seemed 
perfect for our purposes, as Cohen himself ascends Arthur’s Seat and muses on 
various insights from feminist new materialisms and his deep love of stone as he 
does so.  
 
I began our discussion of Cohen’s chapter by reading this passage aloud. I then asked 
students to comment and question. Is this diffractive practice? I asked them what 
they thought Cohen meant by the book having various ‘problems’. My intention was 
to foreground the conceptual-material nature of the day and our discussions began to 
open up potentials for assumptions of outdoor education practice to be questioned. 
This short passage spread our focus; it diffracted our conversations across topics. It 
scattered us along a discursive line that traversed the voyeuristic nature of 
developing-world travel and the impacts of this potential voyeurism on overseas 
youth expedition participants, to deep questions about technology; its place in 
outdoor and environmental education, and the extent to which we can separate a 
‘technology’ from any other material-knowledge practices we partake in; using a 
map and compass for instance. The intervention complexified the event. 
 
As we left the shelter of St Anthony’s Chapel I stopped briefly with the students at 
the interpretation board, fixed to a stone ten metres or so from the ruin. The sign 
refers to Hugot Arnot who, writing in 1779, noted that the chapel is a ‘beautiful 
Gothick building, well suited to the rugged sublimity of the rock…at its west end 









We spent some time discussing the use of the word ‘sublimity’, defining it, and 
looking around to see if we thought the rocks sublime. I hazarded that, perhaps the 
builders of the chapel placed it here for any number of reasons, including economic, 
and that the ‘sublimity’ of the location was further from their minds than it might 
have been for Arnot, a historian writing in the late 1700s. I mentioned Robert 
MacFarlane’s (2009) book Mountains of the Mind to suggest how our notions of 
‘sublime’ nature have changed over time, and may, in fact, be totally invented. This 
suggestion received some blank looks and some nods before we were drawn onward 
up the path to the foot of Arthur’s Seat.  
 
I have had difficulty in the past trying to convince people that nature is a contingent 
concept that is not stable, and does particular things if conceived in particular ways. I 
find this attempt to convince particularly important to do with outdoor environmental 
educators in theory-practice. Troubling this and other concepts is a dangerous 





in which we become. Jamie has asked students if he can send me a few snippets from 
assignment work after their time in Holyrood Park. One student noted, for instance: 
 
During this module I was introduced to theories and concepts that were 
new and frightening to me in their complexity and frustrating to the 
point of tears when I struggled to comprehend them and I dearly wanted 
to retreat into my own ‘cave’. […] but at least I understand the process 
better now and can choose to seek new understanding – I know I must 
be braver...[…] this module in particular has led me out of my ‘cave’ 
but I am most definitely still exploring the brave new world outside. 
[…] Some recent insights gained into my political and core values were 
deeply unsettling and shook me to my core but they also challenged me 
on a number of levels & I realised the implications of these revelations 
would affect not only my practice but my personal approach to far 
bigger global issues.[…] I must let go and see where this ‘rabbit hole’ 




Disrupting the differences in ways of being, diffractive practices, are fraught with 
ethics. The ethical imperative to dislodge an image of thought, and the ethical 
imperative to respect someone’s right to hold their own image. 
 
There seems an ethical invitation to play with concepts. Rather than attempting to 
‘mush’ together culture and nature, or overcome Cartesian dualism with a piece of 
sticky tape holding the subject and object together in ‘interaction’ or ‘connection’, 
we can instead realise that concepts are performative through our specific intra-
actions and story-telling of the world. Karen Barad (2003) suggests that the 
realisation that concepts come to matter has paradigm changing implications for the 
dominant view of perceiving humans as subjects outside of their objects of 
observation. Boundaries, according to Barad, are created in the agential intra-actions 
of material-discursive events. So, there is a sense in which the process of naturing, of 
creating new concepts of nature, is in effect a mode of becoming of the world, in this 
respect it might be the connection that so many wish to attain. In ethical terms, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that concept making is a political and revolutionary act, 
arguing that reflection and communication, mirroring pre-given elements of the 






We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of 
it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of 
concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that 
do not yet exist. Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but 
merely the history of capitalism, which prevents the becoming of 




And so, according to Peters (2004): 
 
The future form of philosophy, both a resistance to the present and a 
diagnosis of our actual becomings—becoming-revolutionary, 
becoming-democratic—is the role of the philosopher as physician, as 
the physician of culture, ‘an inventor of new immanent modes of 
existence (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 113). In philosophy of education 
these categories, these becomings have an easy resonance. (p.224) 
 
 
I am interested in the type of experiments that allow me to become a philosopher 
physician, critically playing with the everyday concepts we pick up in literature and 
our daily lives to literally create new material-conceptual worlds. But we should also 
take care when playing with, conceptualising, nature. As Cutting (2016, p.112) notes, 
educational approaches that claim to ‘encourage a deeper emotional engagement 
with the natural environment may not necessarily promote liberal thought, because 
while there is nothing wrong with promoting a love of the countryside, how students 
come to conceptualize this relationship is critical’.  
 
In a recent article, Jamie and I play with the concept of nature, by diffracting it into 
eight natures which we then follow along their conceptual-affectual trajectories, to 
see what they can do (Mcphie and Clarke, in press). With that article, we go some 












The seal dives, throwing up a great splash of spray. I can’t see it anymore. I am 
aware, immediately, of how lumbering I am in the water. A becoming is never a 
becoming something else. It is only ever becoming yourself differently. There is not 
a literal becoming a seal. There is a becoming-seal. This is a becoming an other than 
I am. Individuating to different degrees we can aim for the political in becoming. 
What Deleuze and Guattari (2004) call a becoming-imperceptible, becoming 
minoritarian. A becoming inhuman:  
 
 
Lines of flight or of deterritorialization, becoming-wolf, becoming-
inhuman, deterritorialized intensities: that is what multiplicity is. To 
become wolf or to become whole is to deterritorialize oneself following 




The event here, of a becoming-seal, is an affective force that alters my state of 
subjectivity from and towards a minor way of being; a way of being outside of the 
striated and majoritarian concerns of myself as a day to day subject. I become 
wrapped up with the concerns of the seal, not in a caring way, but in a way that 
switches the minor nature of the concern for seal to a becoming of my subjectivity 
that realises its power. There is a form of politics here. 
 
 
Becoming-minoritarian is a political affair and necessitates a labor of 
power (puissance), an active micropolitics. This is the opposite of 
macropolitics, and even of History, in which it is a question of knowing 




The capacities of the seal to affect, for my self to be affected, are heightened out of 
nowhere. The seal was of no concern as I swam. Indeed, it did not exist. And then it 
did, and it mattered, and the I dissipated and changed. And what made the seal dive? 
An affective force, from the sea, from me? Perhaps it was curious about me. Perhaps, 





turned several times as I swam back, scanning behind me for shapes in the murk. 
Later, I discover that grey seals hunt large prey, including porpoises. Leopold, 
Begeman, van Bleijswijk, IJsseldijk, Witte and Gröne’s (2015) paper is full of 
gruesome images of half eaten cetaceans, and they state that ‘many of the mutilated 
porpoises were found on Dutch shores used frequently by human bathers and surfers, 
and there would appear to be no a priori reason why humans may not be at risk from 
grey seal attacks’ (p.6). I don’t think this was a risk I faced, but reading Leopold et 






Practicing a life 
 
The internet affects me again. I am completely captivated by the bleak picture 
painted by Wallace-Wells (2017) in his article The Uninhabitable Earth (Wallace-
Wells, 2017), both the Earth occurring now and the Earth yet to come. Wallace-
Wells’ (2017) article in the New York Magazine begins ‘It is, I promise, worse than 
you think’. It is a harrowing read, describing the desertification, flooding, disease 
outbreaks and explosion of refugee numbers just around the corner of (post)human 
history. It has become the most well-read article in the New York Magazine’s history. 
The article affects me unexpectedly; I enjoy it. It is compelling, convincing, 
entertaining even. The scene depicted doesn’t feel virtual or actual. It feels like it 
exists in another existence; an impossible possibility owned by another world, not 
this one. It feels more like setting the scene for Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. It 
feels more like climate fiction than a becoming-certain future we face. How do I 
have this response? How is it that this is what this article does to me, rather than 
scare me, rather than stop me in my tracks and then compel me into climate change 





I talk to Jamie about the article when I am visiting him in the Lake District. His 
partner has read it and is scared for their children. I think about my privilege here. 
Am I affected less because I have less to lose? I need to practise more. Practise 
increasing my capacities to be affected. 
This is, of course, BF: Before Fen. Now the faint wonders I had about those who will 
(and do) experience dystopic futures are concretised in my son. Yet, the other-
worldliness of Wallace-Wells’ depiction places it at the far extremities of everyday 
thought. Yet, it seeps in. And, thinking about it now, I do eat less meat. 
Practice is what we do every day as we practise a life. We can do it better; a life. It 
isn’t something to which something else is applied. Practice is the taking part before 
all else. It doesn’t proceed from a set of instructions or theory. Theory is practice, in 
as much as it is the practice of deciding what is important. What more important 
practice could there be? 
 
Practice does not come after the emplacement of the terms and their 
relations, but actively participates in the drawing of the lines. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1986, p.203) 
 
Practising affect; sensing pre-personal affects. Is affect ethical? Political? Ben 
Highmore (2010) suggests that focusing on affect highlights ‘the transformation of 
ethos through experiments in living. Here politics is a form of experiential pedagogy, 
of constantly submitting your sensorium to new sensual worlds that sit 
uncomfortably within your ethos. There is hope here’ (p.135). Gregg and Seigworth 
(2010, p.12) draw from Roland Barthes’ attempts to form an affective ethics as a 
‘patho-logy’. They suggest that ‘affect theories…must persistently work to invent or 
invite such a “patho-logy” into their own singular instantiations – not only as 
inventory…but also as a generative, pedagogic nudge aimed toward a body’s 
becoming an ever more worldly sensitive interface, toward a style of being present to 
the struggles of our time’. Becoming affective is educational then, and yet the ethics 
remain opaque. The politics of affect seem difficult to pin down. But that also seems 









A ‘better’ problem is one that provides a jumping off point for others to 
continue from in their own way, along their own exploratory paths, for 
intensities of experience to come. (Massumi, 2015, p.204)  
 






Oak trees and emails 
 
A few weeks ago we talked about practice in one of my supervisory meetings.  I 
wrote to one of my supervisors after the meeting. John is in British Columbia, so our 
communication is often staggered, mostly very staggered. I sat in Henderson’s Café 
and wrote the following: 
 
Hi John, 
Sorry the meeting today was such short notice, and so early! My fault. 
We met for around an hour and discussed lots of things.  We kicked off 
by talking about avoiding the type of feedback overload I experienced. I 
talked about my writing style and the type of feedback that that style 
engenders. I've been trying to move from a technical, dialectic approach 
in writing to something more explorative and searching. Something 
more uncertain. We discussed Richardson's work on Writing as Inquiry 
for instance. Ramsey's going to pass on some books about writing style 
to me.  
I talked about Lacan's use of the Möbius strip as a means of thinking 
about various dualisms - two sided when concentrated on at any one 





idea that the ground of dualisms slips beneath us, if we walk a little way 
along the strip. I have started writing about transcendent and immanent 
ethics in this way. Though I still feel the Möbius strip itself is grounded 
in immanence...(what am I saying with these dots. That there's work to 
do here maybe...(and these dots...?)) 
I talked about some experimental writing I've been doing about an 
encounter with a pigeon that had been hit by a car. I contrasted this with 
Pauliina Rautio's recent paper about living with a pigeon as a 
multispecies other. Rautio knew a pigeon very well, the pigeon I 
encountered was any other pigeon (and yet, also not!). An off the shelf 
pigeon. Funny, I'm only thinking now that Jamie and I talk about a 
pigeon in Becoming Animate28 - I might revisit that. I talked about the 
concepts I was exploring in this encounter (with the pigeon), including 
ethics, affect, how I encountered the pigeon including the conflicts of 
thoughts that occurred to me, the opportunism of using the encounter in 
my thesis, weighing the chances of reaching it given the heavy traffic. 
We (Robbie, Ramsey and I) then used this example to explore the idea 
of being affected by things in the world. We talked back and forth 
about whether there was something in particular in pigeons (or pigeon 
like things), or in suffering, or in experiences with particular places -
 such as the Oak tree in Kingussie - that render particular effects. We 
agreed that they do. We were all interested in the origin of these effects. 
I was particularly interested in the way that a pigeon or a tree is never 
just a pigeon or a tree - thinking about Derrida and a chain of 
signification, but also Deleuze and Haraway and natureculture (or 
maybe these are the same thing!) - and thus what we bring to the 
encounter already. 
So it was a good chat. We agreed that I'd like some space to write 
without setting myself a particular 'section' to get done. I've plenty of 
marking to be getting on with over Christmas, but intend to send 
something out for you all to read before the baby gets here in February! 
If anyone wants to add anything to this that I missed out/got 
wrong/misunderstood, go ahead! 
I hope all's well with you John. You're missed, but there's at least one 
upside to your absence; it gives me a reason to reflect/diffract the 
meeting through me and to you. It lets me think with the event of 
supervision. 
All the best, 
Dave 
                                                 






I want to talk about that aspect of being affected; of oak trees and pigeons. I come to 
the pigeon in time, for now I want to talk about the oak tree. I sat under that oak tree 
in Kingussie, a magnificent oak tree. It is affective. But where does the affect come 
from? It isn’t simply sensorial. The chain of signification, of the lively ‘concepting’ 
of the oak tree is also affective. The affect doesn’t just come from an environment, 
even one that is environing, but also comes from the concepts of the oak tree. By 
concepts, I don’t mean a cognitive schema, but something more akin to the middle 
movement between what is traditionally thought of as the percept of the oak (the 
sensorial) and the mental idea of an oak. Perhaps this movement is a percept-
concept-affect.  When I think of the lively concepting of a concept, I think of its 
overspill, in the manner Massumi (2010) describes; a concept’s force in the world. I 
also think of the chain of signification that Derrida describes, or what he terms 
différance. Différance is the idea that meaning is constantly deffered, that there is no 
settled meaning of a word. Différance constructs a chain of signification. As I sit 
below the oak tree, not to clear my mind but to think of the oak tree, I may think any 
number of oaky things. I may start with the idea of the tree, but this may give way to 
trees in general, it may give way to the idea of wisdom, often signified by the oak 
tree, it may give way to ideas of England, and nationalism. It may give way in a 
related manner, to heraldry, family trees, or even the Linnaeus tree of knowledge and 
classification. I can never arrive at a definition of an oak tree that doesn’t require 
other words which then also require definitions. Tim Ingold (2010, p.4) takes this 
idea of constant deferral into the material tree, as a percept: 
 
Suppose that we focus our attention on a particular tree. There it is, 
rooted in the earth, trunk rising up, branches splayed out, swaying in 
the wind, with or without buds or leaves, depending on the season. Is 
the tree, then, an object? If so, how should we define it? What is tree 
and what is not- tree? Where does the tree end and the rest of the world 
begin? These questions are not easily answered – not as easily, at least, 
as they apparently are for the items of furniture in my study. Is the bark, 
for example, part of the tree? If I break off a piece in my hand and 
observe it closely, I will doubtless find that it is inhabited by a great 
many tiny creatures that have burrowed beneath it and made their 





on the outer surfaces of the trunk or the lichens that hang from the 
branches? Moreover, if we have decided that bark-boring insects belong 
as much to the tree as does the bark itself, then there seems no 
particular reason to exclude its other inhabitants, including the bird that 
builds its nest there or the squirrel for whom it offers a labyrinth of 
ladders and springboards. If we consider, too, that the character of this 
particular tree lies just as much in the way it responds to the currents of 
wind, in the swaying of its branches and the rustling of its leaves, then 
we might wonder whether the tree can be anything other than a tree-in-
the-air.  
These considerations lead me to conclude that the tree is not an object 
at all, but a certain gathering together of the threads of life.  
 
I like Ingold’s description, and Derrida’s idea of différance, as they both demonstrate 
the instability of essentialist positions; of trees, but also of ‘nature’, for instance. But, 
as Baugh (1997) points out, there is an important difference between Derrida’s 
différance and Deleuze’s concept of difference in itself. For Deleuze’s understanding 
of the oak tree, we have to look at difference in another way. We can see that 
Derrida’s difference is rather phenomenological, in that it relies on a 
phenomenological theory of time (Baugh, 1997).  
 
 
Différance is the fruit of a radical phenomenology, a phenomenology 
that wants to think its conditions and its limits, but always within the 
horizon of phenomenology, that is, within the horizon of 
horizonality…We know, though, that Deleuze was not very 
sympathetic to phenomenology. (Baugh, 1997, p.131) 
 
 
For Derrida, horizonality is an idea of time ‘in which the future is prior to and 
conditions the present’ (Baugh, 1997, p.128). For Derrida, becoming happens, but it 
is a becoming what one is not. It is based on a negative idea of difference. Deleuze 
however draws on Bergson’s theory of time as duration, and Leibniz’s monad, to 
develop becoming based on difference in itself. Becoming isn’t defined by negation, 
but is affirmative. There is no empty space of a signifier to which to compare a state, 








In general, becoming-actual is a process that is not amenable to the 
past/present/future schema governing phenomenology and history 
(whether dialectical or structural) [27], because such schemas capture 
'the way an event is actualized in particular circumstances/or the event 
as product or effect, rather than the process of becoming as 
such…Derrida's theory of time problematizes phenomenological time 
by problematizing origins and endings making both subject to indefinite 
differal/differing through a future that is always 'to come' and which 
'delays' the arrival of the present; Deleuze insists 'it's not beginnings 
and ends that count but middles' (1995: 161) or the creative 




What is it to consider an oak tree as a non-phenomenological middle? It is not the 
being lost, the aporia, that attempting to get to the essence of what an oak tree is, by 
moving along the chain of signification, produces. If I think with Deleuze as I sit 
under the tree, I don’t wonder at the definitional possibilities (which can always be 
deferred) and complain about the non-essential nature of the oak under those terms. I 
think of the me-tree-sky-percept-affect-concept-etc assemblage as an event that does 
things. Derrida’s critique of interpretation is immanent, but it is one that assumes the 
point of view of interpretation itself (Baugh, 1997). It is phenomenological because it 
takes the point of view of myself, as I try to make sense of the tree.  
 
For precisely this reason, Deleuze finds aporetics and problems of 
identification/identity (such as mistaking Theodore for Theatetus) to be 
weak and empty (1994: 132-40, 148-9; Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 138-
9). Aporetics belongs to the problematics of judgment (is it A or B?), a 
model of thought that Deleuze wants to have done with (1993: 158-69). 
Thinking, for Deleuze, is 'not interpreting, but experimenting with 




At this stage I don’t try and work out what the tree is, but rather what the event does. 
Not what the tree does on its own, as the tree is not the only middle here (how can it 
be?), it is rather a middle with, as Ingold suggests; with the air, with the other threads 





nearby, also contemplating the tree. And the concepts that are put to work. I look to 
my left, and wonder what ideas of oak trees are doing to these other learners. What 
can I change in the assemblage?  
 
Concepts, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) posit, are practices. Concepts are created, 
they are not ready made. And concepts are sensed. They affect and do things: 
 
It is no objection to say that creation is the prerogative of the sensory 
and the arts, since art brings spiritual entities into existence while 
philosophical concepts are also "sensibilia." In fact, sciences, arts, and 
philosophies are all equally creative, although only philosophy creates 
concepts in the strict sense. Concepts are not waiting for us ready-
made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must 
be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without 
their creator's signature. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p.5) 
 
This change in questioning, from ‘what is it?’ to ‘what does it do?’, that a Deleuzo-
Guattarian idea of difference brings links up with Spinoza’s immanent idea of ethics, 
which brings to the fore a problem of environmental education. 
 
The question of "transcendence" is "What must I do?", which is the 
question of morality (a duty or obligation that is beyond being, an 
"ought" beyond the "is"). The question of "immanence" is "What can I 
do?" (my power or capacity as an existing individual within being). For 
Levinas and Derrida, ethics precedes ontology because it is derived 
from an element of transcendence (the Other); for Deleuze, ethics is 
ontology because it is derived from the immanent relation of beings to 
Being at the level of their existence (Spinoza). (Smith, 2003, p.123) 
 
 
Thinking about what things do, what I can do. This is what my supervisors do, and 
what my email to John has done. The process of the thesis event, its process of 
seeking out, is an ethical endevour, and I am not the only thing involved. 
 













How is this event becoming? Where does the writing come from? I’m thinking as I 
write about the meeting. About families. Moving them and making them. About a 
life that is coming soon, in February, to Gemma and me.  
 
What am I playing at, writing this nonsense? What kind of work is this? How will I 
get a job writing something that isn’t practically applicable? The fear that comes 
from these questions seems to drop any attempt to dissolve the boundaries of myself 
and instead express some kind of immanent becoming. I am a human person with 
responsibilities. What on earth is this thesis about? What have I been doing these last 
few years?! This isn’t a PhD. 
 
And then I wonder about the fear. The different forms of me that are created in the 
flow of it. From the flow of it. The ‘me’s who are conjured into existence in the flow 
of it. The panicked Dave who can’t sleep. The Dave who doesn’t want to talk about 
his PhD with those who ask about it. ‘It’s about education. Environmental education. 
And philosophy’. Robbie, my first supervisor, has mentioned my ‘elevator pitch’. 
He’s right. I shudder. 
 
And then there are the other Daves. The ones who become with the writing. The ones 











To add a further speculative folk dimension to this conversation I’ll take a rhizomatic 
digression (so not a digression at all!) back to seals. The Great Silkie of Sule Skerry 
(Child 113) is a folk ballad collected by Francis James Child in the late 19th century 
on Orkney29. Silkies (or selkies) are changelings who, when in the water, are seals 
but, when on land, are human. In the ballad a woman nurses a baby and sings that 
she will never know her baby’s father, nor the land that he comes from. Then a guest 
stands and says he is the baby’s father, and that he is a silkie from Sule Skerry. He 
gives her gold and takes the child and predicts that she will marry a gunner whose 
first shot will kill both him and their son.  
 
One could view the human/seal relationship in an Ingoldian (2011) sense, as a 
human-seal, whereby the seal thinks itself in me, along the lines of Merleau-Ponty’s 
blue sky. Or one could look at it in other ways. The prescription of the result is, 
perhaps, beside the point. Rather, the opening to the affective dimension is what is 
important. The possibilities of affective imaginings it might engender. Folk music is 
one way, among many, I am open to being affected. ‘Learning to be affected means 
exactly that: the more you learn, the more differences exist’ (Latour, 2004, p.213). 
Similarly, climate fiction’s depiction of possible worlds, and its capacity to relate its 
character’s and place’s lives to that of the reader, hold affective capabilities. Texts 
are bodies too: 
 
 
with more meaning also comes more complexity, cognitive dissonance 
and dislocation. The diverse storylines of climate fiction make it 
impossible to think about the future in the singular way. Another way 
of describing these effects of climate fiction is humanization – 
rendering climate change a thoroughly human and social experience 
rather than an environmental problem. Cli-fi places the reader in 
plausible, emotionally wrought, complex situations in which social, 
technological, and natural systems condition one’s experience. 
(Milkoreit, 2016, p.179) 
 
 
                                                 
29 The Corries’ other worldly version can be found here. Child only recorded lyrics, so no 





Finishing my copy of David Mitchell’s The Bone Clocks I feel the pang of loss and 
change at a world that could exist in so near a future. Affect moves between bodies.  
 
Bodies of text and bodies of flesh. Spending time with bodies you wish to know 
seems a good thing to do. A seal from below, coming into my becoming. I think of it 
now, slinking from the deep and up to my friend Simon and me, between the Isles of 
Muck, Eigg, and Rum.  
 
 
Still taken from the video ‘The Small Isles – Inner Hebrides by Sea Kayak Summer 
2014’ (Clarke, 2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDh0pxeGEwc  
 
 
Environing education. Rather than attempting to ‘mush’ together culture and nature, 
or overcome Cartesian dualism with a piece of sticky tape holding the subject and 
object together in ‘interaction’ or ‘connection’, we can instead realise that concepts 









Haecceity 6: The diffractive practitioners - collaborative writing-





In December 2017 Jamie and I visited Walney Island in Cumbria with a group of 
postgraduate outdoor education students from the University of Cumbria. Walney 
Island was formed about 15,000 years ago as till was deposited by the glaciers that 
covered northern Europe in the last ice age. At least, this is one story we can tell of it. 
This story has a particular taste. Do you recognise it? To me it tastes a bit like a 
geography textbook, or the oration of a natural history presenter as they walk down a 
long beach and talk into the camera, as if they are simultaneously on Walney Island 
and in my living room, which in some ways I suppose they are. There are many 
stories that can be told about Walney Island. As we walked with the students on that 
day, we accessed an app called Seldom Seen, on our smartphones. The app starts 





range, the delicate vegetated shingle ecosystem, and personal stories of local people. 
Similarly, we might focus on the story of the evolution of the rare Walney Geranium; 
the long process of gene variation and environmental constraints and opportunities 
that led to this species, found nowhere else on Earth other than this 11-mile-long by 
2-mile-wide island. We might tell a story in which we lay down quadrats and count 
these plants to check their health. Equally we might narrate the life of the Natterjack 
Toad that makes Walney its home. We might objectify, subjectify, or processify the 
toads and the flowers (Clarke and Mcphie, 2014). Each telling would do different 
things. 
These are placeful stories; stories extracted from the place by sorting what is found 
there into comfortable narratives. Till, the stuff that makes up Walney Island, is a 
form of glacial deposit that falls directly from a glacier, rather than being washed 
away by meltwater. This means it is unstratified and poorly sorted, unlike stratified 
drift which is the material carried by meltwater and sorted by size as it is deposited in 
stratified layers. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) use geological terminology to describe 
both ‘natural’ and ‘social’ phenomena, depicting the creation of metaphysical 
categories as a process of stratification. What they term a geophilosophy, where 
thought becomes earthly and vice versa, is useful for thinking about how layers are 
laid down in our discourses; for thinking about what has become sedimented in 
thought. When I think of research stories we might have enacted on our day on the 
island – e.g. using interviews with students or handing them questionnaires - I think 
of sedimented stories; stories I know the answers to already, and where everything 
remains the same. I like the idea of thinking the traces, the impressions, the fallout, 
of our day on Walney as till, as unsorted and waiting for different stories to be told of 
it. There are stories to be told, to be created, and there may also be stories that might 
have been sorting themselves in the days since we were there, sifting themselves as 
till into autonarratives as time has passed. What might it be like to shake up this till 
now? To tell a story with Walney Island as we go? To write with our day there with 
the students, to see what can be learned? To see what happens? Rather than telling a 
story already told, to instead attempt a geophilosophy, where thinking is earthly; 






Sifting through the till 
In this haecceity I borrow from Gale and Wyatt (2017) and create a dialogic 
exchange to wonder about that day on Walney Island by thinking with (Jackson and 
Mazzei, 2012) and employing writing as collaborative inquiry (Davies and Gannon, 
2006; Wyatt and Gale, 2014; Speedy and Wyatt, 2014). This inquiry is an attempt to 
think with and through environmental education practice as theory and 
environmental education theory as practice. It is an acknowledgement of the 
mattering of concepts through the non-method of collaborative writing as inquiry. 
Gale and Wyatt (2017) suggest the disruptive and joyful potential of collaborative 
writing as inquiry for wondering at uncertainties and possibilities. They combine this 
with an ethical need for new stories, a need that is well recognised by environmental 
educators (e.g. Hicks, 1998; Jickling, 2010; Gough, 2015; Adsit-Morris, 2017): 
 
[…] we are with Stengers (2011) when she says that “we need other 
kinds of narratives, narratives that populate our worlds and 
imaginations in different ways” (p. 371) and within these agonistic 
processes of believing we sense experiences of joy and wonder as we 
bring these possibilities to life. So when we describe our work in this 
article as “working at the wonder” we want to evoke a wondering that 
thinks, searches, ponders, and probes. In turn, our intention is [sic] 
convey collaborative writing as contributing to a complex materialist 
practice (Bryant, Srnicek, & Harman, 2011) that, with Stengers, 
“upset(s) our established categories and shift(s) our own theories” 
(Bryant et al., 2011, p. 15): collaborative writing as a “rare event” that 
can—at its best—invoke a sense of wonder to “counter stratifying 
tendencies” (Bryant et al., 2011). (Gale and Wyatt, 2017, p.356) 
 
Here Jamie and I similarly combine collaborative writing as inquiry with the material 
turn to acknowledge the mattering of pedagogical inquiry (Snaza, Sonu, Truman and 
Zaliwska, 2016) in an attempt to dislodge stratifying tendencies. Till isn’t stratified, 
after all. I have invited Jamie to write with me here to take seriously the idea of post-
human authoring. I have often said that I think with Jamie - my colleague, writing 





embodied in each other’s ways of thinking. When authorship is already post-human, 
beyond a single individual, it can be enhanced by bringing in others to write with. In 
this way, this haecceity is a writing-thinking-doing, where the aim is to be taken 
somewhere new; to be productive and creative. Of course, thinking and writing are 
already ‘doings’, but they are too often seen as operating separately. ‘thinking-
writing-doing’ demonstrates the inseparability of these endeavours, which operates 
in the present; it does not so much reflect, repeating the image back on itself to look 
for meaning, but rather diffracts, it moves forward with what is present in the 
thinking-writing-doing. Our concern is for the nature of education, the nature of 
nature, and the nature of ourselves as practitioners. A palimpsest is a text or place 
which is inscribed or imprinted by different effects. Following Deleuze and 
Guattari’s geophilosophy, texts are geological, and thus also places. In this paper-
palimpsest different articulations sometimes run in parallel, and sometimes interject 
with each other, around diffuse problems of the practitioner and learner in/of an 
environment that is becoming conceptually unstable, that is environing (Mcphie and 
Clarke, in press). Through this dialogic exchange, we attempt to explore how the 
environment can be anything other than a concept, and how concepts are anything 
other than material and mattering in important ways. The haecceity is less about 
providing answers to the environmental education academic community or ourselves, 
and more about an experiment in environmental education, or a process of what an 
environing education might entail. It is becoming - still only becoming - an attempt 
to practise immanence. To get away from solid and sedimented ideas of selves and 
environments and educations. Following Levi Bryant, we think of education as not a 
personal thing, but as dispersed across bodies: 
 
…we should ask not what a pedagogy is, but rather what a pedagogy 
does. The first dimension of pedagogy consists of the question of what 
a teaching operates upon. To this, the obvious answer is students and 
apprentices. However, above all, it operates on bodies, affects, and 
forms of cognition. Students and apprentices are the flows that pass 








Reflective practice is not quite the right term for what I think we’ve found ourselves 
attempting. The implicit humanism in reflective practice leads me to prefer the term 
diffractive practice. Diffractive practice, as I conceive of it, is our attempt to think 
past our own tendencies to humanise ourselves and our students in relation to our 
practice as environmental educators. In this way, it aligns well with Jane Speedy’s 
intentions for collaborative writing: 
 
 
…the continued and explicit practice of collaborative writing amongst 
social researchers alters the academic spaces they inhabit and the 
ethical know-how that they come by. In time the (albeit fragile) 
emergence of this different sense of scholarship and scholarly work and 
even, perhaps, of what it means to be a human being amidst human 
beings and other elements can begin to rework and expand the social 




For Barad (2014) diffraction is a process ‘that troubles dichotomies, including some 
of the most sedimented and stabilised/stabilising binaries, such as organic/inorganic 
and animate/inanimate’ (p.168). Diffractive practice is research, but it is also the 
doing of practice, rather than the application of research findings to practice. It is not 
practice which is then reflected upon. Rather it builds on notions of diffractive 
research and diffractive inquiry in the fold of post-qualitative research. For instance, 
Davies (2014) describes diffractive analysis so: 
 
 
In diffractive analysis, research problems, concepts, emotions, 
transcripts, memories, and images all affect each other and interfere 
with each other in an emergent process of coming to know something 
differently. (Davies, 2014, p.734) 
 
 
Building on Davies’ description, what I call diffractive practice does not draw on 
data in the form of questionnaires, observation notes or transcripts of interviews. 





where writing as inquiry interferes with affects, images, memories, emotions30, 
concepts and research problems. Writing as inquiry - and collaborative writing as 
inquiry (Wyatt and Speedy, 2014) where ontological questions of what 
‘collaboration’ implies are raised - form the diffractive grate that produces the 
interference patterns of the diffractive practice-inquiry; the newness of what is 
written. We, Jamie and I, write iteratively with each other, with Walney Island, with 
our places of writing encounters, with interactions with students, with educational 
and philosophical concepts, and with the thoughts that occur, creating diffraction 
patterns in thought; the beginnings of refrains of ideas. Diffraction is not a 
prescriptive method, it can rather be a rotating of a problem in different lights and 
with different lenses at hand. Barad (2014, p.168) wishes to practise diffractive ‘re-
turning’, not in the sense of going backwards – an impossibility – but rather turning 
over and over again: 
 
 
iteratively intra-acting, re-diffracting, diffracting anew, in the making 
of new temporalities (spacetimematterings), new diffraction patterns. 
We might imagine re-turning as a multiplicity of processes, such as the 
kinds earthworms revel in while helping to make compost or otherwise 
being busy at work and at play: turning the soil over and over – 
ingesting and excreting it, tunnelling through it, burrowing, all means 
of aerating the soil, allowing oxygen in, opening it up and breathing 
new life into it. (Barad, 2014, p.168) 
 
 
This imagery suggests the playfulness of diffraction. The sifting through the till of it. 
Taylor and Gannon (2018) note that work that is being framed as the new 
empiricisms or post-qualitative research calls for playfulness and creative approaches 
to research that allow researchers to create the not yet thought, noting that: 
                                                 
30 Emotions are not the same as affects. ‘In the absence of an asignifying philosophy of 
affect, it is all too easy for received psychological categories to slip back in, undoing the 
considerable deconstructive work that has been effectively carried out by poststructuralism. 
Affect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion […] emotion and affect - if 









Amongst educational researchers, this work is shaped around broad 
agreement that (a) the human must be decentred in favour of ‘other than 
human’ or ‘more than human’ within research assemblages; (b) that this 
decentring requires us to pay more attention to affective flows, forces 
and intensities; and (c) that the focus needs to shift beyond discrete 
objects or subjects of research to their co-constitution through 




Decentering does not mean ignoring our practice. Rather, it means focusing on 
ourselves as different (as other than Western human subjects) as well as (or with) 
other things. I’m not particularly keen on the term ‘more than human’ as it seems to 
accept ‘human’ as a conceptual category and retain a sedimented dualism. Perhaps 
the term ‘all beyond humanism’ is more appropriate, with its focus on the 
conceptual. It means acknowledging that we are not necessarily human, as the term 
‘human’ holds too much baggage for us. Instead we are unhuman. A subject undone 
(St. Pierre, 2004). Alien. There is an activeness in the doing of the ‘un’, as if it is a 
command, or something to practise: ‘You there, unhuman yourself!’. ‘I’ll try!’. The 
writing comes to this in time. Nonetheless, I agree with the aims Taylor and Gannon 
(2018) list in overcoming the staid idea of the human subject in qualitative research. 
Equally troubling for me is the residue of a transcendent nature in my own 
environmental education practice; I am hopeful in the struggle to get away from ‘the 
environment’ and towards something Jamie and I are beginning to call environing 
education (Mcphie and Clarke, in press). This pushes me to open up my practice, to 
diffract it and consider what comes through. Diffractive practice troubles one’s 
modes of existence, and allows the creation of ideas that help us to become different. 
A diffractive practitioner troubles difference as they have normally conceived of it, 
especially regarding terms like ‘they’. ‘Practice’ here refers to breaking up the idea 
of difference as that which usually separates writing, thinking, and doing to instead 
produce writing-thinking-doing. It is the ethical endeavour of diffractive practice, to 







Deleuze and Guattari (1980/2004) charge us with actively seeking 
empowering compositions or assemblages – ones that enhance our 
power to act in the world. Those which diminish our power to act are to 
be avoided. Reflexive self-awareness is clearly implied as we evaluate 
each assemblage in which we participate, and such evaluation is an 
experimental, experiential and affective process that does not require 
reference to pre-existing or prescribed criteria or value judgements, but 
that allows new values to be created. (Done and Knowler, 2011, p.849) 
 
Yet reflexivity, like reflection, is all too human. A diffractive practice spies the 
difference of the inside/outside implied by reflexivity; self-awareness diffracts to 
unselfness.   
 
Where does one start with collaborative writing as inquiry? I started in Edinburgh, 
Scotland, with the thought of a minibus. Jamie started in Bavaria, Germany, with an 
email invitation from me. From there, we started writing to it: 
 
 
Increasingly, we are coming to understand that the only way to continue 
in this sense-making and affecting is to ‘write to it’. Issues, queries and 
question arise – in our lives and in our writing – and we say to the 
other, ‘let’s write to it’. Whatever the query or the problem, it is this 
inducement – ‘write to it’ – that leads to new experimentations and the 
sensing of the indeterminate rhythms and refrains of the multiple that 




To this end, what follows is a ‘writing to it’ of our day on Walney Island. We take it 
in turns, each authors writing is indicated by their name. There has been very little 
editing of what follows, save for grammatical changes and the occasional fact check. 








Agency then, is an enactment of an entanglement of researcher–data–
participants–theory–analysis, as opposed to an innate attribute of an 
individual human being. (Mazzei, 2013, p.779) 
 
 
An invitation to write 
 
Dave:  
White minibuses are a staple of UK outdoor education. I’ve sat in minibuses for 
hours of my life. I’ve had formative experiences in and around minibuses. Climbing 
on top of minibuses in the early 2000s to secure baggage for our university trips, 
nodding off on peoples’ shoulders as the minibus drones along at the end of a long 
day out-and-about. Minibuses refusing to start, four hours before the ferry leaves 
when the terminal is a three-hour drive away. Forging lifelong friendships through 
minibuses. Minibuses have changed my life as they have shuttled me from existence 
to existence. Matt Berry, a lecturer in outdoor and adventure education at the 
University of Chichester, where Jamie and I completed degrees in 2006, says that 
many of the best tutorials he’s conducted with students have been in minibuses. 
Minibuses are the on the way, or on the way back. They’re not the destination. They 
are the middle. They are a space in between. Intermezzo. Alongly. Minibuses have 
been the gateway to experiences. A conduit of potential. Minibuses take me places, 
with others. On the way to windswept crags, swelling rivers, claggy mountain sides. 
And the less romantic: French motorway services on a windless hot day – the smell 
of evaporating urine inescapable. Minibuses as quiddities have certain 
characteristics; what makes a minibus? They are vans with seats and windows in. No 
seats? Not a minibus. No windows? Not a minibus. What you’ve got there is a panel 
van. Minibuses are portable arenas. The stands to the shifting stage of the world, 
viewed through an open or closed window, and beheld more intensely by exiting the 
vehicle, arching your back from your crouched position, breathe in, stretch your 
arms, look around, ‘where are we?’, difference, potential, hope and fear in the new 
surroundings. Minibuses as haecceities are never the same. The way home, for 






I’m towards the back of the bus. Tracy is over the aisle (if you can call it that. It’s 
more of a gap you squeeze through to get further back in the bus). Josh is diagonally 
behind me, directly behind Tracy. We, along with 12 others, are on our way back to 
the Ambleside Campus after a day out on Walney Island, Cumbria, as part of the 
postgraduate outdoor studies course The Reflective Practitioner. It’s dark and humid 
in the back of the bus. Cumbrian rain is sucked out of Gortex by the bus’s heating. I 
can’t see either of their faces, except when illuminated by the passing orange street 
lights. The mid-afternoon light in the north of England in December doesn’t offer 
much illumination. Especially on a day like today; grey clouds thickly plastering the 
sky. Wind horizontal. Rain coming in waves, as if delivered by an army of archers, 
reloading and firing the heavy droplets in unison. This bus is dark. Invisible to us. 
Only us three. The radio volume is shifted to the front. Windows are opaque with 
condensation.  
 
In this haecceitical space the three of us become a lively pack of discussion. Our 
topics run through the day. Pulling at moments spent in dips among sand dunes, in a 
council estate carpark dwarfed by grey rolling seas, stood around mobile phones in 
small groups as an app tells us stories of where we stand. We discuss the topics they 
have covered during the week, and the papers they have read. We discuss their lives. 
Our lives. Our discussion traverses agency and objects; what’s real and what is not; 
reflections/diffractions of our practice as educators; of our very purpose and 
existence; all drawn through the events of the day. Our hopes. We’ve shared a day at 
the cusp of ideas. At the edge of thought. And at the edge of England. This day has 
been full of such events. I want to think these events with things. To conceptualise 
education as a dispersed event. Environing education. I want to start by thinking 
them with you. 
 
I wonder, Jamie, about our day with your students. I want to write about what 





Drowned in it31. I want to become different with the writing. To change. To 
disappear as me. Do you think we can explore this, as an event? Can this writing be 
something like a minibus journey; moving somewhere and nowhere? Creating 
potentials for adventure in thought, adventures of thought? Can we surprise 
ourselves? Dissipate ourselves? Creatively inquire into and past that day? With that 
day, and others since? But what type of questions should we even ask? We need 
concepts that rid ourselves of the norms of conventional inquiry. 
 
Creative practices of concept forming, always involving active 
conceptualisation, are the very processual activities that trouble the 
reified substantialities of conventional inquiry. They are not simply 
about changing the concept from one thing, once classified object of 
inquiry, to another through practices of critical interpretation, they 
involve selves in doing, in engaging in affective forms of inquiry that 
animate doing-bodies in ethical, political, and always experimentally 




                                                 
31 I often think of immanence as a swelling ocean surface. The cover of the Album Repave 
by Volcano Choir. The photograph was taken by Corey Arnold, commercial fisherman and 






Our concept, environing education, requires this type of inquiry, Jamie. A 




Well, what can I say? Many things as it happens, or so I’m told! But it’s always re‐
this, re‐that and never really of the moment. In academia we always speak as if we 
know something. But knowledge is just as invented as all the other  ‘re‐
presentations’ we like to convey to each other. Numbers, words, pictures, 
presentations, re‐search! They’re never the moment. That’s always already gone. So 
I’ll attempt to speak from here, where I am now, rather than somewhere else – in 
history, in academia, in space, in place, in time. 
 
I’m sat at a homogenised plywood desk in a hotel room in Bavaria (that was always 
something else). It’s snowing outside. It’s stifling inside. Dry, warm‐hot air 
conditioning in a box of a room with muffled German conversation going on in the 
corridor outside. I don’t speak German very well so it simply sounds like gagged 
sound. This is probably important information to you as it sets the scene and tells 
you what might be co‐producing this event, at this time, as ‘I’ (an assembling event) 
attempt to re‐collect (there I go again, with the re’s) a time already gone, when we 
(you and I, Dave) were on a minibus, going somewhere with some students…again. 
The collective agency producing this event right now involves a desk, a laptop, a 
desk light, a bottle of water, a runny nose, dry warm‐hot air, a background hum, an 
aching back, the excitement of performing my presentation tomorrow morning – 
involving all the ‘props’ that will co‐produce my distributed agential performance: 
my son’s fairy wings (for enacting Deleuze and Guattari’s Wasp and Orchid), a wolf 
mask (the one that Aldo Leopold shot), prismatic lenses (to ‘see’ different versions 








If I was perfectly honest, I would say that I really don’t have a clue as to ‘what’ (a 
quiddity) is writing this now. My hands are moving on the typeface and my lips are 
silently mouthing the words I’m writing, as I sniff, scratch my nose and wonder 
what, or even where, the me to me is that is supposedly ‘controlling’ this event. I 
doubt there is a location I could pinpoint. However, there are many multidirectional 
relations I could mention that may give rise to these words being typed. No 
corrections. Just stream‐of‐consciousness…what I’ve been taught! 
So, the minibus. The windows, steamed up, frame the landscape, a scenic mobile 
production. Still seems 2‐dimentional until we get there. I wonder what my 
embodied memory re‐members?  
 
What we are seeing here is that time is not given, it is not universally 
given, but rather that time is articulated and re‐synchronized through 
various material practices. In other words, just like position, 
momentum, wave and particle, time itself only makes sense in the 
context of particular phenomena. […] The “past” was never simply 
there to begin with, and the “future” is not what will unfold, but “past” 
and “future” are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through the 







It’s obviously not the event at the time as that moment has passed and morphed 
into something else, something new, a palimpsest of furious myriad things that I 
could never hope to pin down, like the cruel practice of pinning butterflies to a wall. 
Nothing static, nothing still, just flows and occasional bulks of embodied memory 
coming to the fore. Where’s that? No idea.  
 
The line‐system (or block‐system) of becoming is opposed to the point 
system of memory. Becoming is the movement by which the line frees 
itself from the point, and renders points indiscernible: the rhizome, 
the opposite of arborescence; breaks away from arborescence. 
Becoming is an antimemory. Doubtless, there exists a molecular 
memory, but as a factor of integration into a majoritarian or molar 
system. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 324) 
 
 
I can still feel the faintest of emotions though, from that day. I was am (there is no 
past, only a past in the present…makes sense) slightly uneasy about the day, 
whether some students will not like/get/appreciate/want the incredibly challenging 
content that I’m delivering. Angry/puzzled/curious faces staring at me, expectantly, 
waiting for me to unwrap a parcel of knowledge that will make everything come 
clear, make sense…something I don’t have. I only have more questions. That’s an 
uneasy feeling that sometimes makes me sad, exhausted, self‐loath, excited, tired. 
It’s warming having a friend there with me, someone who I can simply say, “Dave, 
what do you think” and then stop talking and relax, breathe a little easier, and drift 
off, just for a moment or two, gather my thoughts, my truths, untruths and 
nontruths, and then re‐appear, rested, with something new to say, something fresh, 
something controversial perhaps. Perhaps I shouldn’t say it. Perhaps it’s too … too 
late, I’ve said it. Confused faces, red faces, blotchy faces (the effect of affect – 
forces of encounter), trying to take in what I’ve just said. Years of Enlightenment 
knowledge rammed into their skins, into their lungs and then I’ve just gone and said 





think about the ethics of that statement before I said it. And I know some of this 
stuff, this knowledge, can be life‐changing, yet I still did it! Whispery voice inside 
(my skin?) says, “they may not have wanted to know/hear that little gem”. It’s like 
that moment in The Matrix, when Cypher wants back in! But they can never get 
back in. That’s my fault! But where does the responsibility for that lie? I am a 
moment. I’m a physical moment, always becoming something else, something 
more, something merging (now, with you, with the electronic page, with the 
keyboard, the chair, the topological and invisible part of us that gets sucked up into 
space, to that satellite and then back down to somewhere else on the thin skin of 
the planet, to someone else – a cyborg self, to merge with them, their thoughts, 
their embodied memories, perhaps yours?).      
 
Trying to do diffraction, to get away from reflexivity. Just another concept, that 
performs, that behaves and dances ecologically. Sitting in that pub after being in the 
sideways rain on the beach at Walney was toasty. You explained diffraction to the 
students. That’s what they wanted. An explanation, preferably a simple one. Why 











I knew you’d write more. It was futile when I wrote to write less. There’s always 
more to say. And, some of those words aren’t yours anyway. This isn’t the same as 
saying some of them are quotes. As you say, are any of those words actually yours? 
If there is no ‘you’ to you or ‘me’ to me, is this collaborative writing, or something 
else? Maybe it’s not a collaborative writing (Koro-Ljungberg & Ulmer, 2016). 
What’s going on?!  
 
Now I’m sat with my 3-week-old son, Fen, in our flat in Edinburgh. Outside it’s 
snowing (what’s the ‘it’ here?). Of course, it’s simple to say I’ve changed since Fen 
arrived, and since we were on Walney Island, Jamie. But how do I write this change? 
How do I write with him/not him, now? There was no ‘lightning bolt’ when he 
arrived. No grand sea-change. He hasn’t been anywhere near as disruptive as was 
promised by advice givers. He feels more like a welcome visitor, for now. So what 
do I fear? The potential for it to go differently?  There is a virtuality; an eventing 
horizon of becoming in what we have now; so hygge with the snow outside and Fen 
sleeping calmly. How does this become the “clunky intimacy” of the father-son event 
(Pelias, 2002; Wyatt & Adams, 2012)? I write with that fear, among others.  
 
What has changed in the writing event of us all, here? By here I mean this virtual-
actual space that you also describe. The non-static potential of you on email, now, 
talking to me about this Special Issue on new materialisms and environmental 
education, and potential reviewers of the papers submitted by our colleagues. 
Gemma to my left, talking sweetly to Fen, to calm him. The little red squiggles that 
remind me I can’t spell simple words. They push my fingers onto the delete key, and 
to (re)type. And then you, the reader, wondering what word in the last two sentences 
I couldn’t spell. More than you’d guess, probably. And then, all the others. The other 
writers who write through/with/of me/us/event, themselves events written through by 






An experience of a loss of the author and a loss of oneself multiplied by 
two. Writing without a plan happens, this virtual event surprises the 
writers themselves, and many tiny voices within the writers get 
disturbed. Writing appears almost the same but not quite. Scratch that. 
Writing almost never feels the same. Scratch that. Many writers writing 
in the same space, colliding. Sometimes. Never really. No, this is not a 
collaborative writing. (Koro-Ljungberg and Ulmer, 2016, p.101) 
 
…so, let’s collaborate/not collaborate. Let’s write about Walney without a plan and 
change the past in the present, as we always do. Let’s write and see what happens. 
I’m writing with Walney Island; the dunes, wind, students, graffiti, plastic bag 
poking out of sand and chat that took place and is taking place now. This writing-
thinking-flat-Fen-Gemma-internet-Jamie is environing education as much as that, 
Walney, was. I’m cautious of the idea of a text/lifeworld split as Payne (2005) 
suggested there is. Rather, I wonder if text and discourse never escape the lifeworld. 
To write seems to be to be embodied. And text is a body, but not the only body. And 
bodies are concepts. Plastic and malleable in that way. Concepts are material things 
of the world. Not abstractions. No discourse/matter divide. The recollection of 
Walney is always a collection of Walney and more. But this collection is not one of 
things given a priori. It is always an event. As is the here and now, which has always 
passed. Both events, on Walney Island and here in my flat, are material-conceptual 
becomings. There can be no conceptual abstraction from the world, the 
representation is always a presentation - the problem that troubled environmental 
education in the mid 2000s (Hart, 2005).  
So an environing education has no care for the entering and existing of doors and 
places, or whether I’m on my laptop or on Walney Island. The learning happens 
along the line of my eventing of these becoming places. It is rather more concerned 
with playing with itself alongly (Ingold, 2011). In the same way that life is an 
occurring process both indoors and outdoors (conceptual categories both ‘in’ the 
world), it is an occurring process of both matter and discourse (one considered ‘in’ 
the world, and one considered to be abstracted from it). Ingold (2011, p.155) notes, 
‘in this way the alongly integrated knowledge of the wayfarer is forced into the 





into categorical boundaries within which it is constrained’ (Ingold, 2011). To tell 
someone all they are up to is discourse, narrative, text or post-structuralism, and not 
real like embodied experiences, is to place them in a category that is not given a 
priori. I contend that discourse is experienced. There is no escaping the ecology of 
words and concepts, and the trophic torrents of which they find themselves. Concepts 
are nature (8) too (Mcphie and Clarke, in press). 
And you ask me about diffraction. Are we drawn to diffraction as an attempt to 
place-people-place mingle alongly? To change reflective practice to diffractive 
practice? And…and…and…diffraction’s movement gets us past the etic-emic split of 
discussions of the environment, nature and place. It allows the wayfarer to disrupt the 
categories that someone else places them in. Diffraction, for me, complicates the 
subject. It helps us live alongly. If I reflect, or am reflexive, I remain as a subject, 
just moved elsewhere. If I diffract, I write-think-do myself anew as I notice the 
difference that is made. Diffraction seems a useful concept for environing education. 
For imagining haecceitical selves (Clarke, 2017). I can’t tell you why I tried to 
explain diffraction to the students then, I can only explore the difference your 
question makes now-just gone. The disturbance patterns left by that day, and the 
ripples that change them, made by the pebble of your question. What does it do? It 
makes me wonder about practice. Is this what I-you am/are trying to get to with the 
students? (and if so, where does this intention come from; not ‘us’ surely?). To help 
them, help me/us/(something else), get beyond our human selves as enlightenment 
subjects vs an ‘out there’ nature? But, as you say, do students even want that? Or, 
what is the wanting/not wanting that is occurring of students as events? That 
conversation with Josh and Tracy on the minibus. It was lively, generative, but also 
combative. Entrenched positions were taken, thoughts rallied and outflanked. 
Critique was both negative and generous (Taylor, 2016). But who were these 








I imagine those positions were taken by a variety of multiple assemblies of things 
(thinking their cultures/environments thoughts) and simply passed off as positions 
taken by autonomous biological humans. Then, someone can be to blame, to have 
responsibility and agency. But that’s too easy, too simple, too bound by the organic 
skin. There’s another invented concept that performs rigidly – organic. I prefer the 
inorganic (or something in‐between – the ecotone). It stretches the body much 
further – topologically – and is much more useful as a concept to think with because 
it doesn’t staticize. It doesn’t prevent my be(com)ing from ending at my skin – 
remember when I explored this using tattoos and graffiti (Mcphie, 2017)? An 
extended body hypothesis? Inorganic skin allows my embodied memory, my body, 
to extend into other things (and them into me, as a porous haecceity) – phone, 
laptop, address book, family. They are all important too, Dave. Consider this next 





description of encountering the physicist Stephen Hawking32 when he lectured at 
the University of California: 
 
Exactly where, I say to myself, is Hawking? […] Who is doing the talking 
up there on the stage? In an important sense, Hawking doesn’t stop 
being Hawking at the edge of his body. There is the obvious physical 
Hawking, vividly outlined by the way our social conditioning teaches us 
to see a person as a person. But a serious part of Hawking extends into 
the box in his lap. No box, no discourse; Hawking’s intellect becomes a 
tree falling in the forest with nobody around to hear it. Where does he 
stop? Where are his edges? (Stone, cited in Barad, 2007, p. 159) 
 
Hawking+inorganic speech synthesizer (+ myriad other things) co‐produce rapid air 
pressure variations that eventually becomes sound when a perceiver with an ear 
drum joins the assemblage, not so different from Hawking+organic voice box (that 
one would consider as part of him). Also, the initial thought process did not begin in 
Hawking’s pineal gland in his brain did it? Thoughts and concepts are co‐generated 
by multiple phenomena and as such, cause‐and‐effect sequencing is 
multidirectional ↔ and complex, rather than linear and unidirectional >. In 
Hawking’s case, the speech synthesizer pushes back, influencing the thoughts 
themselves. In this way, we cognize with external components, from laptops to 
snowflakes – although this is now being written back home in Cumbria, there are 
snowflakes falling right now outside my window and so they begin to think with me, 
adding an extra icy weight to help my fingers depress the keys on my laptop, that 
also takes me back to Germany last week, changing the terrain of that memory, 
morphing it into a becoming rather than a preserved snapshot in time. Where are 
our edges? Our inorganic skin is always pulsating, flexing, temporary, topological.   
So, there is no sound of a tree falling in a forest if there is no operational ear drum 
included in the assemblage/process to hear it (it would be only changes in air 
                                                 
32 Author of ‘A Brief History of Time’ (1988), Stephen Hawking contracted amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS) in 1963 leaving him paralysed. His voice is partly co-generated by a 





pressure), just like there is no rainbow without an observer. I agree with Deleuze, 
Monism=Pluralism. Therefore, yes Dave, I agree, education is a dispersed event, 
involving topologically distributed bodies of all kinds, including concepts – like 
pedagogy. Yes, concepts were battling of us that day/now, always becoming, 
environing education. 
‘Deleuze and Guattari (1994) write on how concepts and practices “link up with 
each other, support one another, coordinate their con‐tours, articulate their 
respective problems” (p. 18)’ (Taguchi, 2016, p.213). I think this is because concepts 
are practices in themselves. Concepts perform ontologically, not merely 
epistemologically. Concepts have agency. Or rather, they perform agentially. They 
are not only a re‐presentation of reality, they make reality, for the re‐presentations 
themselves are also made of matter. Therefore, concepts are particularly relevant 
to education, aren’t they? ‘Rather than being a linguistic representation of a 
separate material entity, the concept has an important pedagogical quality of 
shaping and enacting events of life and, thus, reality itself (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994)’ (Taguchi, 2016, p.213). In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari 
‘formulate the task of the pedagogy of the concept and the urgency of practising it’ 
(Semetsky and Masny, 2011, p.448). Focusing our attention on learning about how 
concepts work (ecologically) and what they do could be of particular relevance to 
education research. As a result of this thinking, Taguchi and St. Pierre (2017, p.643) 
declared ‘concepts—acts of thought—are practices that reorient thinking, undo the 
theory/practice binary, and open inquiry to new possibilities’. I think this is the 
exciting potential that is a result of conjoining the material turn with the ontological 
turn with the linguistic turn. Thus, concepts perform onto-epistemologically, onto-
methodologically and onto-pedagogically. Further, in our other paper in this Special 
Issue, after Barad (2007), we highlight how concepts – specifically nature – also 
perform ethico-onto-epistemologically which could be of particular concern to 






Concepts really can undo a variety of binaries, from theory/practice and 
indoors/outdoors to nature/culture and organic/inorganic. But they are also 
stubborn, challenging and epistemologically inaccessible to many. This can create 
anger, barriers to learning and feelings of inadequacy. These are also ecological 
processes. The student’s reactions to our concepts on that day also performed 
trophic torrents. There is an ecology of affect just as there is an ecology of concepts. 
I worry that our disruptions and diffractions of certain romantically idealized 
notions of ‘nature’, ‘the outdoors’, the ‘organic’, and perhaps more significantly ‘the 
self’ may lead some students down paths of unproductive nihilism and depression 
(not that nihilism always leads to depression as I feel I have a very healthy nihilistic 
outlook). So, yes Deleuze and Guattari, there certainly may be an urgent need for a 
pedagogy of the concept because at the moment when I introduce these ideas it’s 
too stark for the Cyphers and some students just want back into their 
caves/Matrix/rabbit holes. The Overton Window of acceptability needs shifting so 
that there are even more looks of wonderment and even less of horror. Either that 
or we need to find another way of introducing these concepts that isn’t so 
terrifying.   
 
By the way, this doesn’t feel like collaborating. You’re here in many respects – as a 
bunch of concepts ‐ but none of them are ‘Dave the percept’. There really is 
something substantially different about a perceptual presence as opposed to a 
conceptual one. So, we’re only really collaborating topologically, using our extended 
inorganic bodies to fly back and forth across cyber‐space to write this. So, this 
doesn’t really feel like collaborating. It’s much more like entangling or colliding, like 
what Koro‐Ljungberg and Ulmer (2016) said – so let’s collide some more. Here I 
come Dave, I’m about to press the send key to transport this part of my body over 
to you…perhaps you’d better move over a little! (Also, now you’ve gone and 
extended the word limit to 1,000 for my collision‐response, I’ve gone and written 







It’s strange, reading that never felt like a collision, or collisioning; at least, not until 
you told me you’d gone over the word limit (and yes, I see how this works). It felt 
more like an old friend telling me things I know; things that you and I have talked 
about and both experienced in different ways over the last few years. Perhaps we are 
too attuned in our thinking? Perhaps we should collide with others in our writing, to 
see what happens. Dance different dances. There are intensities of entanglement, of 
course. Let’s go to the pub. Or rather, back to the pub that we sat in with the 
students, to escape from the wind and rain of Walney Island. As you say, I tried to 
explain diffraction. We sat in an awkward circle. I had a pint. Some students ordered 
pizza. As I talked it felt as if some of the students were entangled, whilst others were 
colliding. Others still orbited peripherally. Yet we were all becoming alongly; 
people, pint, pizza and all. Diffraction as a concept played out in different ways for 
different students. ethico-onto-epistemologically. For some it seemed liberating, for 
others it seemed distancing. Specific positions were taken. You and I were given a 
free stage to talk. Our authority filling the voids. Some students said nothing. Others 
courted our authority, butted up against it, nodded politely or enthusiastically. You’re 
right to talk about the politics of the ecology of concepts and the way we can 
collectively try to take care in our approach to them. Whilst conceptual, they are 
immensely affectual. Perhaps this is another example of immanent ethics. The care to 
be taken (by who/what?) in the affective force of encounter of the ecology of 
concepts. Challenging given images of thought so that we, the students and you and 
I, might think our ontological selves differently, and thus expand our capacities to 
affect and be affected. But do students always want their power increased in this 
way? Who’s to say that it is an increase in power? The ethics is in the pedagogy; the 
manner we broach concepts, but is also in the concepts themselves. As you say, 
concepts are important, and can have world changing consequences.  
So how did I broach diffraction? I (re)member speaking in examples, of ripples on 
the surface of water, of our bodies in the circle and the ways our ideas and 
discussions changed the events we were all participating in. I (re)member being 





How to tell him what I have talked about a little above, the long road of thought that 
you and I have walked from outdoor adventure education to what we perceive, with 
others, as the ethical requirement to challenge the very notion of being human? And 
the environment? Josh is faced with a world changing concept. I think our approach 
to concepts is similar but importantly different to that of threshold concepts, that 
Mayer and Land (2006) introduce. Their book Overcoming Barriers to Student 
Understanding: Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge argues that: 
 
in certain disciplines there are ‘conceptual gateways’ or ‘portals’ that 
lead to previously inaccessible, and initially perhaps ‘troublesome’, 
ways of thinking about something. A new way of understanding, 
interpreting, or viewing a topic may thus emerge – having a 
transformative effect on internal views of subject matter, subject 
landscape, or even world view. (Mayer and Land, 2006, p.i) 
 
 
This description doesn’t get to the world changing nature of the type of concepts you 
and I are discussing. Philosophical concepts don’t provide different ways of thinking 
about something. They provide different ways of thinking about thinking, and 
reality, and thus what matters and what comes to matter. Different ways of thinking 
about everything. Josh is not faced with a concept that might change his worldview. 
For me, the container of the human subject who ‘gains’ different worldviews in 
Mayer and Land’s conception of curriculum, of education, is radically altered by a 
concept such as diffraction. Philosophical concepts, such as environing education, 
are of a different order to concepts that make up the more citizenship or literacy 
approaches in environmental education: 
 
the philosophical concepts of Butler, Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze 
and Guattari that Colebrook and others think with (e.g., subversive 
repetition, power, deconstruction, body without organs) are quite 
different from familiar concepts of education and the social sciences 
(e.g., cognition, race, culture, role, free market) that can overdetermine 
inquiry as much as method because philosophical concepts do not 
identify, organize, consolidate, and represent experience under the sign 







Environing education seems to change both ideas about what it means to think the 
environment, and what it means to think education. It borrows from the ethical and 
pedagogical endeavour to enact micropolitical incisions, to stay clear of new grand 
narratives by instead playing with concepts; as explored by de Freitas and Palmer 
(2016). But further, it borrows understandings of the limitations of any attempt at an 
environmental education after posthumanism (Pedersen, 2010). Commenting on the 
way environmental education has approached posthumanism (at least, commenting 
on Stables and Scott, 2001, and Bonnett, 2004, who both invoke a posthuman 
environmental education), Pedersen (2010) notes that: 
 
To see education as a remedy for everything gone awry in modernist 
humanism is not only to apply an instrumental view of education, 
hoping that the crises of humanism can be fixed by appropriate methods 
of teaching and learning, but also to cultivate the naïve idea that 
education can locate itself outside of ideology. (p.245) 
 
The risk is that education is employed as an attempt to overcome dysfunctional 
humanism with other forms of humanism in the guise of the idea of education being 
enacted. Can we try to think of practice as not educating humanist subjects, but 
playing among eventing percepts, affects and concepts; eventing with them? I think 
some environmental education approaches to posthumanism, new materialisms, or 
ontologically oriented inquiry generally, have moved on since Pedersen (2010) asked 
if the posthuman was educable. We can see this is the case by looking through other 
articles in this special issue for instance. And so, I think we should think of education 
not as a discipline that can be wielded instrumentally, but instead as a dispersed 
process of becoming whose endpoint we can never predict. Accordingly, Colebrook 
(2017) asks What is this thing called education? She notes the problem of conceiving 






To think of education as a part of the humanities may seem to at least 
have the virtue of freeing it from the quantitative pressures of social 
scientific, neoliberal, and biopo- litical managerialism. And yet, it 
would be more radical again not to make claims for the ways in which 
threatened aspects of education, such as art and music [or 
environmental education?], form healthier happier humans, but to think 
of all learning as inhuman. To tie education to philosophy—to open 
problems and transformative encounters—would be as destructive to 
most of what counts as philosophy in its current form as it would be to 
education policy. (p.654) 
 
To be open to problems and transformative encounters might mean thinking of 
education as the eventing nature of the problems of life, where life is conceived as a 
life, as immanence. This seems to mean both environing and an unhumaning. 
Posthumanism might be the philosophical perspective, but unhumaning is the 
activity. I prefer the term unhuman to inhuman, which is used by Cohen (2015) and 
Colebrook (2017), as inhuman can also mean to be unlike a human, but also to be 
cold-hearted or callous. Unhuman is more generally understood as lacking human 
attributes. The attributes I think I lack are such things as independent agency; a mind 
which is separate from my body; a body which is separate from the world; rational 
thought. At least, I haven’t yet rid myself of these beliefs. Perhaps it is more accurate 
to say I am attempting to become unhuman. I am uhumaning. Becoming unhuman. 
Becoming alien. This education no longer feels like educare, like a leading out or a 
facilitation. It feels more like an attempt to become alien from stable ideas of 
ourselves, or of ourselves as stable. An Alien pedagogy. This doesn’t mean 
becoming alienated, at least not from the world. Alien comes from the Latin aliēnus, 
meaning belonging to something else. By keeping the category of the human on the 
move, by always thinking of ourselves as never settled, but always belonging to 
something else. This isn’t the same as, for instance, Bogost’s alien phenomenology, 
where he attempts to see what it’s like to be a thing. Rather my meaning of alien is 
closer to Haraway’s (1992, np) use of monster in her description of cyborg 
subjectivity: ‘A cyborg subject position results from and leads to interruption, 
diffraction, reinvention. It is dangerous and replete with the promises of monsters’. 
Becoming alien is not a destination (personally, I think we are all already aliens), but 





seems to warn of the placeless, or space oriented futurity of the concept of the 
extraterrestrial. So, becoming alien must be an earthly endeavour. It is always an 
attempt at becoming immanent. Of the world. How many different ways can we 
become earthling aliens? The earth with all it entails, especially concepts. There’s 
also something wonderfully alien about the idea of us being aliens. That we can 
never know the otherness of ourselves fully, even as we enact it, we can only attempt 
to reach it and shake the human that we are so used to believing in. We cannot even 
know the ‘we’. There’s something so alien about the inorganic Hawking you discuss, 
for instance, Jamie, just as there is surely something so alien about the me of this café 
on Easter Road in Edinburgh. Belonging to the otherness of it. Never human. A 
totally different (in)human who has been here before and done things in this way. 
Constituted of a billion others, bacterial and authorial, affectual and conceptual. 
Environmental education becomes environing-alienating. If we make the human 
alien. This Café on Easter Road in Edinburgh becomes an opportunity to start. This 
seems less and less like an environmental education, and more and more like lifing. 
Always an attempt and an experiment. (Now looks who’s over the word limit! It 
wasn’t me. The aliens did it…) 
Jamie: 
We come in peace. Shoot to kill? (There are always hidden dangers that come with 
the promise/s of monsters). 
Back at my desk – no snow. You mentioned educare. I know one version of this 
word/concept not from a privileged education – where the ones who can afford it 
learn a romanticized and hierarchical Occidental language that simultaneously 
emancipates and oppresses – but from becoming a dad. It means providing 
nourishment. The first milk passed from mother to infant, colostrum, provides some 
of the best nourishment (education) I can think of. Utilizing microorganisms and 
nutrients, it educates the digestive tract to provide healthy antibodies in response 
to invading viruses. And due to the bodily contact, it also educates warmth, care, 
emotion, wellbeing, attachment, love…nourishment – in both directions. I want my 





one of the healthiest I can think of. I want my body to know how to do this 
(educating my body). But I didn’t get it. I got a bottle and a dummy. A bad 
education? It wasn’t my mother’s fault, it was the zeitgeist that did it, thinking our 
(patriarchal) cultures‐environments thoughts at that time – and still.  
Funny that the area where we went with the students still has one of the lowest 
rates of breastfeeding in England. It also suffers from high rates of deprivation, 
including alcoholism, teenage conceptions, diabetes, long term unemployment, 
violent crime and self‐harm (Public Health England, 2016). Is that a bad education? 
And should we have taken our students there, in amongst the litter on the beach, 
diffracting the aesthetics of the litter so that it almost becomes beautiful decay, 
with all the problems that plastic promotes? Should we have profited pedagogically 
from an unhealthy environment ‐ even though it was a ‘nature reserve’ ‐, from the 
impoverished people who live there? One’s ill‐health is always another’s health. 
Something always profits. I’ve since been back with the same students, Dave, to do 
some psychogeography/schizocartography (see Richardson, 2013) on another 
module – Know Your Place – to explore the power relations that warp and weft 
through Barrow and Walney. One of the students asked me if it was ethical for us – 
with a particular epistemological access – to be there, wandering the back streets of 
people’s lives collecting the urban run‐off (the ‘data’) in a similar vein to the 
anthropologist examining ‘the native’ or the naturalist narrating the lives of flora 
and fauna for the consumer, the onlooker, rather than the participant or even the 
‘spectactor’ (Boal, 1979). Perhaps. Is it healthier to do it with respect? Or what 
Deborah Bird Rose calls ‘responsive attentiveness’ (Rose, 2004)? Or not at all? And 
there are always hidden dangers of cultural and class appropriations. There are 
always hidden monsters.  
So, is environing education about health then? Healthy bodies, healthy 
environments, healthy relations, healthy respect, healthy becomings, healthy lifing, 
healthy aliens? Could we look to nourishing instead of educating then? Nourishing 





thought of environmental education as nourishment. Passing nutrients on. Perhaps 
we’d notice the fast food a little more blatantly. You know, the romanticized version 
of nature evident in articles throughout environmental education? That’s fast food. 
Or could we notice how learning entails entrophy, trophic torrents and ecological 
adaptation? Nutrient exchange isn’t always healthy. Some become more nourished 
than others, causing eutrophication or blandification. A political ecology of the 
oppressed is just as relevant to environmental education as learning the life‐cycle of 
a pond.    
But where can we go to explore and further this futile attempt at knowing the 
other, the environment, the self, the alien, if not education, if not academe? Do we 
need more of the same? Knowledge isn’t knowledge. Knowledge is so fraught with 
power. It’s so historicized, so made up, so fictionalized. Perhaps we need another 
fiction to diffract it. Perhaps we need a speculative fabulation (Haraway, 2011) or a 
speculative fiction for a healthy alien pedagogy. On this matter, I’m in agreement 
with the late Ursula Le Guin. Thinking with her protagonists in her science fiction 
novels she tackles issues of racism, sexism and colonialism, as well as prescribed 
knowledge garnered from an Enlightenment pedagogy. She highlights matters of 
historicity and challenges the idealisms of utopian yearnings. Her stories aren’t 
simply reflections of real life, they are diffractions of it, as well as continually 
becoming it, each time they are read anew. Hers is what I would call an alien 
pedagogy, with the added bonus of extra/inner/other‐terrestrial imaginings. For 
me, reading and thinking with Le Guin has been an otherly‐terrestrial education, 
useful in diffracting more traditional pedagogical ethico‐onto‐epistemologies.     
Or Noel Gough when he said ‘critical readings of science fiction texts should be 
integral to both science and environmental education and that the narrative 
strategies of postmodern fiction should be incorporated into their story‐telling 





Or Donna Haraway when she decides to explore ‘worlds full of unsettling but oddly 
familiar critters who turn out to be simultaneously near kin and alien colonists.’ 
(Haraway, 2011, para 1). She asks, ‘How might a speculatively fabulated SF art 
object help morph eroded and disowned no‐places into flourishing and cared‐for 
places?’ (Haraway, 2011, para 5).  ‘To care is wet, emotional, messy, and demanding 
of the best thinking one has ever done. That is one reason we need speculative 
fabulation.’ (Haraway, 2011, para 9).  
So, maybe that’s what’s needed for the students, Dave. A speculative fabulation 
that environs education and attempts to nourish an immanent ethic of care via an 
alien pedagogy. But the promise/s of monsters will undoubtedly emerge with the 
alienating threat of the alien vitality, as it always does with me. That life may be 
articulated in all things is so repugnant to so many people. It’s almost as if the 
inanimate lifeless spectacle is preferable to a messy vibrancy. I get scowls, Dave. 
Dave, I want to finish by integrating Steven Shaviro into our collaboration/collision if 
I may, as a third voice/assemblage? As well as the Whiteheadian author of a semi‐
generous critique of speculative realism, named The Universe of Things (2014), he 
wrote the introduction to a collection of short science fiction stories by Gwyneth 
Jones, also named The Universe of Things (2011), named after a passage from 
Shelley’s Mont Blanc poem in which he discusses ‘The everlasting universe of 
things’. Take a breather. In one of Jones’ stories, also named The Universe of Things 
(too much?), an auto mechanic meets an alien who asks him to fix her/his/its/their 
car. The mechanic turns off the machines that usually do the repair work and 
decides to fix the alien’s car by hand. Actually, I think I might have mentioned this 
story to you before. But it’s particularly poignant to our collision now as our 
environing education has wandered into a realm of aliens, speculation, materials, 
distributed agency, extended inorganic selves, environ(mental) health (Mcphie, 
2014) and fiction. So, I’m just going to let Shaviro and Jones do the talking in this 





Shaviro and Jones: 
In the course of a long evening, as he works on the car, the mechanic 
has an epiphany – or a hallucination. He experiences, for a moment, 
what the aliens’ “living world” is actually like: his own tools seem to 
come alive. The experience is disconcerting, to say the least. “He 
stared at the spanner in his hand until the rod of metal lost its shine. 
Skin crept over it, the adjustable socket became a cup of muscle, 
pursed like an anus, wet lips drawn back by a twist on the tumescent 
rod.” The living world is obscene and pornographic. Existence is 
suffocating and unbearable. Everything is suffused by “living slime. . . 
full of self, of human substance,” but somehow rendered other. This is 
what happens when you have “succeeded in entering the alien mind, 
seen the world through alien eyes. How could you expect such an 
experience to be pleasant?” The mechanic is terrified and nauseated. 
All he wants is to return to the loneliness and security of the 
customary human world: a world in which objects remain at a proper 
distance from us, because they are “dead, and safe.”  
[…]  
The story therefore posits something like what Jane Bennett calls vital 
materialism: the recognition that “vitality is shared by all things,” and 
not limited to ourselves alone (Bennett 2010, 89).  
But even as the story intimates this, it also dramatizes our fear of the 
liveliness of things. In the mechanic’s experience, wonder turns into 
dread. The sense that everything is filled with “human substance” flips 
over into the paranoid vision of a menacing alien vitality. The magic of 
a fully animate world becomes a nightmare of Cthulhu. We are 
threatened by the vibrancy of matter. We need to escape the 
excessive proximity of things. We cannot bear the thought of their 
having an autonomous life, even if this life is ultimately attributable to 
us. We are desperate to reassure ourselves that, in spite of everything, 
objects are, after all, passive and inert. (Shaviro, 2014, pp. 46‐47) 
 
So, how can we make the familiar unfamiliar with our students? And vice versa? An 
alien pedagogy? An otherly‐terrestrial pedagogy? Maybe we could cover everything 
in skin, like in Jones’ story. An extra‐dermatological pedagogy? An inorganic 
pedagogy? Yes, it feels like environing education now. I know we were doing it 





skin that we’re soaked with and freeing up our co‐produced ruminations, the forces 
of affect feel more like environing. Concepts flew/are flying Dave. It became a little 
more intense as we went along(ly?). I feel a little more alien now. A little more 
inorganic and distributed. My skin has spread. I do enjoy thinking with you Dave – 
whatever/wherever you are. 
(I was under! It was Shaviro’s fault!) 
 
Post-script on diffractive practice 
 
So, the thing that came together, the haecceity that produced the writing above, has 
tailed off and become different again. Another ‘…and…’. I (Dave now33) want to 
write a little about where I think we arrived in our thinking-writing-doing. It has not 
been the more usual type of environmental education scholarship. More traditional 
environmental education research might have been concerned with other aspects of 
our day. I can well imagine a conversation, perhaps by other academics, focusing 
much more on the ‘place’ of Walney Island, but as I said before the conversation 
began, the island was only one multiple material aspect of many that may have 
‘come up’ for us to explore with our post-nature post-human orientation. Indeed, I 
stipulated that there are ‘placeful’ stories that could be told; concerning the 
geraniums, or the toads for instance. But there is a lingering dualism in focusing on 
these aspects of the day. Upon submitting our conversation to a leading 
environmental education journal, Reviewer 1 noted: 
 
At this stage I am missing the geranium, the glacier era, missing the 
stories told by locals in the smartphone’s application, missing the 
students, missing the grasses, missing the smartphones, missing the 
wind, missing the thinking feet of wayfarers, missing Walney island 
who has never been present with-yet. 
                                                 
33 Jamie won’t return to write in the thesis. From this point the use of different fonts 






This type of ‘missing’ - a feeling of loss that the reviewer seems to have felt while 
Jamie and I focused on the things that piqued our interest of and from the day rather 
than theirs - seems to reach out to a particular understanding of materiality as 
‘placeful’, i.e. as not interested in the doing of the concepts at play in the education 
that has been and is at work. Reviewer 2 seemed to have experienced a similar 
sensation: 
 
Indeed, any ‘actually existing environment’ appears to [have] been 
wished out of existence and the purpose seems to create new texts 
rather than new worlds (though of course, in the view of the textual turn 
this can be overcome by saying that texts are worlds, and that texts 
constitute worlds). When I say that the environment has been ‘wished 
out of existence’ I mean that despite its presence in the title, and despite 
the claims that this is a ‘placeful’ text, the actual place- Walney Island – 
is decidedly absent. There are some references to it of course, but the 
materiality of it in a geographical sense, is missing. It could be 
anywhere. If this is a ‘geophilosophy’, then the emphasis is on the 
‘philosophy’ rather than the ‘geo’. 
 
Reviewer 2 seems to feel the need to separate once again what I feel Deleuze and 
Guattari are attempting to draw together, or rather to think as never separated; 
thought and materiality. ‘Walney Island’ does appear in the title, along with many 
other things, including students, concepts, and writing-thinking-doing. All of these 
things are ‘environmental’ in that they are of the world. To focus our attention on 
some aspects that a sedimented thought has reduced to a delineated set of ‘geo’, or 
‘environmental’, is precisely what we are attempting to explore beyond. This attempt 
poses fundamental problems for environmental education as a pedagogical 
endeavour. Geophilosphy places the emphasis on the effects of concepts as much as 
the effects of anything else we might pick out of the world. It is interested in the 
movement across affect, percept and concept. In their chapter in geophilosophy in 






Can we speak of Chinese, Hindu, Jewish, or Islamic "philosophy"? Yes, 
to the extent that thinking takes place on a plane of immanence that can 
be populated by figures as much as by concepts. However, this plane of 
immanence is not exactly philosophical, but prephilosophical. It is 
affected by what populates and reacts on it, in such a way that it 
becomes philosophical only through the effect of the concept. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994, p.93) 
 
It is this idea that we are attempting to begin to explore in our ‘writing to it’. This 
isn’t easy, and one could argue that we have not done this well enough, or one could 
give direction as to how this might be done better. But to fall back to the separation, 
to the sediment that we are interrogating, feels like a misstep. Of course, these 
requests are the prerogative of the journal.  
What is the alien that Jamie and I, with others, evoke? According to Rosi Braidotti 
(2018) the alien abounds in posthuman writing: ‘the empathic bond to non-human, 
including monstrous and alien others, has become a posthuman feminist topos’ 
(Braidotti, 2018, p.9). Braidotti (2018) notes that there is an important focus in 
posthuman feminisms on the manner in which the human subject can be reconceived 
in terms of its material constitution of biological others, as, for instance, ‘trans-
corporeal human-animal compounds’ (Aliamo, 2010), or ‘trans-speciated selves’ 
(Hayward, 2008). Further to this there is the non-human alien that constitutes the 
human in terms of technological mediation, the cyborg feminisms of Donna Haraway 
as well as the nature that is the digital life of human becomings (Braidotti, 2018). 
These are important conceptual moves that deterritorialize the Western human 
subject across the earth. They unhuman. That is, if they are concepts that are enacted, 
they may produce particular effects through their mattering. My interest, however, is 
pulled not to the animal, but towards the power of concepts, and thinking of lines of 
conceputalisation as alien others that move through the constitution of 
subjectification. The ‘concepts battling of us’ that Jamie and I describe above, is the 
alien within and without that I am drawn to. The posthuman practice of ethics 





Haecceity 7: practicing immanent ethics 
 
 
Direct discourse is a detached fragment of a mass and is born of the 
dismemberment of the collective assemblage; but the collective 
assemblage is always like the murmur from which I take my proper 
name, the constellation of voices, concordant or not, from which I draw 
my voice. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p.93) 
 
 
Xeno-glossic. Alien speak. Words belonging to others. Other ideas. Other people. 
Other modes of thought. Other bodies. This body is made up of alien languages. 
The human cells provide about 20 thousand genes; the instructions for making a 
person. But the human microbiome, all the others that help me be human – in my 
gut, on my skin – the microbes. All together the number of genes required comes 
out between 2 and 20 million (Gallagher, 2018). I am far more other than I am 
‘me’. Tim Morton suggests that the whole is less than the sum of its parts. I think 
this works with being human. The human is less, far less than the sum of its parts. 
The human is a wisp of an idea of the body environing. The human is a will-o’-the-
wisp. A fen-fire. Ignis fatuus. A bioluminescent apparition produced by microbes. 
An amorphous haecceity that shouldn’t be given too much credence. Tempting 






 ‘Good’ problems 
 
In this haecceity I struggle with the aliens within and the ways I am an alien without. 
Scratch that. The aliens that lie, transversally, across any fictitious boundary of the 
self. By alien, I don’t mean little green men, but rather the others that I already am 
and that I become. Or that are before I am as I occur. The conversation between these 
aliens is an ethical one. It is also one about ethics. Or perhaps this is the same thing? 





dwells in this thesis as a faint refrain. Here I take up the conversation more directly, 
for now at least. This voice, this direct voice to you, is a form of direct discourse 
made up of many other narratives that constitute me, these are the aliens. The alien 
languages. In Haecceity 4: becoming rocked this voice is steady. It becomes more 
unstable in Haecceity 5: practicing environing education. In Haecceity 6: the 
diffractive practitioners it is joined by another, my colleague, Jamie, an alien that 
constitutes me, but is also troubled by exploring where concepts come from and on 
what they act. Here, in this haecceity, the direct voice is troubled once more. It is 
broken up. I am breaking up. Attempting schizoanalysis in an effort to seek out the 
ethical. What are the things that constitute the inside-outside of me? The drives that 
constitute the me-event? Each drive working in a different context. Arcing a different 
trajectory. Pulling me in different directions. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) refer to the 
art of examining these lines as schizoanalysis: 
 
What is your line of flight? What is your BwO, merged with that line? Are 
you cracking up? Are you going to crack up? Are you deterritorializing? 
Which lines are you severing, and which are you extending or resuming? 
Schizoanalysis does not pertain to elements or aggregates, nor to subjects, 
relations, or structures. It pertains only to lineaments running through groups 
as well as individuals. Schizoanalysis, as the analysis of desire, is 
immediately practical and political, whether it is a question of an individual, 
group, or society. For politics precedes being. Practice does not come after 
the emplacement of the terms and their relations, but actively participates in 
the drawing of the lines; it confronts the same dangers and the same 
variations as the emplacement does. Schizoanalysis is like the art of the new. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.203, emphasis added) 
 
 
You have to practise ethics to become. Rather than thinking of myself as a contained 
subject, I instead attempt to create myself as a subjectless individuation constituted 
of multiple worldly lines of desire. Something new. The BwO (Body without 
Organs) is the practice of living and is created through desire actualising the world: 
‘It is not a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices. You never reach the 
Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit.’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.149-150). For me BwO is the practice of always 
attaining a different body, the practice of unnormalising my body; to consider my 





body as not necessarily ending at my skin, or, indeed, necessarily made up of 
domesticated organs. Rather, the BwO is a practice of ethics, of conceiving of the 
self in different ways. Ethics is always a practice of moving concepts, 
deterritorializing their bodies and arriving somewhere new.  
 
 
The "individual" has no prior or transcendental unity. The individual 
remains multiple. Once we see ourselves this way, we can begin to free 
ourselves from the fascist organizing principles that structure and 
define us and the free flow of our desires. Only then—not ahead of 
time, but only through an experimentation or active exploration— can 
we discover and test the limits of what we can truly do and become. 
(Lundy, 2014, n.p.) 
 
 
In Becoming Rocked I touched on the question of what environmental education is 
supposed to orient itself to, if there is no essential environment to conserve. There 
are multiple reasons I wish to pursue this question. As I have moved my interest 
from outdoor activities as a means to promote personal growth in learners in my 
career, and begun to consider the manner in which we might educate to help deal 
with the various crises we face, the move beyond a strict nature/culture dichotomy 
has been attractive as a means to tackle the crises of mind, or perception (Bonnett, 
2012; Clarke and Mcphie, 2014). The realisation that a single definition of ‘nature’, 
that is inclusive of culture (or vice versa), cannot be reached, there is no ideal nature 
(Mcphie and Clarke, in press). Instead we can play with the concepts that generally 
constitute our conversations about nature and culture. Whilst Jamie and I focus on 
nature elsewhere, diffracting it into eight variations (Mcphie and Clarke, in press), 
here I focus on me, as an event of subjectification that might, ostensibly, be 
‘connected’ to nature. This move leaves me wondering about many aspects of my 
life, not the least of which is to ask, as an educator, how I should orient my theory-
practice. What is ethical? What is the ethical imperative of a flat ontology? What 
ought I do? These are not problems to which I offer solutions (at least, not final, 
settled answers). They are ‘good’ problems. According to Massumi (2015, p.204), a 
‘good’ problem ‘is one that wears its inconclusiveness like a badge of merit: a token 





life. The ethics, for me, is in pursuing them. Further, Deleuze identifies the search for 
good problems moving past the notion in philosophy that problems are given ready 
made, and that the philosophy entails finding their solutions. For instance, Wasser 
(2017, p.63) notes how ‘a view of problems as ready-made neutralises the activity of 
thought in problem-formation. Moreover, it masks the degree to which problems are 
determined within already- existing fields of relations.’. And so, these questions are 
located in a specific assemblage of a ‘me-doing’ event. The me-event is more than 
one environing. It is a plurality of environings. A life in multiplicity. For instance, 
the me-writing, -deleting and -formatting these words. The event of becoming with 
students. The event of non-hylomorphically making the thesis. But also the event of 
reading (others thinking similar/different things) as well as thinking-learning-
concerning. Careering. Driving. Fathering. Consuming. Capitalising. Thinking. 
Aliening. And…and…and… 
 
I find it hard to separate the event of inquiry from the event of a life. Not my life. A 
life. How can I think these things with a different concept of the subject? A subject 
as haecceity. And it’s hard to separate the event of all these events from the event of 
being concerned. How do these modes of being not always crash into each other, or 
pop up within each other at unexpected moments? Why should we think these 
categories pre-exist each other? The assemblage is always undergoing an education, 
a life. When Colebrook (2017, p.649) draws on Sloterdijk (2013) to state that 
‘philosophy, so some claim, has always been a pedagogy—not so much concerned 
with knowing but knowing well’ I can’t help but nod, and see methodology as both 
of these things also. Methodology picks up the fundamentals of the world, whatever 
we think they may be, and runs with them, either to reproduce the same differently – 
difference as repetition - or difference in thought. The effects of these productions 
are the process of education – keeping thinking the same, or making it different. 
Keeping it on the move. But methodology is always applied to matters of concern. 
Indeed, it dictates them. Rather like Eisner’s pedagogical notion of curriculum as 
deciding what is important by its inclusion or omission, methodology does the same 
thing by asking ‘where to next’, ‘this is important’, or ‘here’s the gap’; and 





what validity is’, and ‘only this is real’. It dictates the conversation. These matters of 
concern are always present. Is it possible that inquiry without methodology, without 
rules, will be more likely to produce different thinking, education as difference, as 
Taguchi & St. Pierre (2017) suggest? I end up writing without methodology, but 
rather a process of life dealing with problems in the assemblage of life in which I am 
imbricated. An attempt at practicing immanence. Perhaps in the attempt and in the 
practice is where ethics lies. Not as a destination, but as a process of inquiry. That is 
not to say my life receives an education that is ethical or environmental – I don’t gain 
knowledge – as it is not really my life. It is a life. I use the term life in the Deleuzian 
sense:  
 
Life is not a foundation, but better conceived of as desire. What 
something is is its self-formative and self-transformative relation to the 
forces it encounters. (Colebrook, 2017, p.653) 
 
 
Life as desire is the event occurring now; the ‘self-formative and self-transformative 
relation’ of the me-thesis event. In this haecceity I experiment by breaking myself up 
as a human subject with ethical responsibility to try to map some of the multiple 
desires that constitute me, as a desiring event, as a haecceity. I look for the alien. Try 
to make the familiar alien. As practicing immanence in plural ways. As a becoming 
academic (does one ever arrive?); as someone who is coming to terms with the 
Anthropocene epoch, what Paul Kingsnorth (2017) might term a recovering 
environmentalist, doubting the impact of the ‘environmental movement’; as a person 
in front of a computer; as a person I once was; as a person to come.  
 












Immanence and ethics 
 
This haecceity is one story of an immanent ethics. It’s not the ‘right one’. It won’t be 
sealed up and polished. It’s not supposed to be seaworthy. It’s a mess. Bits and 
pieces fall off of it and there are cracks everywhere. Stick your finger in and break it 
apart if you like. Or take it up, see what happens. And it’s not a unitary story. It’s 
already a multiplicity. It is only an attempt. It has to be: 
 
 
. . . proclaiming “Long live the multiple” is not yet doing it, one must 
do the multiple. And neither is it enough to say, “Down with genres”; 
one must effectively write in such a way that there are no more 




How is an haecceitical self an ethical subject? There are layered voices so let’s try to 
tease them apart. The voice of Haecceity 1: A middle for instance. Is this one mode 
of ‘me’ as opposed to others? When I started this thesis, I started in a different voice, 
a different timbre that did different things. I talked back to it. Do you recall? I talked 
back to it in this voice, this slightly different voice that is as much thinking-feeling as 
thinking. That voice, the voice that talked back. That is closer to this voice. My voice 
has changed over the years since I wrote those initial passages. My modes of 
existence have shifted. There is less certainty. They continue to shift. To do battle. 
To compete as lines of desire. They event, and are evented, are eventing. In the 
event, the constitutional event, is where ethics lies: 
 
 
To the extent that events are actualized in us, they wait for us and invite 
us in...[i]t is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; 
of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced within us, the 
Operator; of producing surfaces and linings in which the event is 
reflected, finds itself again as incorporeal and manifests in us the 
neutral splendor which it possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre-
individual nature, beyond the general and the particular, the collective 
and the private. It is a question of becoming a citizen of the world… 





nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us. 
(Deleuze, 1990, p.148-149)  
 
 
This is an ethics of response to the events we are of. It is a worldly pre-individual 
ethics that aims to increase the capacities of modes of existence. To increase a body’s 
capacity to affect and be affected. 
 
How does one determine a mode of existence? Smith (2012) notes that both Spinoza 
and Nietzsche take the body as their territory of the evaluation of modes of existence. 
Spinoza determines that we should consider bodies in terms of their capacities to 
affect and be affected. So, rather than categorising a body by the ‘abstract notions of 
genus or species’, i.e. homo sapiens, we instead consider what it is affected by and 
what leaves it unaffected, what it draws its power from and what diminishes its 
power (or destroys it), and considering how far it can go, or what a body can do 
(Smith, 2012). And so, Smith (2012, p.154) notes that the first feature of an 
immanent ethics is that it ‘replaces the notion of a transcendent subject with 
immanent modes of existence that are determined by their degrees of power and 
relations of affectivity’. In the The History of Sexuality Michel Foucault 
demonstrates how the idea of the subject has changed throughout history, and also 
how the idea of the subject at any one instance is imbricated with the particular 
material and political economy of the time (Smith, 2013). Foucault called this milieu 
an apparatus (dispositif), Deleuze called it an assemblage (agencement). For Deleuze 
the ethical act is the identification, the evaluation, and the creation of modes of 
existence (Smith, 2012). To the first of these questions Deleuze and Guattari focus 
on the body and its capacity to affect and be affected, not as a subject, but as an 
assemblage. In this respect, in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, they identify four basic 
types of assemblage: so called ‘primitive’ societies; state apparatus; nomadic war 
machines; and, capitalism (Smith, 2012). None of these modes of existence exist in a 
‘pure form’; there is no reason why modes of existence (defined by their affects) 
cannot be established differently. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari urge that we look at 





They describe how the pursuits they variously name ‘schizoanalysis, micropolitics, 
pragmatism, diagrammatics, rhizomatics, cartography - have no other object than the 
study of these lines…to study their dangers, to mark their mixtures as well as their 
distinctions’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, pp.71-72, cited in Smith, 2012, p.156).  
 
I wonder where the definition of modes of existence, as delineated by their capacity 
to affect and be affected, leaves the task? If I think of affect as a wave or flow it 
seems hard to draw a line that separates ‘parts’ of even various ‘me’s. The lines are a 
line in that they come from an ‘other’ that constitutes me. That runs through me and 
onward of me. In the constituting event is where I gain some purchase, some say in 
what happens. It is here I must try not to be ‘unworthy’ of the event.  This ‘actor’ 
‘delimits the original, disengages from it an abstract line, and keeps from the event 
only its contour and its splendor, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events - a 
counter-actualization’. (Deleuze, 1990, p.150). This notion of counter actualization is 
the site of resistance. 
 
Deleuze’s concept of transcendental empiricism might be useful here, where the 
process described as a life is recognised by the differences between differences. In 
this respect it is difficult to talk of absolutes and the ‘identification’ of my modes of 
existence. The practice is therefore as much an identification as it is an act of 
creation and experimentation. Some examples come to mind, Kathleen Stewart 
(2007), for instance, describes herself in the third person, wrapped up in the everyday 
‘ordinary affects’ of life in America. In this way her modes of existence seem to be a 
post-self experiment in creating and describing a life affectively. Different again is 
what seems to be Clarice Lispector’s (1973) experiment in subjectification, where 
her modes of existence are painted, mirage-like and shifting, from page to page. One 
moment she writes ‘a fantastical world surrounds me and is me’ (p.60) and the next 
she is ‘a fruit eaten away by a worm’ (p.60). I’m still not sure how one creates and 
identifies modes, all at once. Perhaps you just do it. What does seem to be the case is 
that these are not autoethnographic accounts that identify and describe one’s life. 






According to Daniel Smith (2012) the second or perhaps proper task of an immanent 
ethics will be the evaluation of the modes of existence. For Smith (2012), if modes of 
existence are defined by their capacity to affect and be affected ‘then they can be 
evaluated by the manner in which they come into possession of their power’ (p.156). 
To this end, according to Smith, what an ethics of immanence criticises is ‘anything 
that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting’ (p.157). Deleuze and 
Guattari, building on Spinoza and Nietzsche, enact a political and ethical project 
across their oeuvre to reveal modes of thinking and transcendent concepts that limit a 
body’s ability to affect, or to go to the limits of what it can do. They identify how 
transcendence gets in the way, how it captures modes of thought, how representation 
is based on a logic of reason that is a construction built upon a state philosophy 
prescribing the real, the nature of moral judgment, difference as negation and what it 
is possible to think. This state philosophy binds us to the majoritarian order. 
According to Smith: 
 
 
When Spinoza and Nietzsche criticize transcendence, their interest is 
not merely theoretical or speculative (to expose its fictional or illusory 
status), but rather practical and ethical; far from being our salvation 
transcendence expresses our slavery and impotence at its lowest point. 
This is why Foucault would interpret [Deleuze and Guattari’s] Anti-
Oedipus as a book of ethics, in so far as it attempted to diagnose the 
contemporary mechanisms of “micro-fascism” – in psychoanalysis and 
elsewhere – that cause us to desire the very things that dominate and 
exploit us, and that cause us to fight for our servitude as stubbornly as 
though it were our salvation. (Smith, 2012, p.157, emphasis in original) 
 
 
Accordingly, in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari set 
about describing the conditions under which a mode of existence can come into full 
possession of its power, in effect creating a new mode of existence.  
 
Following this, it is an active form of affect, whereby bodies are capable of affecting 
themselves, that is required for the creation of new modes of existence. This seems 
the ethics of the diffractive practice I described earlier. With ‘autoaffection’ Deleuze 





(and his definition of a mode by its capacity to be affected and particularly the means 
by which to render active affections – where bodies’ affect themselves); and 
Nietzsche (and his concept of the will to power as the invention of ‘new possibilities 
for life’, as a ‘transvaluation of the value positing element’ in which Nietzsche 
criticises the guilt of sin in the transcendent moral judgment of Christianity (Smith, 
2012, p.157)). How does an affective body increase its affective capacities? 
According to Smith (2012, p.157) ‘the question of auto-affection is the object of 
some of Deleuze’s most difficult and penetrating passages’. This leaves me a little 
relieved that I find it so hard to follow, while at the same time being drawn forward 
by intrigue and hope in the possibilities it seems to suggest. The self, as defined 
affectively, affecting the self, as defined affectively, does seem complex. And yet the 
echoes of the other haecceities, of Becoming Rocked, Environing Education, and The 
Diffractive Practitioners also seem obvious to me. There is a refrain among and 




This is what process-oriented exploration does: complexify its 
conceptual web as it advances. It tries not to reduce. It tries not to 
encapsulate. It does not end in an overview. Rather, it works to become 
more and more adequate to the ongoing complexity of life. This means 
that it does not arrive at any final answers. It does not even seek 
solutions, It seeks to re-pose the problems life poses itself, always 
under transformation. The goal is to arrive at a transformational matrix 
of concepts apt to continue the open-ended voyage of thinking-feeling 
life’s processual qualities, foregrounding their proto-political 
dimensions and the paths by which it comes to full expression in 
politics (taking the world in the plural). (Massumi, 2015, p.xi) 
 
 
I’ve already used this quote in the thesis. Is it against the rules to use the same quote 
again? Why should it be? It’s different here, and yet is also a comforting reminder. In 
Becoming Rocked I drew on Mark Halsey and Noel Gough to consider that nature is 
the possible masquerading as the real. I wonder here if the same can be said of me as 
the subject, as a process of subjectification, where my modes of existence can, in 





becoming different in a manner that attempts to go to the limits of what it can do. 
This isn’t really about describing the ‘what is’ of my modes of existence, but creating 
the ‘what if’ of them (Gale, 2016).  
 
What follows is an attempt to auto-affect. To create new subjectivities by 
creating/identifying haecceitical modes of existence and to ask ‘what if’. I enact a 
conversation with haecceitical selves that follow their lines of desire. When I first 
started this attempt, I began to name the voices in the conversation. There was 
‘Theory-Dave’ who brought various authors points of view to the discussion. There 
was ‘Practitioner-Dave’ who wanted to know how to apply what was being 
discussed. There was also ‘Environmental-Dave’, for instance. But as the 
conversation progressed, as I talked to ‘myselves’, different voice, desires and 
agendas cropped up within the voices. I couldn’t hold one position in the face of the 
competing positions that wanted to come through, to crop up. The titles I had given 
the voices no longer ‘represented’ them. They were their own things in their 
becoming, not bound by a signifier that has been predetermined for them. So, I have 
removed these labels. Instead I present the flow practicing autoaffect. This will 






Some alien lines 
 
The view from the window was of the university playing fields. Green grass under 
blue skies. I remember this. Sitting at my desk in Chichester, I realised that I 
probably knew that I had failed my PhD by about the halfway point. It was coming 
up to summer 2009, my final year of study. As I packed the contents of my desk, 
looking back over what had happened over the previous three years, I wondered at 
my inability to either complete the thesis or to quit earlier, when I knew my heart 





These were not joyous days and I won’t dwell on the darkness I lived. Suffice to say 
that this memory, those memories of Chichester, of falling behind in my work, of 
friends leaving town, of my family being far away, of not possessing the faculties to 
get it, this, done, of judgment all around - real or imagined. Of the struggle with my 
then supervisors. The many, many memories. They hold me bodily; they affect me 
now. They may even be one of the most significant drivers in me arriving here, of 
this particular conceptual and physical space. That is an affective force. I can’t pin it 
down as the drive to attain a PhD. It is not as simple as a redemption question. There 
is no such simple explanation. I am here for many reasons, some serendipitous, some 
pushed by the flows the subject ‘Dave’ rides and plays upon. And yet, this me is with 






A bountiful line. A rich tapestry is frayed. Pull a thread. I stutter. A stutter. 
and…an overspill. The line is tripped, beyond yet of. I see it coming, take it and 






I’m sat in front of a computer right now. I can still feel the buzz of my late morning 
coffee. I’m looking forward to getting this piece of writing finished so I can go for 
lunch. I’m trying to balance the agendas of the other lines, which is itself a line. 
Maybe I’m day-to-day Dave. I remember that time as well. Our thesis, what there 
was of it, was about ethics and outdoor education. Sad times indeed! But, remember, 
you are creating modes here, not simply identifying them. You sound, if you don’t 
mind me saying, like a limit on what might happen. You claim to not be an attempt at 





these memories with guilt. Get past it. Break it open. Destroy it. ‘Which lines are you 
severing, and which are you extending or resuming?’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, 
p.203). Indeed, which? Perhaps this is an imperative. There is not one way to be a 
‘real academic’. A PhD, as a noun, is a transcendent attainment. It blocks you up and 
gets in the way if you think of it as anything other than a process whose title can be 
left behind. A PhD is not a quiddital category. No experience of doing a PhD is the 
same. Many people will need to go to a different degree of effort depending on how 
they match up with their subject area. Besides, people don’t get PhDs, assemblages 
do, it takes the right events to conspire together. The right place, the right topic, the 
right supervisors, even the right weather. I’ve quoted Haraway (2015) before, but 
she’s right: ‘[n]o species, not even our own arrogant one pretending to be good 
individuals in so-called modern Western scripts, acts alone; assemblages of organic 
species and of abiotic actors make history, the evolutionary kind and the other kinds 
too’ (p.159). 
 
I remember telling John, one of my supervisors here at Edinburgh, that I could not 
complete a traditional qualitative inquiry, I don’t have it in me to write that way. I 
know! I tried! Doing a PhD this way, thanks to the world that new reading has 
opened up to me, is easier. Not easy. Just easier, for me. It is here, in this mode that I 
find a joy. Tamsin Lorraine’s (2011) notes that an immanent ethics means that we 
realise we are not masters of the world, but that we can ‘attempt to be as skillful as 
we can be in working with the forces moving through and beyond us in ways that 
move us or increase our joyful power.’ (p.165). This is the counter-actualisation of 
the actor that Deleuze discusses in Logic of Sense, and I see this as meaning that our 












The glass of water comes to lips.  
A lip-glass-water-suction.  
The brittleness of glass.  
Where is the choice? 
I didn’t make it?  
It didn’t happen. 
Somewhere between an unconstituted two. 
A line of desire that makes and is made. 
A glow, fire like, picks up the sounds of my son.  






So, these are some (non-static, perhaps arbitrary, one telling, selecting them is a cut, 
they do certain things) of the modes of my existence. But they aren’t in ‘me’, rather 
they constitute me and extend virtually before and after my constitution. I become 
something of a dissipative structure. A propagation of lines of desire. I can’t pin 
down the subject as ‘me’ in this flow. As Massumi (1986, p.xii) points out: ‘What is 
the subject of the brick? The arm that throws it? The body connected to the arm? The 
brain encased in the body? The situation that brought brain and body to such a 
juncture? All and none of the above’. It is possible to pin down the subject at each 
point here, and yet each of these pinnings would be one telling of multiple possible 
stories. Further, these lines of desire can’t be judged against a moral principle to care 
for the environment. That impulse is already there within a vague amorphous Social-
Environmentalist-Dave who raises his head at times in relation to certain 
environmentally-culturally established ‘environmental issues’ that he finds affective, 
which carries embodied assumptions about the nature of the world, as if I am a thin 
sheet of metal hammered against the anvil of nature-culture. No doubt this ‘Dave’ 





course. That part of me can’t be cut out or reinserted depending on a moral code I 
choose to follow. It has come from somewhere and it is going somewhere. It is 
materially present within my modes of being already. The question is about how far I 
can go with it. How far my capacities allow me to become with it. ‘This is the sense 
in which becoming is the process of desire’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.272). But 






He’s surprised with joy. Or joy has surprised him. It is hard to tell which came 
first, if either needed to. Eyes so wide. How can a mouth be held in such a shape? 







Maybe I can help. Daniel Smith (2011) notes for instance that: 
Modes are no longer “judged” in terms of their degree of proximity to or 
distance from an external principle, but are “evaluated” in terms of the 
manner by which they “occupy” their existence: the intensity of their power, 
their “tenor” of life. It is always a question of knowing whether a mode of 
existence— however great or small it may be—is capable of deploying its 
capacities, of increasing its power of acting to the point where it can be said 
to go to the limit of what it “can do.” (Smith, 2011, p.67) 
 
What can my body do? This point raises questions about not just assessing 
qualitative modes of existence, but also of pushing the lines of desire, the drives of 






A Spinozan–Deleuzian notion of affect is inherently orientated toward a 
future of becoming-other. In a world in which individuality is defined 
according to the capacities afforded by a situation, “you do not know 
beforehand what a body or a mind can do” (Deleuze, 1988, page 125). A 
conventional conception of agency falls short in light of this statement, as it 
fails to grasp that an action is always an uncertain experiment with unknown 
capacities. (Roberts, 2012, p.2516). 
 
This becoming other is also becoming yourself. Difference in itself. Choice, or 
agency, remains an important part of ethical practice, but it is not the type of choice 
that we would attribute to a subject. Instead agency is distributed across human and 
nonhuman assemblages, or at least is not strongly situated only in a human body 







He fashions my choices. He lives here. On the screen. Inflection. Is this right? A 
line runs, it picks up speed and swells. Its origins are dispersed and untraceable, 
though a tuberous growth of capitalism rolls in its core.  
 
Another line. This one slight, narrow. Yet it is sharp. It comes at an angle, from 







Smith (2012) also touches on this problem, asking: ‘How can one evaluate modes of 





abandoning any basis for comparative evaluation?’. This is the heart of it. This is the 
question. It’s the ‘good’ problem (Massumi, 2015). How does an immanent ethics 
judge itself immanently? How can an immanent principle be followed and not attain 
the transcendent status that bring good and evil back? Smith goes on: 
 
It is this problem that lies at the heart of an ethics of immanence, and 
Deleuze’s response to it is a rigorous one. A mode of existence can be 
evaluated, apart from transcendental or universal values, by the purely 
immanent criteria of its power or capacity (puissance): that is, by the manner 
in which it actively deploys its power by going to the limit of what it can do 
(or on the contrary, by the manner in which it is cut off from its power to act 
and is reduced to powerlessness). (p.147-148) 
 
It is a qualitative judgement, not a binary one. It is a vector. Ethics is a movement to 






Be still, in the event. No. Become still in your becoming. Close your eyes. Play. 
Play at the borders of thought. Take the things. The hums. The pressures. The 
temperatures. The scents. Draw them through each other and constitute new 






And yet I am still left wondering about the very idea that an ethics can be written in 
this way, as an instruction which can be followed. Would this not make it 
transcendent again? In an early draft of this haecceity I initially thought that 
establishing what an immanent ethics meant for environmental ethics would give me 





scale thinking I want to now avoid. I think I see now that this idea depended on an 
immanent ethics prescribing something for me to follow (which would have then 
been transcendent, ultimately limiting what it is possible to do, getting in the way of 
creating new values). Immanent ethics seems to be much more about the present and 
my going as far as I can in my capacities, as a situated event. Here is the Möbius 
strip of immanent ethics. I stop and think about this for a moment and follow my 




When I am of immanence I see that any principle I abide by must be of the world 
itself. It has come from somewhere and is going somewhere and is always changing. 
Or rather, that there are principles manifesting of the world which are not objectively 
morally ‘right’ but which it is strongly my desire to adhere to. Anti-fracking, let’s 
say, is becoming of my body. Striations created by the flux of geology-people-
planet-history. For instance, looking after the environment…and there I go. I take a 
step into the dualism. Not that dualisms are bad per se, but that I want to explore 
beyond the constantly rehearsed ones here, or at least make different dualisms, even 
if by accident, to see what I might do differently. Rearrange the furniture. So, I bring 
my thoughts back anew. What about strong transcendent ethics? The ten 
commandments or the categorical imperative? The golden rule or rule utilitarianism? 
Aren’t these of the world also, despite their claims or aspirations to the contrary? 
Isn’t transcendence always grounded on a smooth space? Should I (not that it’s 
tempting) choose to stick to these moral laws, is that not also immanent and 
occurring of the world? By ‘buying into’ immanence this seems to become the case. 
It becomes the field or ground from which everything is drawn, no matter its claim to 
the contrary. Transcendent ethics is actually always immanent. It is not a separate 
category that is the negation of immanent ethics. Immanent ethics is difference in 
itself (this is like the problem with inquiry, positivist inquiry is located on an 
immanent plane, even if it doesn’t realise it). If I follow the ten commandments I will 
always pick up a bible, glance at the page and read. This is a material process of the 





and non-repeatable. The rules are not cookie-cutter replications. They are different 
each time they are read and enacted. And yet, something binds the repetition. There 
is not a radical departure of the events of one instance of ‘you shall have no Gods 
before me’ to the next. But the process between them is one of becoming. Or rather. 
The line along which the events occur are related. Here’s the intractable Möbius strip 
of immanent and transcendent ethics. The figuration of the Möbius strip is useful for 
thinking about dualisms. Named after August Ferdinand Möbius, the ‘strip’ is an 
object which has the property of only having one surface and one edge. Interestingly 
when I look at any one point of the strip, I can see that it has an opposite side, and 





To make a Möbius strip, take a strip of paper, rotate one end of it 180° and join it to 
the other end of the strip. 
 
Lacan proposed the Möbius strip as an alternative to various dualisms in 
psychoanalysis, including love/hate, inside/outside and truth/appearance. Palombi 
(2009, p.356) draws on Lacan’s use of the Möbius strip to suggest that there ‘is no 
identity but only a process of identification that accompanies us throughout our 
existence, obliging us to reflect and to redefine, in every single point, that which 
belongs to us and that which is extraneous’. The Möbius strip as a path of life is a 





resides. The Möbius strip is also put to work by Elizabeth Grosz to think beyond the 
mind/body dualism. She draws on Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari to 
‘undermine the pretensions of consciousness to know itself, to exert a guiding 
direction, to be the site of rationality’ (Grosz, 1994, p.xiii). It’s not surprising to find 
someone who has thought of the Möbius strip as a useful figuration for reflective 
practice in education (Kidd, 2015). The Möbius strip, as well as the concept of affect, 
works well to help me think about environmental ethics as an eventing process 
without a subject. Not as a saviour to replace all, but as an experiment to see what it 






I make and follow the lines.  
They catch the inside-outside of me.  
That attempt.  
That first attempt at a PhD.  
It weighs in me. Heavy and heavy.  
Get free of it. Kill it off. 
That last Christmas. I never wanted to end. 
To go back to University.  
To the campus, hiding.  
A pile of unfinished marking. 
Nocturnalism. 
 
Now, a weight from the past and a weight from the future meet in event. 
 
Desertification stretches forward.  





The world is changing. 
‘So what? Worlds change.’ 
Not like this. 






Why am I stuck on this? On ethics? The transcendent, single I of ‘Dave’ may limit 
my capacity to affect and be affected, but it is ethics, ethics itself that debilitates me. 
The constant desire to attain the way to do it. I know ethics is not ‘out there’, and yet 
I keep trying to find it. The ought of ethics is stuck in me. My conception of ethics 






2018. It’s the hottest day in May for some time. I have been at a reading group 
this morning. We are reading A Thousand Plateaus, slowly, over months. We are 
doing other things as well. Exploring what it is we are doing. The thisness of it. 
We are writing to help explore this. I find these meetings buoy my feelings about 
work. I haven’t written about these reading groups in this thesis, yet. But now I 
feel I need to. Just a little. Just to get it out. This doesn’t feel like it’s for them, 
though I know Jonathan, at least, will read this.  Nonetheless, I want to write 
this.  
Today I come away affected in a different way. I think I upset somebody. They 
said as much. I’m not sure what happened. I thought I was in a space that 
perhaps I wasn’t. Or perhaps others weren’t. I’ve been walking. It’s the hottest 





written there, after our reading, after they’d said it, and I stopped for a moment. 
The most unplaceable of sensations. I’d missed a step. Fallen through something 






These practices, these experiments will always be of a minor type.  Affect is the 
theory, or practice, of examining the manner in which bodies are affected and affect. 
Agency is present throughout the process of affect in the sense that bodies are called 
to act by their material capacities and the virtual real. The (post)human, as a 
particular propagation of materiality, is a body with its own affective capacities 
among other bodies, as material propagations, with their own affective capacities. In 
this sense affect is nondeterministic as ‘rather than avoiding human intentionality 
altogether, the challenge is to situate it within a wider ontology of nonhuman forces’ 
(Roberts, 2012, p.2520). According to Brian Massumi (2015, p.3) the use of the term 
‘affect’ allows: 
 
a way of talking about that margin of manoeuvrability, the ‘where we 
might be able to go and what we might be able to do’ in every present 
situation. I guess ‘affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope’. One of the 
reasons it’s such an important concept for me is because it explains why 
focusing on the next experimental step rather than the big utopian 
picture isn’t really settling for less. It’s not exactly going for more, 
either. It’s more like being right where you are – more intensely. 
 
Bowden (2015) depicts the Deleuzian approach to agency by distinguishing between 
voluntaristic and expressive notions of agency: 
 
The key idea behind the expressive conception of agency is that actions 
are in some sense primary in relation to the intentions that animate 
them. This is what sets the expressive conception apart from 
‘voluntaristic’ approaches to agency, where intentions are thought of as 






Bowden (2015) explains that, from a voluntarist perspective, an action is split into 
two separate elements: an intention, followed by a physical movement. Further from 
the voluntarist perspective the agent in an action has a ‘privileged and unrevisable 
access to this prior and causally efficacious intention, which is accordingly more or 
less fully specified in the agent’s mind’ (2015, p.75). This is agency as we commonly 
understand it, and as it is most often conceived in relation to normative ethical 
decision making. It’s also the way I generally understand my actions in the world. 
For instance it’s what I think happens when ‘I decide’ to write this sentence. For 
Bowden (2015) in an expressivist understanding of agency an agent’s  
 
intention is not incorrigibly known by the agent, and is not artificially 
separable from the action itself, such as this unfolds, and produces 
effects, in shared or public space. In other words, for an expressivist, to 
say that actions are primary with respect to intentions is to say that 
actions ‘express’ (or ‘manifest’, or ‘communicate’) their agent’s 
intentions, and at two levels. Firstly, intentions are said to be 
ontologically inseparable from the unfolding of the actions that 
manifest them in the actual world. Secondly, the action from which an 
intention is inseparable is non-isolatable from a public ‘expressive 
medium’ in which the meaning and purpose of the action can be 
articulated and clarified. (Bowden, 2015, p.75) 
 
In this regard, Bowden perceives a distinction between agents and patients in 
Deleuze’s writing. In my reading, Bowden seems to agree with, for instance, Jane 
Bennett, that we cannot locate an intentionality solely within the human. However, 
he then seeks to place an intentionality elsewhere within a receptive social milieu 
which interprets an actor’s intentionality. I agree that this interpretation takes place 
(as I have already stated, that I decided to write this is what I commonly think, and 
what those who read it will commonly interpret), but this does not mean that 
intentionality needs to occur, in a concrete sense, be ontologically inseparable from 











It’s the hottest day in May for some time. Edinburgh buzzes. Not like the 
summer. Not so busy. But there is life everywhere, in this heat. The buildings 
direct my path, I avoid their shadows and soak the sun up. The bus? Not today. I’ll 
walk home. At least, I’ve found myself walking.  
 
Lundy (2014) thinks that life is best lived as a practice of strolling. He says this is 
an ethical practice: 
 
Deleuze thinks the best sort of life is a light and active one that is 
lived as an exploration of our own bodies, our own desires. In other 
words, as I have said, an ethical life is very much like a stroll through 
life. It is about affirming becoming, multiplicity, and chance. It is 
about expanding horizons, through new possibilities and new 
connections. It is about finding out what is possible for us, what our 
minds/bodies can do. It is about being bold in the face of chance and 
the arbitrary and irregular flows of life. Instead of forcing ourselves 
into a particular mold that will shape our life to resemble some 
prescribed model of "the good life" we need to recognize that this 
model is a fantasy and that we must rupture the mold in order to 
find the truly good life that lies beyond it. (Lundy, 2014, n.p.) 
 
 
As I stroll I think of John Lundy’s paper. I think of the virtual real before me, the 
opportunities it affords. This seems to jar with ethical prescriptions to: recycle, 
drive less, eat well. To fit into an ‘environmentalist’ mold, a ‘good citizen’. That is, 
of course, unless I think of these things as enabling my capacities, rather than 
closing down my choices. I stop at traffic lights. Wait for the green man. ‘My 
choices’, the haecceitical self’s preferences are dispersed beyond, and lay 










Now, be careful not to critique Bowden (2015) in a negative sense, remember, you’re 
supposed to be being creative! Think instead about what his text does. It’s made you 
write what you’ve written for instance, that and the desire line that you are springing 





I missed a step. Is it getting hotter, this May day? I’ve been speaking to Gemma 
and now, as I hang up, I feel the heat worry me. It troubles me. I missed a step, 
and I am airborne. The liminal space of wake dreaming, and the sudden fall. 
It is the constant shadow. The question that lies behind everything, hanging in 
the air – quite literally. 
 
I look down. My legs sway below me. The bright ground drops beneath me as I 
rise. The buildings fight the brightness with their grey; could they be cleaned 
with a pressure washer? How would they look? 20 foot up, I see the road, a 
thinning line below.  
 
It is in the line of environmental care that the struggle takes place. It meets the 






Yes, I struggle with that too, the generous critique. Anyway, when I think of my 
agency I must think of what I’m capable of doing, I don’t have a radical freedom to 
be other than I am. The virtual is real, just not yet actual. I am a multiplicity of 
competing desires. There’s you, for instance, a type of ‘post-qualitative-Dave’. You 
seem to really want to understand this way of thinking. And there are others, some of 





the loner, the friend, none of which are strictly delineated, each of which with its 
own genealogy which is also a geology in that it is laid down as strata through a 
complex process of becoming. Through me-in-the-human-natural-cultural-milieu the 
world is stratified into various understandings and desires which are spatially 
expressed. It seems it is in the interpretation of these desires that Bowden sees a 
socially produced post-hoc ‘expressive’ intentionality. For me, however, 
intentionality seems too strong a term. I instead think of myself as the result of 
flailing and anticipating. Attempting and wishing. Desiring. Realising what just 






He’s there when I get home, of course. ‘Welcome to the end of being alone 
inside your mind’, as Brandi Carlisle puts it. But I, we, were never alone, nor inside 
our minds. Our bodies don’t even end at our skin. What is skin but stuff of the 
world? His was of another body; Gemma’s. Why should a gap of air make a 
difference? We’re already full of air. This otherness lives in me, is growing of me. 






Deleuze and Guattari (2004) discuss the process by which stratification of desire 
occurs as consisting of both content and expression. They call this a double 
articulation. I understand content as the realm of the selective processes that lay 
down the strata and expression as the manner in which the formed content is 
presented. Deleuze and Guattari suggest this double articulation of content and 
expression is present at all levels of existence, be it culturally, organically or 





each other in processes of becoming organised by abstract machines, meaning that no 
level of strata is superior to any other. Deleuze and Guattari discuss these ideas in the 
third Plateau, 10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does The Earth Think It 
Is?). This seems a play on the title of Friedrick Nietzsche’s book On the Genealogy 
of Morality. On the Genealogy of Morality is an historical analysis of the 
development of moral values as an idea. Whilst Deleuze and Guattari do not mention 
the book, or Nietzsche, in their third Plateau, it seems as if theirs is an explanation of 
the process by which all things come about in physically processual ways, including, 
and this seems inferred and not stated plainly, human morality. So it seems to me that 
whereas Deleuze and Guattari attempt to demonstrate the content of becoming, 
Nietzsche attempts to demonstrate its various expressions in the form of the 
becoming (genealogy) of modern western moral values. That is, where Nietzsche 
explains what has happened in the history of modern western reasoning about moral 
values, Deleuze and Guattari offer an explanation of the process by which this came 
about, applicable not only to moral values, but to the laying down of islands and river 
beds and the morphogenesis of snouts to mouths, and then language. The link to the 
concept of ‘anthropocene’, where human actions/intentions can be understood as 
geological, seems resonant. Nonetheless both approaches demonstrate how the moral 
is something that exists apart from the idea of me as a morally responsible actor. I am 
suffused within the flow that creates me, and so, in this regard at least, my agency is 
dissipated. Of the world. Interestingly I would place the various strains of my 







How many ‘me’s have I been today? 
Whose interests have I manifested? 
Perhaps 2, 3, 4? More? 





‘Me’s are amorphous. A multiplicity. Endlessly shimmering selves whose 
boundaries cannot be mapped.  
A raw edge fades.  
A self lunges forward, only to be subsumed by another, and another. 






This seems more productive. You’re saying that whilst your agency may be 
distributed to, for instance, your mobile phone as an object34, as it decides which 
news notifications to update you with, or leaving you behind entirely, we might talk 
of the agency occurring in any thing that gains its power by holding your attention. 
You’re talking about your agency being split around competing lines of desire? Can 






Maybe I can help here. Let’s start with suffering. Making my way to and from work 
in Edinburgh I pass underneath a railway bridge. This is a dark and smelly place. It is 
wet from the rainwater that seeps through from the track above. And it is busy with 
traffic which either seems to be queueing from the nearby traffic lights or speeding 
well above the 20 mile an hour limit. It is also a place that is alive with pigeons. I 
like pigeons as examples of species that confuse a strict urban/natural divide. I also 
like the way they demonstrate the processness of their ongoing coming into being of 
places. Their intra-actions of mating, dancing, bin-scrap collecting, and defecating. I 
can also see beauty in them, their blackboard-chalk rubbed bodies which sparkle 
                                                 
34





around the fatness of the males’ necks in iridescent greens and purples, as they bob 
to attract females. Or bully them. It’s hard to tell what’s going on. But I also find 
pigeons frustrating. When I walk through crowded streets with pigeons on the ground 
they always seem to evade people’s feet in the most unreasonable manner possible, 
finding themselves cornered and then needing to burst into flight from under me and 
into my face. I don’t like this. And yet, at the same time, I do. Under this bridge, 
however, it is the echoing coos from above that betray what threatens to fall on me as 
I pass underneath and makes me pull my collar close and dislike pigeons again. A 
few weeks ago, as I reached the bridge on my walk home from the office, I stopped 
at the sound of erratic flapping. In the middle of the road was a pigeon, wings at odd 
angles, desperately trying to get into the air. A car passes, and then another, barely 
missing the bird. It’s desperate. What happens to me now? I feel its fear. Or 
something comes up within me in such a way when I see the desperate bird, and if I 
had to label it I might call it fear, but this doesn’t seem to do it, the process, justice. 
Scratch that. Something comes at my body from the desperate bird in such a way as 
to change me. Scratch that. My body reacts to the sights of the desperate bird. 
Scratch that. Body reacts to sights of. Scratch that. Body-changes is sight of 
desperate-bird. Scratch that. Body-desperate-bird.  
 
Can I reach it? The road’s busy, and I’m behind a barrier. Is it making its way to the 
side? No. What does it say about me if I don’t do something? (I promise I thought 
this). Can I use this in my thesis? (I thought this too). There’s a space, maybe I can 
reach it, could I stop a car? What would I do with a broken pigeon? RSPB. There’s a 
thud and some feathers float in the air. An environing education.  
 
If I think of the experience of having these thoughts arise in me, they seem to come 
all at once and yet separately, they arise from different directions, with different 
hopes attached to them, or perhaps latching on to them. I distinctly recall wondering 
if this experience and my inaction is representative of the way I respond to 
environmental degradation occurring around me more generally. And then thinking 
that, ‘well the pigeon is just an articulation of the world here, and now the world’s 





flat ecological ethics. However, this last thought that occurred to me is, I feel, 
outweighed by the affective charge that constituted me, and the tone of the event of 
wanting to help the bird and ease its suffering is one that I prefer, as a mode of 
existence. The preference is moralistic and empathetic, it is a learned, naturalcultural, 
but is also a mode of existence that extends my joyful capacity. I feel somewhat lost 
again. Perhaps a flat ecology doesn’t work ethically on a plane of reason. Perhaps 
trying to explain it is pointless. Perhaps it requires a plane of affect. 
 
So, did one of these modes of existence outweigh the other, and trump it so to speak? 
Was the agency of one of the lines of desire that gave rise to my thoughts successful, 
whilst another not? I don’t think so, instead there is the tacking of the sail boat, or the 
paddling of the canoe. Each thought-feeling pushed against the other, was assessed 
by another, and gave rise to the event of cars passing, pigeons flying, or not, and me 
standing there doing nothing, and then writing this. If I think of the lines of desire 
that constitute me as kin to the lines that force the car to move, the pigeon to duck 
under my feet, or fly up into the air, I can think of a world full of moving desires. 
Here, agency itself does not exist solely in the human actor but is rather spread in the 
things with which we are imbricated. Note: I don’t turn to suffering as a moral base 
from which to build. I did not rationalise the pigeon’s suffering and imagine myself 
in its position. Rather, suffering constituted me through fear, pain, and panic, as an 
affective force. But these feelings don’t exist in me individually, they are part of the 
collective social force of humaning which my body undergoes. They are 
naturalcultural. I am not in relation to a pigeon, which is out there somewhere, I am 
wrapped up with the thisness which is a me-pigeon process35. The phrase ‘I am a 






                                                 





Ok, but this doesn’t seem like a straightforward explanation. Something feels opaque 





Well, the non-organic has a form of agency. Jane Bennet surmises the notion of 
material agency in this way: 
 
 
the agency of assemblages of which I speak is not the strong kind of 
agency traditionally attributed to humans or God. My contention, 
rather, is that if one looks closely enough, the productive impetus of 
change is always a congregation. As my friend Ben Corson helped me 
to see, not only is human agency always already distributed to ‘our’ 
tools, microbes, minerals and sounds. It only emerges as agentic via its 
distribution into the ‘foreign’ materialities we are all too eager to figure 
as mere objects. (Bennett, in Khan, 2009, p.93). 
 
 
So, whilst humans can be responsible, they are never solely responsible. Again, 
Donna Haraway notes that all things make history, not just humans. The railing and 
the passing cars are not impassive objects that stop me, the subject, from heading out 
to the pigeon. They are lines of desire enacted by/of the world. That is not to say they 
are right or moral, but they are immanent. Jane Bennet’s notion of agency goes 
further still in the dissipation of the moral agent. And yet her intention is clearly 
political: 
 
Would politics become less centred around the punitive project of 
finding individual human agents responsible for the public problems of, 
say, an electricity blackout or an epidemic of obesity, and more 
concerned with identifying how the complex human–nonhuman 
assemblage that’s churning out the negative effect holds itself together 
– how it endures or feeds itself? Until we do that, political attempts to 
remedy the problem are likely to be ineffective. (Bennett, in Khan, 







To this end, I should blame myself (what there is of it) less than I do (or the 
Environmentally-concerned-Dave should blame himself less than he does), as the 
responsibility for suffering is distributed among material events (including of him). 
In short, the identification of an ‘himself’ as an a priori category is an ontological 
mistake. What is being contested with the idea of affect: 
 
are the peculiarities inherited through the notion of ‘man’ that came 
into consciousness at the time of the Renaissance. This is the idea of 
man, heightened by Kant into a self-conscious, autonomous, 
individuated being – who, in the capacity for rationality was elevated 
above nature, and with it other species, by his [sic] accounting to the 
self for the self. (Latimer and Miele, 2015, p.8) 
 
 
The medium by which events of desire come together to create possibilities is that of 
affect. Affect is used here not as ‘emotion’, but rather in the Spinozan sense of the 
capacity to affect and be affected. This is because, as Deleuze recognised, Spinoza 
rejects the mind-body dualism and ‘the assumption that the mind can control the 
passionate body’ (Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015, p.240). The ontology of affect is 
intimately associated with its epistemology and its ethics. With affect, there are no 
positive or negative connotations, no good or evil, as to place such judgements upon 
it would be to moralise from the outside: 
 
 
Spinoza makes a distinction between morality and an ethics. To move 
in an ethical direction…is not to attach positive or negative values to 
actions based on a characterization of classification of them according 
to a pre-set system of judgment. It means assessing what kind of 
potential they tap into and express. Whether a person is going to joke or 
get angry when they are in a tight spot, that uncertainty produces an 
affective change in the situation. That affective loading and how it 
plays out is an ethical act, because it affects where people might go or 








This ethics is epistemological because it affects the nature of critique as well as the 
location of knowledge, which cannot be in the mind alone; knowledge becomes real, 
ontological. And so, epistemology is rendered worldly, affective, and political, in 
effect becoming an ethico-onto-epistemological matter (Barad, 2007). With affect it 
is no longer possible to pin down a position, to then scrutinise its identity as tenable 
or not.  To do so ‘is an almost sadistic enterprise that separates something out, 
attributes set characteristics to it, then applies a final judgement to it – objectifies it, 
in a moralizing kind of way’ (Massumi, 2015, p.14-15). Rather Massumi (2015) 
suggests a need for ‘other kinds of practices that might not have so much to do with 
mastery and judgement as with affective connection and abductive participation’. In 
academic work: 
 
...it requires a willingness to take risks, to make mistakes and even to 
come across as silly. Critique is not amenable to that. And it suffers as a 
consequence. A critical perspective that tries to come to a definitive 
judgement on something is always in some way a failure, because it is 
happening as a removed from the process it’s judging. Something could 
have happened in the intervening time, or something-barely perceptible 
might have been happening away from the centre of critical focus. 
(Massumi, 2015, p.15) 
 
This is an ethical movement of affect, because one can’t tell what the outcome is 
going to be. ‘So you have to take care, because an intervention that is too violent can 
create rebound effects that are unpredictable to such a degree that it can lead to 
things falling apart rather than reconfiguring’ (Massumi, 2015, p.43). Ethics must 
therefore be carried out in a minor key, or using a minor voice (or in this case minor 
voices!). Practice must be micropolitical. Roberts (2012) suggests two main 
implications of affect. Firstly that ‘we can no longer grant the human subject a 
monopoly over creative intervention in the world’ and secondly that ‘new 
materialists raise fundamental questions regarding modes of human intervention, 
such that we can no longer grant the mind a monopoly over the body’ (Roberts, 






Beyond challenging the mind–body dualism, this highlights the 
dynamic capacities of the body. This is a question of the body’s power 
to affect and be affected by other bodies, independently of any will 
power of the mind. Moreover, it involves a complex reality of affective 
relations between bodies who all seek the good, powerful and joyful life 
by enhancing their capacity to affect and be affected by others. (2015, 
p.241) 
 
So here I am exploring the lines of desire I have identified and some of the manners 
in which my capacities along these lines are affective and affecting both between 






What is the affective double move? Floating above Edinburgh. 400 feet up. I feel 
the slightest of breezes on this, one of the warmest days on record for May. I 
reach out and take the city by its corners. I find its corners and lift it up. Pull it up 
close to me. I feel David Hume Tower first. It touches my chest, gently folding 
against me. The cars do not slide or fall as I wrap myself in the city. They seem 
stuck in their places, as do the people; magnetised and yet going about their 
lives. Salisbury Crags become my collar, as I pull Edinburgh Castle, atop the 
Drumlin hood, over my head. The cloak city is warm and buzzing. It hums a warm 
compost of life. I sit in the cloak city and place my hand gently inside the pocket. 
My fingers touch a shape: it is Gemma and I arriving in 2015, looking for 
somewhere to live. My fingers trace a line and find my first supervisory meeting; 
they feel my hopes and they pull away. My palm brushes tiny sculptures of our 










This makes sense to me, but I am left with a wonder about where the value is placed 
in a quote like this. The problem is one I return to throughout this haecceity; it is a 
‘good’ question (Massumi, 2015): Who dictates the preferred micro/macro-politics, 
even if I try to operate at the micropolitical level? What would be different about 







The city cloak feels hotter now on this May day. I worry for the people. I reach for 
the collar, but there is no button or zip. I look down to my feet to try to lift the 
cloak, but I see it does not end. The city cloak turns to fields and the rising 
Pentlands ahead of me, the hot sun unrelenting. I turn to lift the city cloak from 
behind, but there is the Firth of Forth, stretching out the Scottish Coast and the 







Here is one answer: I think, perhaps, that plucking this question out of the material 
implications of asking it, as if it doesn’t matter if you step out of politics for a 
second, to consider ‘what is of value?’ too far, may be a risk. It matters, physically, 
what questions I ask, or perhaps how long I spend asking them. I am an activist in 
that I am acting in the world already, micropolitically. I am eventing. I talk to people; 
it has fallout. I buy food; it has fallout. I eat meat; it has fallout. I drive my car; it has 
fallout. I drive my car less; it has fallout. I walk; it has fallout. I smile as I hold the 





when the rain is hitting my tent at 5 o’clock in the morning, the group is tired of 
walking, the sun isn’t risen, the ascent to come is steep, the rain drums harder, I sing, 
loud, happily, ‘build me up buttercup’; it has fallout.  
 
It’s not only that spending three years wondering about the correct macro-political 
direction might be the ‘wrong’ thing to do. It’s that I can’t stop being micropolitical. 
Even by not doing anything particularly micropolitical I have an effect. If I spend too 
long wondering how to become a piece of resistance, I resist nothing and am 






My finger is being held. The lightest of firm grasps. I’m sure he is sleeping. I look 
down at my arm and follow it into the pocket. As I walk inside the heat is stifling. 
The light of the sun is behind me as I head deeper. I walk along my wrist to him. 






St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016) describe how the American Psychological 
Association, the people whose referencing convention I am currently following, 
aided the American government in the torturing of prisoners at Guantanamo:  
 
 
On a larger scale, millions of refugees flee their countries fearing 
torture, rape, famine, and death, and wealthy nation states refuse them, 
fearing the Other who is too Other. On a global scale, the 
Anthropocene, the newest geological era, scientifically confirms and 





planet. Front page news articles report devastation from melting ice 
caps, floods, droughts, hurricanes, and tornadoes caused by 
deteriorating climate conditions we can’t unwind, reverse. Even 
science, long the cure for the problems of human existence, can’t fix 
this one. Man-made destruction of the planet is underway, and it’s not a 
stretch to say we’re now living in a disaster movie….What kind of 
existence have we created? What conditions have produced such a 
profound failure of ethics? Is it possible to imagine a different 
existence, a more ethical mode of being? (e.g., see Braidotti, 2013a). 
How we think existence, the nature of being, ontology, is a profoundly 
ethical issue, one that becomes increasingly urgent. (St. Pierre, Jackson 




St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei are articulating a current which runs through this 
thesis: that our ontological assumptions impact our ways of being in the world, and 
our ethical possibilities. The idea of environmental degradation as a problem of mind 
is not new to environmental education. For instance, Michael Bonnett (2012) 
describes two prevailing responses to environmental crisis. The first is based on how 
we might continue to meet current ends in a more intelligent way, with no 
fundamental change in our conception of our relationship with the world, the second 






So, as a line of desire, you are drawing on post-qualitative literature which has an 
ethical orientation within it. This is to be expected from you as you will defer to the 
academic discourse to provide solutions to political problems. Here you perceive an 
overlapping in the manner in which post-qualitative literature, in this case St. Pierre, 
Jackson and Mazzei (2016), position the political possibilities of post-qualitative 
research with literature in environmental education, which suggests that there is a 
fundamental political issue: namely that of the possibilities our current modes of 
thought, or our image of thought, allows – the crisis of perception. You, as you 





Rocked, seeking to demonstrate how the dissolving of boundaries (i.e. nature and 
culture) somehow solves the problem of a crisis of perception, opening up the 
potential for pushing the ‘limits of the possible’. This seems a similar case that St. 
Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016) are putting forward, writing ‘outside’ of the 
discipline of environmental education. Your capacities derive from the literature you 
come across and your inclination to attempt a form of academia that you have 
learned from your academic education. For you, we are embodied and embedded in 
the materiality of the world, including in our research performances/practices 
(MacLure, 2013). Knowledge is thus always situated and contextual, but is also 
always a political and thus ethical performance (Kruger, 2016): 
Because we gain knowledge through unfolding with/in the world, all 
our research endeavours are affective and as such always already 
political. That is, they concern power relations (in the Spinozist sense). 
This means that they are also ethical. It is, however, an ethics that 
moves beyond recognition of the other based on a shared vulnerability 
towards an affirmative ethics based on interconnectedness, co-poiesis 
and becoming-with the other. In conducting research, we need to 
carefully consider whether the relations we enter into, and the relations 
we make possible through our research – human and nonhuman, 
organic and inorganic – are sustainable and extend the power of the 
other to act to its fullest degree. (Kruger, 2016, p.88) 
Objects do not pre-exist encounter, and so it is not ‘interconnection’. Nonetheless, 
the environmental affect of all methodology is its political pedagogy. There is an 






Hold on, all this stuff about ‘interconnectedness, co-poiesis and becoming-with’, 















Right, remember you’re of the plane of immanence. Upon this plane ‘Deleuze and 
Guattari appeal to the immanent criterion, inspired by Spinoza and Nietzsche, of 
affirming the active and joyous extension of our power for action in the assemblage 
of which we form constituent parts’ (Lorraine, 2011, p.115).  So this ‘co-poiesis’, 
etc, is a situated practice, which is not to say a local one per se, as effects occur 
















It seems to me as if the notion of becoming is important here. If we think of ‘co-
poiesis’ as a self-making between two, as the terms ‘interconnectedness’ and 
‘becoming-with’ also suggest, we retain the notion of two beings distinguished a 
priori, which are then related. But Deleuze’s notion of increasing my capacities to 
act, my power to act, operates on an immanent plane devoid of beings. Difference as 
affirmative, rather than negative, means that the plane is in flux and motion, or 
becoming. So, to increase my capacities to affect, I can’t just extend myself willy-
nilly to pregiven categories of difference, but have to ‘hook-up’ with what is 
happening. Tamsin Lorraine (2011, p.120) puts it like this:  
The increase in power at issue for Spinoza is thus not that of conquest, 
mastery, or control, but rather of composing relations with other bodies 
that require no diversion of one’s power into warding off the effects of 






So, this ethics seems like a compromise in which you match up with the flows of the 






I remember receiving this email from student I had never met, Randy Campbell, 
and feeling empowered. Feeling like the work I had done had affected. Randy 
sent me a link to a YouTube video in which he presented his work. My capacity to 
affect had come back and affected me. I seemed to spread out in some way. Was 





of my supervisors felt that it might seem like I was trying to prove my approach, 
using emails as evidence in some way. I suppose that is true. This email felt like 
becoming an academic. My power to affect was being evidenced by the email. It 
was an opposite feeling to the one I got when I read Professor Bill Scott’s blog 
post – I will come to this. But this spreading out, this getting out of myself as 
inaffectual; I felt this same spreading out when I heard from Colin Wood. Colin, 










I thought I might drop you a note to say that I used your article 
yesterday as part of a third year module on Environmental 
Approaches to Outdoor Adventure. The students pre-read for 
the lecture, identified key arguments and defined the terms in 
small groups, I guided them through some key passages and 
then they considered the implications alongside last week's 
reading (Hill and Brown 2014) in small student led debates. 3 
hours of concentrated study! 
 
As you can imagine they approached it with considerable 
trepidation as it is a very hard read, but really got a lot out of it - 
indeed one lad took me aside afterwards to say that it had really 
changed his whole way of thinking.    
 
Next week i have set them Phil Mullin's paper (2014)  on 
conceptualising skills within a participatory ecological approach, 
so there is a bit of a conceptual shift ... hopefully they will 
critique that with relation to your paper and that should spark 






So, many thanks - nice to read an article that is prepared to 
explore an original line of thought in a literature that too often 
relies on emotional understanding of terms (place, nature etc) 
and thus rushes to conclusions without questioning either 
ontology or theoretical foundations. 
 
all the best 
Colin  






Now, this is affective in the way that teaching so often is. The sensation that you 
have made a difference. That you have played a part in forging ‘a people yet to 
come’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p.345). But the ethics of affect are 
multidirectional: ‘it had really changed his whole way of thinking’. I am reminded of 
my time on Walney Island with Jamie, and with the students. Concepts are powerful 







But it is not a you to you. It is the eventing that has sent out this affective line. ‘…the 
earth asserts its own powers of deterritorialization, its lines of flight, its smooth 











Another way I become alien is by making music. I write songs about constituting 
myself; about relationships to things and places, and how they affect me36. I’ve been 
writing songs throughout the process of doing my PhD. The songs are about doubt, 
about trying to find a position to which to relate. Sleepless nights, the effects of new 
knowledge, losing weight and becoming strange. Knowing things all along. And yet 
not knowing what’s happening. Slowly finding things. Support of loved ones. 
Catching a little self in the fire. Building bones. In the process of writing, playing 
and recording I feel grounded somehow. Deleuze’s concept of the refrain is an 
obvious example. 
 
You’ve got me all in pieces,  
Walking on my squares now 
And low, 
Telling me which way to go 
 
Writing these songs is political in a minor sense. At home. Reading. I stop and look 
around the room. I feel something. An absence that I know how to fill. Not as harsh 
as this though. It’s more like something tugs at me, and I know that responding will 
ease me. I’ve done it before. The tug gets stronger. In writing music - in the moment, 
as I play, not with a pen and paper, but with a guitar, somewhere to sit, and a view 
out of a window – in writing music, I hook up to the events of a life. I take them, 
those things that affect me, that threaten me now. This is a space where the selves 
that need allaying can be counter-actualised.  
 
I pick up my guitar and place it on my lap. It’s better already. Pull up my sleeve. Left 
hand to the neck and the warm smooth wood. There, that’s it. Fingers to strings. And 
play. I’m somewhere, someone else, immediately.  
 
                                                 







The arts produce and generate intensity, that which directly impacts the 
nervous system and intensifies sensation. Art is the art of affect more 
than representation, a system of dynamized and impacting forces rather 
than a system of unique images that function under the regime of signs. 
By arts, I am concerned here with all forms of creativity or production 
that generate intensity, sensation, or affect. (Grosz, 2008, p. 3, cited in 






So, after all this, what is an immanent ethics? Perhaps I’ve formed the question 
incorrectly. Ethics is not a what, but a this. It’s this attempt, right here. It is probably 
any attempt to increase the capacities to affect and be affected. The obvious space for 
these ethical attempts are in minoritarian contexts, where majoritarian discourses and 
structures don’t allow for the idiosyncrasies of the world to each increase their 
powers to affect. That’s why Deleuze’s ethics is an ecological one, because if we all, 
each thing as haeccetical moment-events, are to increase our powers to affect and be 
affected, then no one overriding story can be given too much power. No person, no 
state, no ideology, no philosophy, no paradigm or research approach, and certainly 
no ethics. An immanent ethics is one of plurality and monism. It is an attempt to 
think outside thought. To overcome transcendent assumptions of the logic of thought. 
It senses the folly of looking outside the world for stable structures that might pin 
down a single story of the world, yet it recognises the multiplicity of reality. 
Massumi notes that many philosophers have attempted to think a nomadic thought, 
drawing particular attention to Spinoza: 
 
A Thousand Plateaus is an effort to construct a smooth space of 
thought. It is not the first such attempt. Like State philosophy, nomad 














I opened this haecceity by quoting Deleuze and Guattari (2004). By having them 
speak through and for me. But this isn’t really a speaking for. It’s more of a speaking 
together. A speaking with. I want to finish the haecceity by continuing that quote, 
where it left off: 
 
I always depend on a molecular assemblage of enunciation that is not 
given in my conscious mind, any more than it depends solely on my 
apparent social determinations, which combine many heterogeneous 
regimes of signs. Speaking in tongues. To write is perhaps to bring this 
assemblage of the unconscious to the light of day, to select the 
whispering voices, to gather the tribes and secret idioms from which I 
extract something I call my Self (Moi). I is an order-word. A 
schizophrenic said: "I heard voices say: he is conscious of life." In this 
sense, there is indeed a schizophrenic cogito, but it is a cogito that 
makes self-consciousness the incorporeal transformation of an order-
word, or a result of indirect discourse. My direct discourse is still the 
free indirect discourse running through me, coming from other worlds 
or other planets. That is why so many artists and writers have been 
tempted by the séance table. When we ask what faculty is specific to 
the order-word, we must indeed attribute to it some strange 
characteristics: a kind of instantaneousness in the emission, perception, 
and transmission of order-words; a wide variability, and a power of 
forgetting permitting one to feel absolved of the order-words one has 
followed and then abandoned in order to welcome others; a properly 
ideal or ghostly capacity for the apprehension of incorporeal 
transformations; an aptitude for grasping language as an immense 
indirect discourse.' The faculty of the cuer and the cued, of the song that 
always holds a tune within a tune in a relation of redundancy; a faculty 
that is in truth mediumistic, glossolalic, or xenoglossic. (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004, p.93-94, emphasis added) 
 
 
My language is mediumistic. It isn’t mine, but rather speaks through me whilst also 
speaking of me. A nonsense, referring to itself in tongues. It belongs to the other. It’s 
alien-speak. A xeno-glossary. This otherness constitutes my conscious mind. This 









Haecceity 8: Another, different, middle 
 
 
In this haecceity I end without ending. I partly agree with Ben Highmore (2010, 
p.135) when he writes ‘A commitment to descriptive entanglement is hard to sustain 
for long and harder still to shape into academic conclusions’. I feel I could keep on 
entangling, and indeed I do, a little. But I agree that academic conclusions are hard to 
gather from threads which complexify. In this haecceity I discuss becoming an 
academic.  
 
Affectively becoming an academic 
 
I’m aware that peers will read this.  Perhaps even friends or family – though this is 
less likely. I hope that the PhD in some way contributes to conversations surrounding 
environmental education and post-qualitative modes of inquiry, but of course I’m 
scared that it won’t, that perhaps it’s all been said before; or worse, that it doesn’t 
even make any sense. What is this wanting to contribute? Is this the hope of an 
increase in my capacities to affect? If so, this increase seems to come with the 
converse of increasing my capacities to be affected. Being affected by new openings 
and opportunities, but also showing an underbelly, and chink in an armour. I wonder 
about Bill Scott’s (2017) blog post of April 2017, where he described the Call for 
Papers (CfP) for a Special Issue of Environmental Education Research that Jamie 
and I had published as ‘babble’. After quoting a large section of the CfP, Bill told his 
readers: ‘There's no question that this is babble, but is it more (ie, worse) than that?’. 
I’m still not sure what he meant by this. Nonetheless I found the affective shock of 
reading it on my computer screen quite debilitating. Bill Scott is a well-known and, 
to my knowledge, well respected academic of environmental education. At the least, 
he is well established. I’m an early career researcher who is trying to get their PhD. 
My heart rate picked up and my mind went into a fuzzy mess of questions. The first 
thought that came to me was, how can an educator call something that someone has 





wouldn’t someone like this be…nicer? If they disagreed, aren’t there more ethical, 
empathetic ways to go about expressing it? By contacting me privately for instance? 
Or writing a more nuanced blog inviting discussion? Does Bill have no inclination of 
the effects of his writing? Does Bill have a responsibility to mentor? My next 







August, 2016 in Cambridge. We’d just watched a keynote presentation by Professor 
Marcia McKenzie at the European Educational Research Association Network 30 
ESER (Environmental and Sustainability Education) PhD Student seminar at 
Homerton College. Marcia asked us to form small groups and answer some 
questions. Bill was in my small group and it was the first time I had talked to him. I 
don’t remember the details, but I think Marcia had asked us to consider why we were 
doing what we were doing, i.e. why environmental education? I was as honest as I 
felt I could be and, without talking about ideas of lines of desire or affect, I tried to 
explain that, whilst I was driven by empathy to reduce the environmental and social 
suffering in the world, I was also a product of a society that wanted these things, and 
that, as much as this, I want a career; to be secure and stable for myself and my 
family yet to come. I think I tried to explain that this wasn’t a calculated decision and 
that, in fact, it was almost out of my hands; it was bodily, or rather it ran through my 
body; that capitalism is a strong mode of my being, no matter how much I don’t like 
that fact. My being there, doing ‘environmental education’, was just as much the 
habits of capitalism manifesting in the particular event of the me-career nexus as it 
might be any other nobler intention that ‘I’ might have. I distinctly recall Bill 
mentioning ‘wanting a career’ back to me at some point in our conversation. I recall 






Affect happens in encounter. Bodies do not interact, they intra-act. Intra-action is 
always situated and local and co-constitutive of bodies. 
 
…ethics emerges as situated responsibility, becoming and solidarity. It 
is local and specific to material phenomena—demonstrating that ethical 
being involves (allowing) the proliferation of being. Following Spinoza, 
ethics becomes something that is not only relational, but recognizable 
in its ability to enhance the powers of life and the entities in an 
assemblage (Bazzul, 2018, p.76) 
 
Now, reading Bill Scott’s work with Andrew Stables from a decade and a half 
before, I wonder at Bill’s choice of word, ‘babble’, in describing the CfP. Did he not, 
at least once, share these inclinations when, with Stables, he wrote: 
 
 
To understand the environmental crises, and to make sense of 
environmental education, we need a post-humanism, or at least a new, 
modified or extended humanism for a postmodern or new modern age 
in which the continued health of non-human nature is no longer 
something we can take for granted. (Stables and Scott, 2001, p.273) 
 
 
I wonder what differences Bill sees between this and the call that Jamie and I put out, 
in which we said that new materialists argue:  
 
 
that contemporary environmental, economic, geopolitical, and 
technological developments require novel articulations of nature, 
agency, and social and political relationships, and that means of inquiry 
that privilege consciousness and subjectivity are not sufficient for the 
task. (Clarke and Mcphie, 2017, n.p.) 
 
 
Perhaps he thinks we’ve gone too far? Or perhaps he is not happy with our language. 
Stables and Scott (2001) go on to encourage critical thinking and application of post-
structuralism to environmental education theorising. And I feel that those authors, 
writing in 2001, would be encouraged by recent, further work on post-humanism and 





authored the ‘babble’ post doesn’t appear to have been. My feeling is that Bill’s label 
of ‘babble’ indicates that he sees either the words we use, or their ordering, as in 
some way opaque. Helena Pedersen (2010, p.244), reading this same article, notes 
how: 
 
A posthumanist environmental education would emphasise the role of 
cultural studies in the understanding of science and involve a critical 
engagement with humanist modernity at all curricular levels, including 
the tacit assumptions underpinning environmental education 
programmes and the notion of sustainable development itself. Still, 
Stables and Scott’s (2001) vision of posthumanist environmental 
education curricula remains rooted in humanist regimes:  
A post-humanist, as well as a postmodernist, critique is 
called for; at the very least, a retrospective on the aims 
and means of modernity; at its most ambitious, a 
reworking of humanist assumptions with a view to greater 
valorisation of the non-human, though this will inevitably 
emanate from and respond to human concerns: for 
example, increasingly recognising non-human life as 
necessary and not just as desirable and self-renewing 
resource. (pp. 277 278)  
In the above analysis of a posthumanist environmental education, there 
is little space for the various forms of multispecies agencies, identities, 
and cross-formations of lifeworlds increasingly highlighted by cultural 
studies (including animal studies). The ‘human’ is still conceived as the 
rights-granting, voice-giving, and value- ascribing uncontested 
authority, and the use value of a posthumanist curriculum is modestly 
expressed as a ‘greater care for ecology and the environment’ (Stables 
& Scott, 2001, p. 276) 
 
Not wanting to resist the pull of the potential pun I can see how all of the quotes 
above ‘babble’. The ideas in them seem to have been rising through the bedrock of 
thought to the surface for years in environmental education, changing in terms of 
terminology and nuance, but still questioning the fundamentals upon which 
prevailing thought about ourselves rests. The analogy is as obvious to see as it is 







How to respond when a major figure in the field accuses me (along 
with innumerable others) of harbouring faulty assumptions, and 
zealously urges others to ‘avoid embracing’ my effort to contribute to 
(environmental) education theory? (Greenwood, 2008, p.336) 
 
What is this sweeping critique that David Greenwood, Jamie and I experienced? 
Different conversations, different topics, different intensity, even, but still a form of 
critique far removed from Latour’s (2004) call ‘towards the gathering’.37 Far 
removed from an immanent critique (MacLure, 2015). How can this be in education? 
In environmental education? Could there be two words that should evoke more care? 
And what is the ‘or worse’ of the blog posts title? After quoting our call for papers, 
Bill writes:  
 
 
There's no question that this is babble, but is it more (ie, worse) than 
that?  The "the taking up of new materialisms is not merely a retreat 
into obscure philosophy" point suggests that the editors understand the 
problems of communicating these ideas, even if they can do nothing 
about it. (Scott, 2017). 
 
 
An ethics I work with immanently here is the ethics of academia, layered atop the 
ethics of environmental care (are they not the same?). Together they form the ethics 
of environmental scholarship. Conceiving of these ethics immanently I seek to auto-
affect. To go beyond the limiting affects of reading Bill’s critique of the call for 
papers, the bodily affects I felt that stopped me in my tracks (and still raise my heart 
rate when I visit his blog to copy the quote), and to instead develop active affects. 
Rather than holding on to the dejection, this immanent ethics leads me to question 
how we write about each other in environmental scholarship; others as others, human 
                                                 
37 I’m not intending to draw a comparison between David Greenwood’s work, or his 
achievements, and my own. It is the form of critique at work that I critique (whilst 
recognising the irony involved here!). Massumi’s (2015, p.14-15) point bears repeating: 
traditional critique is a ‘sadistic enterprise that separates something out, attributes set 
characteristics to it, then applies a final judgement to it – objectifies it, in a moralizing kind 
of way’. I draw on Greenwood to echo my situation, and the ‘how do I respond’ question he 






and non-human. How do I create the haecceity of the me-us-event (the borderless 
body beyond, but sometimes closer than what might traditionally be called my body) 
with new capacities, in the event of encounter with Bill’s blog post? How do I extend 
what a body can do, how do I move further to the limit?  
 
Perhaps one way I am extending my capacities to affect is through the internet. In the 
issuing of the Call itself, my reaction to Bill’s blog, the process of editing a Special 
Issue and, specifically, the online nature of these events. Drawing from Haraway’s 
(1985) Cyborg Manifesto, which disputes the solid distinction between 
human/animal/technical, and indeed Deleuze and Guattari themselves in their 
imagining of an inorganic life, it is quite possible to conceive a body as extended 
through the printing process, telephones and, more recently, the internet. I think, ‘no, 
this is all outdoors and the environment, even the online world’. New types of 
environing. In his critique of dominant ‘first wave’ ecocritical pedagogy, Garrard 
notes (2010, p.242): 
 
 
From the perspective of place‐based ecocritical pedagogy, the online 
environmentalism of a Facebook group lacks the moral seriousness and 
emotional traction of lococentric commitments. The truth is, though, 
that at present we simply do not know what works. 
 
 
I’ve written elsewhere about problematising the indoor/outdoor binary, with Deleuze 
(Clarke and Mcphie, 2014). And besides, I don’t think I can talk about the 
environment as a thing over there which needs to be educated for. I am the lines 
environing. I have to talk about the ways I am becoming now and the things I can do 
about that. The ways I can put concepts to work. 
 
The capacity for bodies to affect and be affected has increased in the digital era in a 
way that Deleuze perhaps foresaw. Smith (2012) reminds me that an immanent ethics 
is always about the present and thus will always be different and unprescribable. He 





required for new modes of existence to come into being in different ways at different 
times. For Deleuze, it is often the minor, which he opposes to the molar, which is the 
site for the creation of new modes of existence or becomings. The molecular, or lines 
of segmentation, make up bodies, along with other lines; minor lines, and lines of 
flight (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002). Rigid lines of segmentarity mark bodies by, for 
instance, the demarcations between being of your family, of your school, of your job, 




These details of our existence, which are essentially historical, although 
they may sometimes take a form biologists think belongs to their 
domain (i.e., gender, race, body shape), segment us in different ways, 
slicing and dicing us this way and that so that we adhere to the 
conventions and demands of the socius itself. (Buchanan, 2007, n.p) 
 
 
Buchanan (2007) suggests that, rather than the obvious attraction to consider the 
internet straightforwardly as an extended body, or as the realisation of a body 
without organs, we can instead think of its abilities to limit and extend affective 
capacities through the extent it promotes molar lines of segmentation or minor lines 
of becoming. For Foucault, limitations are put on a body’s capacity through societies 
of discipline and their modes of enclosure such as the institutions of family, school, 
prison, the military, etc. For Deleuze, societies of discipline are in decline. What is 
needed is an immanent ethics in response to the emergence of societies of control 
operating in a molar fashion (Deleuze, 1992; Smith, 2012). In this way the internet 
becomes a site where lines of segmentarity are present in our online footprint in the 
form of information held about us in the digital sphere, but the internet is also a site 
of resistance to such segmentation. The internet is morally neutral, though, like the 
rest of the world, it is both a space of capture and resistance; it is a site of ethics. 
 
Other online lines come to mind, perhaps more relevant to my auto-affective 
attempts at becoming an academic. Molar lines of segmentarity exist in, for instance, 





profiles; in researcher scores on commercial sites such as Academia or Researchgate; 
or when you encounter paywalls when accessing journal articles. For instance, the h-
index is a ‘bibliometric’ which has been proposed to be ‘a representative measure of 
individual scientific achievement’ (Hirsch, 2007, p.19193). This is so much the case 
that Hirsch (2007) suggests that the number can be used as a shortcut to decide the 
value of an author, recommending that ‘the h-index is a useful indicator of scientific 
quality that can be profitably used (together with other criteria) to assist in academic 
appointment processes and to allocate research resources’ (Hirsch, 2007, p.19198). 
My h-index is currently 3. That’s my worth. In the life sciences scores can run into 
the 100s. In general, the ranking of academics in terms of a quantifiable ‘impact’ 
produces material consequences in terms of their career prospects and access to 
funding. The achievement of funding is another barrier to an academic career. Often, 
advertisements for academic posts will require that applicants have already been 
awarded external funding as an ‘essential’ on their criteria. Yet, in my experience, 
there is little information or opportunity to do this. The world is diced up between 
those who have gained external funding, and those who have not. In this way the 
ubiquity of academic work in certain areas or on certain problems is decided by the 
funder, rather than the inquiring academics themselves. For instance, Jamie, Marcia, 
Monique Blom (a multidisciplinary artist based in Alberta) and I applied for funding 
to carry out a participatory action research project on walking in British Columbia in 
2017, linked to the World Environmental Education Congress. The funding body 
decided none of the applications they received were worth funding, despite the fact 
that our application strongly contoured their requirements. In a similar manner, the 
way in which academics are assessed by their ability to publish in academic journals 
with a high impact factor is another line of segmentarity that exists in the online 
sphere. Indeed, the editor-in-chief of Nature has noted how he is ‘concerned by the 
tendency within academic administrations to focus on a journal’s impact factor when 
judging the worth of scientific contributions by researchers, affecting promotions, 
recruitment and, in some countries, financial bonuses for each paper’ (Campbell, 






Deleuze (1992) notes how in the past, societies of discipline where made up of two 
poles: the individual, or signature, and the number which indicated the individuals 
position within the mass. Societies of control, by comparison, focus instead on a 
code, or password: 
 
 
in the societies of control…what is important is no longer either a 
signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the 
other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as 
much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). 
The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to 
information, or reject it. (Deleuze, 1992, p.5) 
 
 
The paywall that surrounds academic research means that many academic works that 
may be useful to the public are locked behind an expensive barrier (Cordova & 
Sherman, 2017). In societies of control, your ‘dividual’ self is permitted or declined 
access. Deleuze (1992) describes how ‘Guattari has imagined a city where one would 
be able to leave one's apartment, one's street, one's neighbourhood, thanks to one's 
(dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily 
be rejected on a given day or between certain hours’ (p.7). These systems are 
becoming more ubiquitous. Indeed, I used such a card to get into work today. To 
access research studies, philosophy and theory you will need the right password, or 
the system will have to recognise you. Looking up a paper just a moment ago, I 
entered my password into Shibboleth, the gateway allowing entry to some academic 
institutions, but not others. The term shibboleth originates from the Bible. When 
escaping a failed attack on Gilead, the Ephraimites crossed the fords of the River 
Jordan. The residents of Gilead were able to stop them at the crossings, asking 
everyone who passed to say ‘shibboleth’. The Ephraimites were not able to 
pronounce this word and so their identity was revealed.  ‘Forty and two thousand’ 
Ephraimites were killed. In this world I am currently privileged. I have the password 
to most areas. There are few places to which I do not have access in terms of 






And there are other passwords at work in academia. Honan and Bright (2016) 
suggest that the terminology of qualitative research has become what Deleuze and 
Guattari would call ‘overcoded’. Here the very terminology, in this case of academia, 
becomes the password that allows access. 
These passwords are used to create the identity papers to pass through 
into academia (Spivak, 1996); they are the shibboleths – words like 
semi-structured interviews, participant, interviewer, interview schedule, 
informed consent, observations, anonymity, confidentiality, 
transcription, coding categories – “overcoded” signifiers that produce a 
“uniformity of enunciation, unification of the substance of expression, 
and control over statements in a regime of circularity” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 135) that are used in the text to permit recognition 
and entry into this new world. (Honan and Bright, 2016, p.726) 
 
I can imagine a reader finding this point ironic. The same can be said about 
Deleuzian terminology in academia; that it has become a ‘regime of circularity’. I 
wonder about the writing I’m doing. Is it for the reader to learn something, or to help 
me understand something? When I write ‘haecceity’, some readers might feel a 
closing down of access, while I feel an opening up of possibilities. Like any 
language, it has to be learned. I return to Kathryn Strom, who I mentioned in 
Haecceity 1 for noting that it doesn’t make sense to say you are ‘Deleuzian’: 
 
Reflecting on my own nonlinear journey from a teacher who had no use 
for theory or philosophy, to one whose career (at least in part) hinges on 
it, I believe now that both the inaccessibility of language and the 
discourses surrounding these bodies of thought probably played a part 
in my initial resistance to engaging with them. After all, I was a 
teacher, not a scholar, philosopher, or any other of the particular 
categories who were allowed to theorize. In perpetuating those 
discourses for myself, I closed myself off to different, wonderful, 










I’m not so sure why I’m writing about this. It just happened. I’m interested in the 
way my subjectification is becoming online. The futurity of myself as a self. As a 
self differently. Who is the human subject? We’re not replicated by a mold. Each in 
our becoming is an instance like no other, in different ways becoming animal, 
becoming technical, becoming molecular (minor, resistant, political, guerrilla, 
nomad, deterritorialized, revolutionary, smooth), and becoming molar (established, 
segmented, sedimented and stratified, striated). Each a thisness. Perhaps an ethical 
self walks attentively through this process. Feeling when to put down roots and find a 
territory, and when you should find a gap between the molar structures - a space to 
send out a line of potential, follow the lines of desire whose tenor seems fruitful. 
Perhaps I’m worried about becoming caught up in a perpetual battle to gain access, 
to improve my score, to up my impact and to gain funding. It sounds like a trap. 
These things seem to push at me like passive affects that limit. But if I gain access, 






Hold that thought. ‘What’? ‘Is’? No, this is becoming an academic. This attempt. It’s 
something you are forever attaining. Not a category which you can settle down and 






A job has just been advertised: ‘Lecturer in Outdoor Learning’. I read the job 
description and wonder if I fit? In scanning the advert I am reminded of an article 
written by Pete McDonald (2000) which I came across during my undergraduate 





lampooning of one of my lecturers at the time. I look up Pete’s article on the 
academicisation of outdoor leadership. It makes me laugh, with its intelligent 
dismissal of ‘sociologese’ and ‘educationese’. I wonder what Pete would make of 
this thesis? Some of it, perhaps, might speak to him. Though I doubt those bits would 
have been the ‘theory’. No matter how practical it is, theory has to be learned, like 
any practice.  I think Pete and I would get on. I feel I could convince him that this, 
this thesis, for me, is a practical and useful endeavour. Much like an adventure up a 
mountain or on a river, adventures in thought can be powerful learning experiences. I 
am not concerned, at this stage, at the inaccessibility of the work I have done. As I 
advanced earlier, I hope readers take from it what they like.  
 
I look at the advert again. I know I will apply. I have to. I wonder if, with this thesis, 
I have troubled the very job I’d be applying for. How would I even fit in? Besides, 
others will apply for this job, of course. Others with more papers, more experience, 
higher h-index scores, and funding, though I don’t think these are the things that this 
particular teaching team are really interested in, there may be others involved in the 
process who are. These things I want to resist. The controllingness of having to jump 
through these hoops. Leaving the hoops in place for others to have to jump through 
as well. Helping construct the hoops. And where does this leave me anyway? 
‘Environmental education academic’ is pretty niche. Not many of those come up on 
job websites. ‘Environmental education academic critical of themselves as an 
individual human and the environment as a thing’ seems an impossibility. 
 
So what are the alternatives? How to resist molar academic forces? Deleuze notes 
that ‘the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose 
passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the introduction of 
viruses’ (1992, p.6). It’s not hard to visualise the state reducing the capacities of its 
citizens through jamming social media. And it is easy to find examples of activists 
pushing at the limits that the control society places on us. Brian Knappenberger tells 
the story of Aaron Schwartz in his 2014 documentary The Internet’s Own Boy. 
Schwartz endeavoured to create free access to academic information through pirating 





Schwartz was a research fellow at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) at 
the time. Upon discovery of his activities Schwartz was arrested on campus by MIT 
police and a U.S. Secret Service agent. Federal charges were brought carrying a 
maximum of 50 years in prison and a $1 million fine. A plea deal was offered to 
Schwartz in which, if he pled guilty, he would serve 6 months in a low security 
prison. Aaron Schwartz refused, and later committed suicide within a year of charges 
being brought. That same year he was posthumously inducted into the Internet Hall 
of Fame. 
 
It’s easy to think of Researchgate and Academia as pirating sites, set on free access 
to information and the sharing of academic scholarship, but these sites are for-profit, 
and who knows what they do with the data on their users? For my own part, I know I 
use other means to reach the corners of the academic internet still off limits to me 
despite my official pass. Sci Hub was created by Alexandra Elbakyan in 2011 when 
she was a 22 year old graduate student in Kazakhstan. I think Deleuze (1992) would 
agree that Sci Hub is an active piece of resistance to the corporate society of control 
he describes. In the six months between September 2015 and February 2016, the 
website, which could be described as a kind of Pirate Bay for academic content, 
received 28 million download requests worldwide (Bohannon, 2016). Sci Hub’s 
motto is ‘to remove all barriers in the way of science’. The statistics on its use reveal 
the extent to which it is used in the world’s poorest countries. For instance, in Iran 
the number of download requests was 2,629,115, in India 1,946,052 and in China 
2,349,385. For comparison, in a 6-month period 2965 download requests were sent 
from Edinburgh; 1,268,158 were sent from Tehran. But it is not just the levelling 
nature of Sci Hub that makes me think of Deleuze; it is also the micropolitics it 
enables. Whilst Bohannon (2016, p.511) notes that data on Sci Hub usage ‘generally 
looks like a map of scientific productivity, but with some of the richer and poorer 
science-focused nations flipped’, it is also interesting to look into the data, to see 
what stories are being told: 
 
 
Someone in Nuuk, Greenland, is reading a paper about how best to 





in Libya, even as a civil war rages there. Someone in Benghazi is 
investigating a method for transmitting data between computers across 
an air gap. Far to the south in the oil-rich desert, someone near the town 
of Sabh ̄a is delving into fluid dynamics. (Bohannon, 2016, p.511) 
 
 
Searching the interactive map myself, I find that the most downloaded paper in the 
central region of Uganda is titled Insecticide-Treated Plastic Sheeting for Emergency 
Malaria Prevention and Shelter among Displaced Populations. Of four papers 
downloaded in Bujumbura, Burundi, in the 6-month period, the most popular is a 
synopsis of the educational theories of Paulo Friere. On the highly fishing-dependent 
Faroe Islands, someone has accessed the article Experience Of Unemployment For 
Fishery Workers In Newfoundland. Where do these stories of resistance leave me? 
Sci Hub is a freeing rhizome of connections and lines of flight. It facilitates an 
increase in the capacities of bodies to affect and be affected. I would be very happy 
for my work to be accessed via Sci Hub, should anyone ever find it useful. 
 
Deleuze’s work is about finding what works for you. It’s not about getting it all 
(Strom, 2018). In my role as becoming editor of a Special Issue I am aware of the 
society of control in which I operate and the manner in which I may be able to 
actualise minor politics and lines of flight. I consider the history of Environmental 
Education Research and remember a colleague telling me that From Places to Paths 
(Clarke and Mcphie, 2016) (which used a Deleuzian rhizomatic methodology) 
wouldn’t have got in to the journal in the past. I wonder about the types of 
scholarship that have been ‘allowed’ in the past, and the types of scholarship that I 
might help facilitate now. For instance, Gough (2012) notes the negative potentials 
of double-blind peer reviewing as a form of ‘policing’ of knowledge. Through the 
internet, a new type of nature is being created (Mcphie and Clarke, in press). My 
capacities to affect and be affected are increasing constantly. I am in contact with 29 
contributors for the Special Issue from around the world. I have only met 5 of these 










I am thinking of submitting some of what I have written in this thesis to a special 
issue of a/b: Auto/Biography Studies entitled Life writing in the Anthropocene. When 
I saw the Call for Papers I immediately wondered if this is what I had been 
attempting all along: an immanent life writing in the Anthropocene. For me, ‘life 
writing in the Anthropocene’ signals the end of ‘eco-biography’, if eco-biography is 
to be understood as “a type of autobiographical text that enables nature or landscape 
writers to discover ‘a new self in nature’” (Perreten, cited in Pryor, 2017). This might 
sound odd because, as Pyror notes, ‘ecobiography remains a largely unexplored form 
of autobiographical text.’. It has hardly gotten off the ground. And yet, in the 
Anthropocene, there is no Nature in which the self might become new. As I have 
mentioned, according to those who advocate the term the Anthropocene marks the 
point at which humanity has overcome the great forces of Nature. However, there is 
a further reason why ecobiography, and in fact the Anthropocene itself, can have the 
‘sense’ with which we think them upturned; their definitions hold within them a 
persistent assumption of the Western world; that there exists, or did once exist, a 
thing called Nature. According to Farr and Snyder (1996), ecobiography constitutes: 
 
 
a life-story constructed according to a pattern divined internally through 
the Self’s interaction with the external environment, especially Nature, 
the multiple exchanges between which (re)present a kind of ecosystem 
of the Self. All the various voices of the Self, conscious or unconscious, 
plus the environment within which and against which they speak, 
comprise the dynamic network of that Self’s ecosystem. (Farr and 
Snyder, 1996, p.198, cited in Edlich, 2010) 
 
 
Yet the existence of this Self, and this Nature, seem hardly tenable. A critical life 
writing in the Anthropocene challenges both traditional and ‘new’ Nature writing to 
work past or trouble stable notions of selves and environments. 
 
It is to Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy and particularly the concept of 





in the (im)possibility of a critical (non)nature writing which, conversely, is also an 
activist (post)autoethnography. Perhaps the ‘non’ and ‘post’ are interchangeable, but 
I feel the ‘(im)’ is important for indicating that I feel this form of writing is may be 
something that we can only attempt, not necessarily something achievable. I stress 
the ‘critical’ and ‘activist’ here to highlight the ethical orientation of this writing, but 
ethics is not straightforward either, and this writing takes a particular interest in an 
unfolding, lively and lived ethics, which is how I think of immanent ethics. For 
instance, this may be contentious, but I don’t think this type of writing would take up 
ostensibly ‘environmental’ problems or locations as its focus, per se. At least, it 
could do this, but the classification of each category would be retroactive. One could 
write to reach the point at which the immanence of events is forwarded, rather than a 
spatially or temporally pregiven category, such as Nature or Self. Indeed, Deleuze 




Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To 
make ourselves unrecognizable in turn. To render imperceptible, not 
ourselves, but what makes us act, feel, and think. Also because it's nice 
to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows 
it's only a manner of speaking. To reach, not the point where one no 
longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance 
whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his 




To make imperceptible what makes these authors ‘act, feel, and think’ is to render 
imperceptible the assumptive ground which we think the names ‘Deleuze’ or 
‘Guattari’ rest upon. That is the human, as a stable and straightforward concept that 
we have a strong claim to knowledge over (through arborescent knowledge practices 
in traditional physiology, psychology or sociology, for instance), becomes troubled. 
The writing in this thesis at once succeeds and fails in attaining posthuman-
postnature ecobiography. This seems inevitable given that this way of seeing is 





Nature are also ‘habits’, then what is a life writing that reaches this point of 
understanding? The least we can say at this stage is that it will not forgo the I or 
Nature in its writing, but it must treat these things very differently to the 
ecobiography described above. It can no longer understand the Self as a transcendent 
category that is necessarily rationale, privileged, removed, reflective, ‘in here’, and 
subjective. Further it can no longer understand Nature as a transcendent category that 
is irrational, unprivileged, noble, balanced, ‘out there’, and objective.  To reach this 
point is to reach a realisation; a way of understanding reality that informs all else. I 
think of the process of attaining this way of thinking as an environmental education 
in its broadest sense, or as environing education. In this thesis my attempt has been 
to think with theory, to use juxtaposition and creative forms of writing to tell an 
educational story. It is an education not so much for ‘the environment’ as for 
intensifying life. What haunts accounts of Nature in environmental theory and 
research, including ecopedagogy, is a spectre of a transcendent environment to which 
an often implicit transcendent moral principle is applied. This is not necessarily a 
bad thing. An immanent ethics is not necessarily better at dealing with 
‘environmental’ problems. But importantly, this is because this way of seeing doesn’t 
see them as such. It is not oriented towards finding solutions to axiomatic problems, 
but rather to exploring the conditions that constitute problems and increasing 
affective capacities. Further, an immanent ethics locates itself on the threshold of 
occurring instances that are thrown up in life, and its orientation is to micro-aesthetic 
ruptures and resistance to homogenising and striating accounts, such as Self or 
Nature. And so, this orientation troubles various environmentalisms, as articulated by 
Mark Halsey (2007). Immanent ethics is not an instrumentally applicable ethics. It is 
not for something and it does not have an intention or destination, such as 
‘sustainability’. This may make it completely unsuited to many problems we face in 
macro environmental terms, however, the scale of a micropolitics of an immanent 
ethics also render possible radical changes and reorientations. To the problems that 
interest me, to exploring the depths of our operationalised concepts in environmental 
education and life writing, it is the ethics which is produced by my understanding of 
the world, by an immanent ontology, and it is the ethics that I am drawn to attempt, 





want to stress that it is not fiddling while Rome burns, or ‘babble’. It is a 
serious/playful attempt at exploring the ethics of problems, rather than arriving at 
solutions. It follows the spaces left by critiques of essentialism in the most apt 
manner possible for a thesis: through experiments in writing. It can seem a form of 
heresy. At the risk of extending the Nero analogy too far, an immanent ethics might 
be seen to question the burning. However, I think it looks for the pockets of life 
hiding under unstable concepts. There are plenty of others who are attempting the 
important work of arranging fire engines and diverting watercourses (too much 
Nero?). This ethics, however, will attempt tiny changes to the nature of Self and 
Nature and, in turn, inquiry, to see what happens. Environing education involves a 
necessary double movement across planes, producing an inquiry into (non)concern 
for the (non)environment. 
 
Nardizzi’s (2017) image of ‘environing’, as a harrowing and affective state ‘in which 
death and otherworldly agents press upon – and sometimes into – the human figure’, 
speaks to what might erroneously be thought of as the ‘flip side’ of environing, but is 
rather a constitutive element, or alternative perspective of the same: the posthuman. 
Huff (2017, p.279) notes that posthumanism challenges most aspects of 
autobiographical and, I think, autoethnographic practice —‘the autonomous self, the 
pact between author and reader, the foregrounding of the human—in favor of 
focusing on the relational, the material, and the umwelt to suggest a radical 
reconceptualising and reconstruction of life narrative, much less life writing’. This is 
a fundamental shift, away from writing with its human audience, and instead towards 
worldly interaction, or intra-action, as Karen Barad (2007) suggests. Posthuman life 
writing would foreground practice, and writing (as well a concept creation), as a 
form of practice, could only ever constitute a useful space for its intensification 
rather than tell its full story. It would focus on participation in forms of expression 
that exceed reliance on delineated sets. And so, I will not try to claim that what I 
have produced is a complete form of posthuman autoethnography, for that can only 






Further to these points, the thesis is an example of what an environing education has 
taught.  In terms of becoming an academic, it is highly sensitive to the hidden or null 
curriculum of methodology itself, as a potentially unexamined enactor and reinforcer 
of ways of being. That is to say, enacting research methods simultaneously enacts 
environmental educations (to whatever ends). This inquiry attempts to be 
immanently ethical, in that it is curious about the research process, is situated and 
relational, to my/a life, and in that it tries to avoid attributing effects to pregiven, 
habitual, or dominant concepts of categories, representation or transcendence - for 
instance the human Self and Nature. This being so, the thesis process has produced in 
me a lingering doubt about my capacities to describe or prescribe an instrumental 
pedagogy for the environment. This is a significant shift from where I started the 
PhD process. Rather, now, I see potential in autoaffective practices: practices of 
counter-actualisation whereby I can enhance my capacities to affect and be affected 
through creating/playing with concepts. This is being practised through learning to 
write aesthetically, tentatively, collaboratively, and creatively, as a form of ethical 
inquiry within the PhD process. 
 
As I sit here in a small village in Kent on the 27th of July 2018, as the temperature 
reaches into the mid 30s around the country, I hope that I am able to take up the 
opportunities for this form of ethics as they arise in coming events, including in 
writing, and with students. To not be unworthy of what happens in the constitution of 






Jamie’s question: ‘How can we make the familiar unfamiliar with our students?’. I 
wonder about this. About the ‘unfamiliar’ of it. About me, and how I can become 
unfamiliar to myself in a process of learning how to educate further. How to counter-
actualise. I am writing in a café, again. It’s the café my Deleuze reading group 





and Fen at Waverley Station to board a train to London. His first trip away without 
me. It being early I decided to walk through Edinburgh and ended up here. 
‘Checkpoint’. The place feels unfamiliar, on the wrong day, and without the right 
people. I’ve sat at the window, away from our usual booth at the back. I just had 
something I’ve never had before. It’s called a Long Black. It’s a style of coffee. It 
was unfamiliar. But this doesn’t seem enough. Or at least, it doesn’t seem right. It 
doesn’t seem like the type of unfamiliarity that I am getting at with affectively 
becoming alien. Haraway’s cyborg is useful for thinking about the ways that I affect 
other bodies. Or how my body becomes inorganic. An alien cyborg. The borg. My 
body is spread across the internet. But is also hurtling south, to London. I think of 
Gemma, on the train, and Fen with her. I think of how they increase my capacities to 
be affected. How, thinking with Fen and his mum, I encounter the world as bright 
and full. I’m with her. I was married to Gemma last summer and in our vows we 
asked our celebrant to acknowledge this understanding. After recounting how 
Gemma and I had met to our gathered family and friends, our celebrant read: 
 
So that is how we come to be here today, but I want to say something 
about those two little starting words “met online” 
 
World wide web.....an amazing bit of human-techno-ecology, but we 
understand it is meant metaphorically – it’s about knotting, and it’s 
about a loose open-weave connection which is incredibly strong: fragile 
filaments making places and spaces, tied at the nodes, able to withstand 
fierce winds, even sharp tugs.  Part of the world when it is built by a 
spider, and glistening with sparkling drops of dew; part of the world 
when by the fireside the lace-maker builds her filigree mantle; part of 
the solid world when the suspension bridge gracefully joins two sides 
of a gorge; and part of the world when it spans cyberspace and 
transports us across the globe.  Dave, and that tiny bit of evolution, the 
spider, and Gemma, in that human built environment, connecting and 
creating with bricks and mortar, making meeting places like homes and 
dance halls and museums.  Consider how romantic that makes the 
internet, and how fitting a metaphor for what links these two people in a 
loving strong and sparkling relationship. 
 
 
My body is not ever my own. It is affective. It affects. Writing – learning how to 





educational. Academic work is not soloed or siloed. Practicing immanence is 
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